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ethical perspective the health and performance evaluations he will likely face
throughout his career. Some of these evaluations are commonplace and familiar, while
others are more futuristic—and potentially of unproven value. How much
information about themselves should aspiring and current professional players be
expected to provide in the employment context? What are the current legal standards
for employers collecting and acting on an individual’s health- and performancerelated information? Drawing on disability law, privacy law, and the law governing
genetic testing, this Article seeks to answer those questions, as well as to provide
recommendations to better protect the health and privacy of professional football players.
The upshot of our analysis is that it appears that some of the existing evaluations
of players, both at the NFL Scouting Combine (Combine) and once drafted and
playing for a club, seem to violate existing federal employment discrimination laws.
Specifically, (1) the medical examinations at the Combine potentially violate the
Americans with Disabilities Act’s (ADA) prohibitions on pre-employment medical
exams; (2) post-offer medical examinations that are made public potentially violate
the ADA’s confidentiality provisions; (3) post-offer medical examinations that reveal
a disability and result in discrimination—e.g., the rescission of a contract offer—
potentially violate the ADA provided the player can still perform the essential job
functions; (4) Combine medical examinations that include a request for a player’s family
medical history potentially violate the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act
(GINA); and (5) the preseason physical’s requirement that a player disclose his family
medical history potentially violates GINA.
(NFLPA) and is supported by funds set aside for research by the National Football League (NFL)–
NFLPA collective bargaining agreement. Id. The content is solely the responsibility of the authors and
does not necessarily represent the official views of the NFLPA or Harvard University. For more
information on the background of the Football Players Health Study, see generally CHRISTOPHER
R. DEUBERT, I. GLENN COHEN & HOLLY FERNANDEZ LYNCH, PETRIE–FLOM CTR. FOR HEALTH
LAW POLICY, BIOTECHNOLOGY, AND BIOETHICS, PROTECTING AND PROMOTING THE HEALTH OF
NFL PLAYERS: LEGAL AND ETHICAL ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2016). Of particular note,
from August 2010 to May 2014, Deubert was an associate at the law firm of Peter R. Ginsberg Law, LLC,
formerly known as Ginsberg & Burgos, PLLC. During the course of his practice at that firm, Deubert was
involved in several legal matters in which the NFL was an opposing party, including Williams v. The
National Football League, discussed in note 153. Additionally, Cohen has consulted in the drug and medical
device industry in the past. While, to the best of his knowledge, no company he has worked with is involved
with any of the products discussed in this Article, he is aware of one company he has consulted for which has
partnered with one of the companies mentioned in this Article on products unrelated to this Article.
The NFLPA reviewed this Article prior to its publication, but did not have the right to control
the content and in fact did not provide any comments. The NFL declined our invitation to review
this Article. Finally, National Football Scouting, Inc., the entity that operates the NFL Scouting
Combine, did not officially respond to our invitation to review this Article. When we offered it the
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We believe all employers—including the NFL and its clubs—should comply fully
with the current law. To that end, our recommendations center around four “C”s:
compliance, clarity, circumvention, and changes to existing statutory schemes as
applied to the NFL (and perhaps other professional sports).
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INTRODUCTION
Meet James. He is a twenty-two-year-old male who stands at 6’1’’ and
weighs approximately 203 pounds.1 James has had a very successful college
career as a wide receiver in the Pac-12 and now hopes to join the
approximately 2200 men who play professionally for the National Football

1 James, a composite of many existing players, is an “average” National Football League (NFL) player.
On any given NFL club, the vast majority of the players are in their twenties while approximately twenty
percent are in their thirties. CHRISTOPHER R. DEUBERT, I. GLENN COHEN & HOLLY FERNANDEZ
LYNCH, PETRIE–FLOM CTR. FOR HEALTH LAW POLICY, BIOTECHNOLOGY, AND BIOETHICS,
PROTECTING AND PROMOTING THE HEALTH OF NFL PLAYERS: LEGAL AND ETHICAL ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 60 (2016). Online Appendix A contains a list of heights and weights by position.
Jessica L. Roberts, I. Glenn Cohen, Christopher R. Deubert & Holly Fernandez Lynch, Evaluating NFL
Player Health and Performance: Legal and Ethical Issues: Online app. A (2017), https://www.pennlawre
view.com/print/165-U-Pa-L-Rev-Appendix-A.pdf.
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League (NFL) each regular season.2 But before he can realize his dream, James
must face a series of health- and performance-based evaluations, designed to test
whether he can withstand the rigors of playing professional football. Should
James succeed as a professional athlete, any number of individuals will have a
great interest in his health and fitness, from those who run the NFL clubs to the
eighty-five million fans that will turn on their televisions every week to watch
him play.3 But how much information about his health and his abilities should
James be willing to share and, perhaps more importantly, with whom?
Before and during his NFL career, James will be asked to submit to any
number of evaluations. Should James agree to an electrocardiogram (EKG)
to assess the electrical activity of his heart4 and to put him (and his club) on
notice if he is at risk of cardiac arrest as the result of overexertion? What
about a running drill that, while not directly assessing the activity of James’s
heart, will nonetheless demonstrate his cardiovascular capacity? What if an
NFL club asked James to swallow a pill that would send wireless signals
through his body to sensors that translate those signals into data about James’s
heart rate, respiration, and skin temperature to share with an athletic trainer?
How about a genetic test that assesses cardiac risk? Some of these examples
may sound like science fiction but such technologies are currently being
deployed by NFL clubs, and trends in this direction are only likely to
increase. What about the decidedly low-tech method of just asking James
about the history of cardiovascular disease in his family? Should James submit
to all of these evaluations? Some of them? None of them? And if he refuses,
what are his legal rights?
No one would presumably ever tolerate this degree of invasive inquiry into his
or her health status and physical ability when applying for a standard office job. But
those jobs do not require full-body collisions with other hulking athletes on a
weekly basis. Nor do they promise the potential of multimillion dollar salaries. To
be sure, prospective and current NFL players are physically exceptional human
beings. Just compare James’s physique to the average American male between the
ages of twenty and twenty-nine, who is 5’9” and weighs 183.9 pounds.5 Because of
their extraordinary physiques and abilities, much of what we know about health
within the “normal” population may not translate to NFL athletes. Further, the

2 This figure is derived from official NFL–NFLPA playtime statistics on file with the authors.
3 MARK FAINARU-WADA & STEVE FAINARU, LEAGUE OF DENIAL: THE NFL, CONCUSSIONS,
AND THE BATTLE FOR TRUTH 4-5 (2013).
4 Electrocardiogram, WEBMD, http://www.webmd.com/heart-disease/electrocardiogram#1 [https://

perma.cc/HAU6-8624].
5 CHERYL D. FRYAR & CYNTHIA L. OGDEN, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
SER. 11, NO. 252, ANTHROPOMETRIC REFERENCE DATA FOR CHILDREN & ADULTS: UNITED
STATES, 2007–2010, at 10 tbl.6, 16 tbl.12 (2012).
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average person does not subject himself to the kinds of physical challenges regularly
encountered by NFL players.
NFL football is big business. The NFL began play in 19206 and since that
time has been the premier professional football league in the world and one of
the most lucrative of all the sports leagues. The NFL generates about $12 billion
in revenue annually7 and is the most popular sport in America by a variety of
measures.8 Thirty-five percent of Americans consider NFL football their favorite
sport, a number that continues to increase.9 On average, approximately 68,000
people attend every NFL game.10 Moreover, NFL games are the most watched
television programming. More than twenty million people watch the primetime
broadcasts, nearly triple the ratings of the major television networks.11 In 2015,
Forbes estimated the average NFL club to be worth $1.97 billion.12 The average
salary of an NFL player is approximately $2 million per year13 but varies widely
based on skill and experience. The National Football League Players Association
(NFLPA) estimates that the average player’s career is about three and a half years
long, while the NFL asserts that it is nearly six years.14 All of these features are
dramatically different as compared to the employment context of the average
office worker, or even to those in more physically demanding jobs.
6 NFL Founded in Canton, PRO FOOTBALL HALL FAME, http://www.profootballhof.com/
news/nfl-founded-in-canton/ [https://perma.cc/L4MB-U74H].
7 See Daniel Kaplan, NFL Projecting Revenue Increase of $1B Over 2014, STREET & SMITH’S
SPORTSBUSINESS J. (Mar. 9, 2015), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2015/03/09/
Leagues-and-Governing-Bodies/NFL-revenue.aspx [https://perma.cc/BW76-MUAJ] (stating that
the NFL’s revenue in 2015 was over $12 billion).
8 See, e.g., Regina Corso, As American As Mom, Apple Pie, and Football?, HARRIS POLL (Jan. 16,
2014), http://www.theharrispoll.com/sports/As_American_as_Mom__Apple_Pie_and_Football__.h
tml [http://perma.cc/4VAW-NQME] (explaining that 35% of Americans say that football is their
favorite sport while just 14% prefer baseball, the second most popular sport).
9 Id.
10 NFL Sees Small Regular-Season Attendance Decline; Titans, Rams Down Sharply at Home,
STREET & SMITH’S SPORTSBUSINESS DAILY (Jan. 5, 2016), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/
Daily/Issues/2016/01/05/Research-and-Ratings/NFL-gate.aspx [https://perma.cc/FYT3-PXG4].
11 Press Release, TV by the Numbers, NFL 2013 TV Recap: 205 Million Fans Tuned In; 34 of
35 Most Watched Shows This Fall (Jan. 8, 2014), http://tvbythenumbers.zap2it.com/2014/01/08/nfl2013-tv-recap-205-million-fans-tuned-in-34-of-35-most-watched-shows-this-fall/227726/ [https://perma.cc
/5XAH-3FET].
12 Mike Ozanian, The Most Valuable Teams in the NFL, FORBES (Sept. 14, 2015, 9:51 AM), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/mikeozanian/2015/09/14/the-most-valuable-teams-in-the-nfl [http://perma.cc/9F9F-X
VXH].
13 Jim Baumbach, Life After Football, NEWSDAY (Jan. 22, 2015), http://projects.newsday.com
/football/life-football/ [https://perma.cc/VY97-EYMJ].
14 See What Is Average NFL Player’s Career Length? Longer than You Might Think, Commissioner
Goodell Says, NFL COMM. (Apr. 18, 2011), http://nfllabor.wordpress.com/2011/04/18/what-is-aver
age-nfl-player%E2%80%99s-career-length-longer-than-you-might-think-commissioner-goodellsays [http://perma.cc/YG3W-D3S8] (explaining that NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell attributes
the difference in the NFL’s estimates to the fact that other estimates include every player who ever signed an
NFL contract while the NFL only includes players who made an NFL regular season roster).
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Given the revenue and prestige of the sport, and the clear consumer
interest, the NFL and its clubs have strong incentives to scout, draft, and
retain the highest performing players. As a result, they want to obtain as much
information as they can about a player’s current health, athletic abilities, and
risks of future injury or disease to facilitate as informed a decision as possible.
Moreover, with that kind of fame and money on the line, prospective and
current NFL players face substantial pressure to do what they need to do to
play professional football, which inevitably includes submitting to numerous
health and performance evaluations, even if they would prefer to avoid them,
all things being equal.
At present, the NFL and the clubs already collect a significant amount of
information about aspiring and current players through medical exams (including
physicals) and athletic drills and training. While this existing data is important, it
represents only the tip of the iceberg regarding the information NFL clubs would
like to have in making decisions related to hiring, firing, trading, and playing.
Not surprisingly then, companies are creating all kinds of new technologies
designed to assess health and physical performance.15 The ingestible pill
described above is not science fiction but is based on an actual FDA-approved
innovation.16 Companies are also designing ever-shrinking wearable technologies
to measure speed, agility, and strength,17 as well as genetic tests,18 which could be
used to assess risk or enhance performance. These new evaluative technologies
could give stakeholders access to even more data. Consequently, the technologies
could also pose a potential concern for players who may fear that the results of
those evaluations could cost them their careers. All of this raises a fundamental
question: How does the current law apply to these approaches when deployed in
employment contexts? This Article, the first to address these issues, seeks to
provide an answer.
Focusing on the employment relationship between NFL players, the
clubs, and the league, we explore the applicability of two key federal
employment discrimination statutes: the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA). Both
the ADA and GINA contain provisions limiting an employer’s access to and
use of current or prospective employees’ health-related information.

See infra subsection I.B.2.
Jessica L. Roberts, I. Glenn Cohen, Christopher R. Deubert & Holly Fernandez Lynch, Evaluating
NFL Player Health and Performance: Legal and Ethical Issues: Online app. B (2017) Section F, https://www
.pennlawreview.com/print/165-U-Pa-L-Rev-Appendix-B.pdf [hereinafter Online Appendix B].
17 See infra subsection I.B.2.
18 See infra subsection I.B.3.
15
16
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The ADA, which Congress passed in 1990 and amended in 2008,19
protects people with disabilities against discrimination across several spheres,
including employment, government services, and public accommodations.20
While it may seem counterintuitive to apply a disability rights law to an elite
athlete who is in peak physical condition like James, the ADA’s employment
provisions nonetheless cover professional sports,21 and a professional athlete
may meet the legal definition of a person with a disability. Most notably, the
law restricts employers’ ability to seek health-related information about their
prospective and current employees through either medical exams or
disability-related inquiries.22 Moreover, the ADA also prohibits employers
from discriminating on the basis of disability, unless that discrimination
implicates the employee’s ability to safely perform the job in question.23
GINA24 provides additional protection, outlawing discrimination on the
basis of genetic information in health insurance and in employment.25 Congress
passed GINA in 2008 to assuage people’s concerns about genetic privacy and
genetic discrimination. Genetic information, as defined by the law, includes a
person’s genetic test results, the genetic test results of his family members, and
his family medical history.26 Like the ADA, GINA imposes constraints on both
an employer’s ability to obtain, as well as to act on, the covered information.27
However, unlike the ADA, GINA does not include health- or safety-related
exceptions for discrimination.28 Consequently, an employer cannot make
decisions based on lawfully obtained genetic information, even if the outcome of
that choice would be in the interest of job performance or safety.
Given the wide coverage of both the ADA and GINA, we conclude that
the NFL and the clubs may already be violating these laws with their current
practices. Additionally, as new technologies develop, those entities will be
19 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012)).
20 Americans with Disabilities Act, U.S. DEP’T LAB., https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/disability/ada
[https://perma.cc/Q2UJ-W4SH].
21 Title I of the ADA applies to employers, employment agencies, labor organizations, and
joint labor-management committees. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2) (2012). The statute, in relevant part,
defines an employer as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more
employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
calendar year, and any agent of such person.” Id. § 12111(5)(A). The statute provides no explicit
exception for professional sports.
22 Id. § 12112(d)(1)–(2), (4); see also infra notes 172–75 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 290–300 and accompanying text.
24 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881
(codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
25 GENETIC INFO. NONDISCRIMINATION ACT, http://ginahelp.org [https://perma.cc/2RYT-CB5T].
26 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff(4)(A).
27 See infra note 313 and accompanying text.
28 GINA does, however, include several exceptions for the acquisition of genetic information,
including for wellness programs. See infra notes 372–83 and accompanying text.
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further tempted to seek and act on even more information about current and
prospective players. Some of the new innovations blur the line between
evaluations of health and evaluations of performance, pushing the boundaries
of which evaluations are medical or genetic—and are thus covered by the
ADA or GINA—and which evaluations merely assess athletic ability or
potential—and are not. Based on our analysis of the ADA and GINA, we
argue that the existing legal safeguards, both as written and as applied, could
benefit from additional clarification, as well as certain changes.
First, we assert that the NFL and its clubs should ensure that they are
complying with the current law. We are concerned that a number of potential
legal violations may be occurring with respect to (1) medical examinations at
the NFL Scouting Combine (Combine) (an annual event each February in
which approximately 300 of the best college football players are invited to
undergo medical examinations, intelligence tests, interviews, and multiple football
and other athletic drills and tests in the hopes of demonstrating their prowess and
landing a spot in the NFL29); (2) post-offer medical examinations that are made
public; (3) post-offer medical examinations that reveal a disability and that result
in an adverse employment action; (4) Combine medical examinations that include
a request for a player’s family medical history; and (5) the preseason physical’s
disclosure requirements. Second, we suggest areas where the ambiguous state of
the present legal regulation demands additional clarity. Third, we identify areas of
possible legal circumvention and argue against them. Finally, we outline potential
changes to the law. To that end, we suggest potential reforms to better strike the
balance between the players’ autonomy and privacy and the interests of the NFL
and its clubs in avoiding liability, in having the most competitive players, and in
protecting players from injury.
This Article is the first in-depth analysis of the law and ethics of health
and performance evaluations in the NFL (or any professional sports league).
It proceeds in three parts. Part I provides the necessary background for
understanding the possible impact of various traditional and cutting edge
evaluative technologies on NFL players. It begins by identifying the relevant
parties and stakeholders and their relationships. Part I then proceeds to
describe both existing and prospective technologies that are either already
being used by—or of potential interest to—the NFL and its clubs.30 Building
off this foundation, Part II explores the existing law governing the acquisition
and use of health, medical, and performance evaluations by the NFL, its
clubs, and National Football Scouting—focusing on the ADA and GINA—
and applies those laws to the practices and technologies outlined in Part I.
Finally, Part III turns to recommendations for the future. We conclude with
29
30

Home, NFL SCOUTING COMBINE, http://www.nflcombine.net [http://perma.cc/7ZSS-YBSP].
For more on these technologies, see Online Appendix B, supra note 16.
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our four “C”s: compliance, clarification, circumvention, and changes. While
our focus is on the NFL, our analysis and recommendations have clear
implications for other professional sports leagues, and potentially also for
other workplaces that will rely on evaluating technologies.
I. BACKGROUND ON THE NFL AND EVALUATIVE TECHNOLOGIES
Much like its exceptional players, the NFL is not a typical employer.
Individuals like James who aspire to play professional football will find
themselves interacting with several separate but related legal entities, including
the NFLPA, the NFL, the clubs themselves (as well as their medical and
training staffs), the entities that organize the Combine, and the private
companies seeking to develop and market technologies to these stakeholders.
Because of the complexity of these relationships, understanding them is
essential to our analysis. To that end, Part I presents the factual and
technological background necessary to assess the legal and ethical implications
of the use of health- and performance-related evaluations by the NFL and its
clubs. It begins by describing the relationships between the various relevant
parties before turning to the practices and technologies currently available for
measuring NFL players’ health and performance.
A. Interested Parties
The use or potential use of both traditional and cutting edge evaluative
technologies in the NFL has major implications for a variety of stakeholders,
including most importantly (1) the players and their union, the NFLPA; (2)
the NFL and its clubs; (3) the club doctors and athletic trainers; and (4) the
private companies responsible for developing the new evaluative technologies.
Below we provide background information about these stakeholders to help
understand the legal and ethical issues raised by both old and new health and
fitness evaluations.
Each season, approximately 2200 players play in the NFL.31 As explained
in their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), players are the employees
of their respective clubs.32 Their union is the NFLPA. Pursuant to the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the NFLPA is “the exclusive
representative[] of all the employees in [the bargaining] unit for the purposes
of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of

This figure is derived from official NFL–NFLPA playtime statistics (on file with authors).
Collective Bargaining Agreement, NFL/NFLPA (Aug. 4, 2011), pmbl. xiv [hereinafter
Collective Bargaining Agreement].
31
32
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employment, or other conditions of employment.”33 The bargaining unit
consists of
1.
All professional football players employed by a member club of the
National Football League;
2. All professional football players who have been previously employed by
a member club of the National Football League who are seeking employment
with an NFL Club;
3. All rookie players once they are selected in the current year’s NFL
College Draft; and
4. All undrafted rookie players once they commence negotiation with an
NFL Club concerning employment as a player.34

The NLRA requires NFL clubs, acting collectively as the NFL, to bargain
collectively with the NFLPA concerning the “wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment” for NFL players.35
From a legal perspective, the NFL is an unincorporated association of
thirty-two member clubs.36 Each club is a separate and distinct legal entity,37
with its own legal obligations. However, the NFL also serves as a centralized
body for the clubs, including facilitating shared policy and decisionmaking.38
The CBA obligates NFL clubs to retain, or hire as consultants, doctors
with a variety of specialties, including but not limited to orthopedics,
cardiovascular disease, and neurology.39 Club doctors perform a variety of
duties, including
(1) providing healthcare to the players; (2) helping players determine when
they are ready to return to play; (3) helping clubs determine when players are
ready to return to play; (4) examining players the club is considering
employing, e.g., at the NFL Combine or as part of free agency; and, (5)
helping to clubs determine whether a player’s contract should be terminated

29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2012).
Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 32, pmbl.
29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 187 (2010).
Cf. Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 640 F.3d 785, 787 (8th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (providing
an example of a case in which each of the thirty-two teams and the NFL were named codefendants).
38 See Const. and Bylaws of the National Football League art. II, § 2.1(A) (stating that the
purpose of the NFL is “[t]o promote and foster the primary business of League members, each
member being an owner of a professional football club located in the United States”).
39 Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 32, art. 39, § 1(a)–(b). Of the thirty-two NFL
clubs, only two directly employ any of their club doctors while the other thirty clubs enter into
independent contractor arrangements with the doctors. Telephone Interview with Larry Ferazani,
Vice President, Labor Litig. & Policy, Nat’l Football League (Oct. 6, 2014).
33
34
35
36
37
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because of the player’s physical condition, e.g., whether an injury will prevent
the player from playing.40

Each NFL club also employs approximately four athletic trainers, including a
head athletic trainer and three assistants.41 Club doctors principally rely on the
athletic trainers to monitor and handle the players’ health during the week.42
National Football Scouting is also relevant when applying the ADA and
GINA to the NFL. National Football Scouting is an organization that provides
scouting services to NFL clubs and that is owned and managed as a joint
endeavor by twenty of the NFL’s thirty-two clubs.43 National Football Scouting
also owns and controls National Invitational Camp, the legal entity that is the
Combine.44 National Football Scouting, through National Invitational Camp,
runs the Combine.45 As will be demonstrated below, we are not concerned with
the application of the ADA and GINA to National Football Scouting directly,
but instead with the application of the ADA and GINA to the NFL and NFL
clubs as a result of their relationship with National Football Scouting. 46
NFL club executives, coaches, scouts, doctors and athletic trainers attend
the Combine to evaluate the players for the upcoming NFL Draft.47
According to Jeff Foster, the President of National Football Scouting, all thirtytwo NFL clubs consider the medical exams (and not the athletic drills) to be the
most important part of the Combine.48 Since 1987, doctors with IU Health, a
healthcare system affiliated with Indiana University School of Medicine, perform
x-rays, MRIs and other exams at each year’s Combine.49 The IU Health doctors
40 DEUBERT, COHEN & LYNCH, supra note 1, at 95; see also Collective Bargaining Agreement,
supra note 32, app. A, para. 8 (“If Player fails to establish or maintain his excellent physical condition
to the satisfaction of the Club physician . . . then Club may terminate this contract.”).
41 Athletic trainers—unlike most club doctors—are full-time employees of the club and are
with the club and the players at almost all times. DEUBERT, COHEN & LYNCH, supra note 1, at 160.
42 See Frequently Asked Questions, NFL PHYSICIANS SOC’Y, http://nflps.org/faqs/how-do-nflpsphysicians-collaborate-with-team-trainers-to-ensure-optimum-health-for-players/ [http://perma.cc
/CPZ5-JKTE] (“There is a constant source of dialogue between the athletic trainers and the team
physicians in all aspects of the player’s care.”).
43 Bill Bradley, Too Much Overlap Caused NFL to Create Annual Scouting Combine, NFL (Feb.
17, 2014, 2:27 PM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap2000000326212/printable/too-much-overlapcaused-nfl-to-create-annual-scouting-combine [https://perma.cc/Y3FH-X6ZQ].
44 Jeff Foster Talks About Challenges of Hosting NFL Scouting Combine, NFL (Feb. 19, 2014, 1:27
PM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap2000000326405/article/jeff-foster-talks-about-challenges-ofhosting-nfl-scouting-combine [http://perma.cc/WT22-JGAU].
45 Id.
46 See infra subsection III.B.2.
47 Home, NFL SCOUTING COMBINE, http://www.nflcombine.net/ [http://perma.cc/7ZSS-YBSP].
48 Albert Breer, NFL Scouting Combine’s Evolution Raises Questions About Future, NFL (July 22,
2014, 12:05 PM), http://www.nfl.com/combine/story/0ap1000000139993/article/nfl-scouting-combin
es-evolution-raises-questions-about-future [https://perma.cc/DN9G-DMTR].
49 See id. (“350 MRIs were conducted on 330 players in a four-day period, with IU Health—a
Combine partner for 28 years . . . .”); Jeff Foster Talks About Challenges of Hosting NFL Scouting
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perform examinations on behalf of the Combine, which then provides the results
to NFL clubs.50 After the IU Health examinations, club doctors also evaluate the
participants.51 The medical examinations at the Combine generally include xrays, MRIs, echocardiograms, EKGs, and blood analysis.52 Participants must also
take a drug test.53 Dr. Richard Kovacs, a cardiologist with IU Health, describes
the medical exams as “the choke point [because] . . . [n]o one goes to [the
Combine] until they go through us.”54 These details about the structure of the
Combine and the specific individuals who do the examining will prove important
for the legal analysis in Part II.
The NFL exercises considerable control over the Combine, including
helping to make decisions about the drills players perform, selling public
tickets, and broadcasting the event on television.55 Thus, as we argue below,
National Football Scouting may be understood for ADA and GINA purposes
as an arm of at least some clubs and of the NFL itself.56 At a minimum, it
provides the NFL and the clubs with the very types of information that the
ADA and GINA seek to regulate.
Lastly, many private technology companies both in the U.S. and abroad
are creating biological and other health-related products principally geared
toward a sports application, making those companies important stakeholders
in the conversation about evaluating NFL player health and performance.57
Biometric companies are working on technologies, with some focusing
specifically on genetic tests. For example, several companies are putting
cutting-edge technology into wearable devices that generate a variety of
biological data. As these technologies get smaller and smaller, robust data
Combine, supra note 44 (describing how IU doctors “handle all of the testing, imaging and reporting
of the standard and special battery of tests that we do on each athlete”); see also About IU Health,
IND. U. HEALTH, http://iuhealth.org/about-iu-health/ [http://perma.cc/92B5-SQJJ].
50 Bradley, supra note 43.
51 DEUBERT, COHEN & LYNCH, supra note 1, at 113.
52 Jordan Raanan, What’s the NFL Combine All About? Giants’ Justin Pugh Breaks It Down,
NJ.COM (Feb. 21, 2014, 8:17 AM), http://www.nj.com/giants/index.ssf/2014/02/what_s_the_nfl_com
bine_all_about_giants_justin_pugh_breaks_it_down.html [https://perma.cc/9V5K-V5WX].
53 See Kimberly Jones, Randy Gregory: ‘I Blame Myself ’ for Failed NFL Combine Drug Test, NFL
(Mar. 26, 2015, 7:06 PM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000481581/article/randy-gregoryi-blame-myself-for-failed-nfl-combine-drug-test [https://perma.cc/8UX9-G5MQ] (discussing player’s failed
drug test at the Combine); Ralph Vacchiano, N.Y. Giants Cornerback Jayron Hosley Gets Four-Game Suspension
for Violating NFL’s Drug Policy, NY DAILY NEWS (June 5, 2014 12:17 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/
sports/football/giants/hoseley-latest-giant-suspended-failed-drug-test-article-1.1817119 [https://perma.cc/C6S
T-R9G8] (same).
54 Dana Hunsinger Benbow, The Real Reason for the NFL Scouting Combine, INDYSTAR, (Feb.
25, 2016, 9:06 AM) (internal quotation marks omitted), http://www.indystar.com/story/sports/nfl/
2016/02/20/real-reason-nfl-scouting-combine/80251866/ [https://perma.cc/4WU7-ZKVM].
55 DEUBERT, COHEN & LYNCH, supra note 1, at 112.
56 See infra text accompanying notes 154–56.
57 See infra subsections I.B.2–3.
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generation and collection will increase over time. These companies are
responding to market demands, incorporating technologies that can help
athletes (professional and amateur) improve their performance and also those
that can help athletes be healthier and safer. Given that these demands are
principal concerns of the NFL and many other powerful sports leagues, there
are powerful economic incentives for the continued creation and expansion
of new evaluative technologies.
B. Current and Prospective Technologies
Having identified the relevant stakeholders, here we turn to the kinds of
evaluative technologies that are either currently being used or could potentially be
used to assess the health and performance of current and aspiring NFL players.
Although related, health and performance are not completely synonymous. For
example, while detecting a cardiac abnormality speaks to a potential player’s health,
he might still be capable of performing at a high level in the present, just with a
greater degree of future risk. Thus, when appropriate, we attempt to differentiate
measures of health from measures of performance, but we do so cautiously and with
the knowledge that these categories frequently overlap. For this reason, we employ
the broader rubric of “evaluative” technology, which we intend to include
assessments of medical conditions, performance, potential, and risk.
NFL players are subject to a wide variety of assessments of their health,
physical condition, and abilities. These evaluations range from athletic drills and
traditional medical examinations to cutting-edge wearable technologies and genetic
tests. The following sections discuss each of these different types of tests and
technologies and their application to professional athletes as groundwork for
analyzing the legal implications.58
1. Medical Examinations and Athletic Drills
The first category of evaluations is medical examinations and athletic
drills. Athletic drills, as used here, refer to skills and performance-based
evaluations that are not principally diagnostic. In other words, while medical
examinations assess health and wellness, athletic drills are primarily intended
to assess skill and performance. This distinction can of course be muddy. For
example, both types of assessments could meet a particular legal definition of
a medical exam, which we explain in Part II.59

58
59

Online Appendix B catalogues such technologies in much more exhaustive detail.
See infra subsection II.A.1.a.
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a. Medical Examinations
As discussed above, players undergo a wide battery of medical examinations
during the Combine.60 Some have labeled the Combine’s medical examinations
dehumanizing. One former NFL player, Aaron Collins, described the
Combine as follows:
During the physical exams, they pull on every bone in your body, and evaluate
everything and X-ray everything. You are like a slab of beef . . . . It’s a meat
market. There is not much dignity in it. They are evaluating potential. They
check your legs, and pull on you. They check your knees and your ankles,
pulling every joint. If you ever had surgery, they X-ray that part of your body
a thousand times. They X-ray everybody’s chest, their heart, their this, their
that. You take a stress test. You walk on a treadmill. You do everything. At
the Combine, every player gets totally evaluated by every team doctor. They
stand around you, they slap you on the table, and they evaluate you. This may
be one of the first times that you realize that you are no longer Aaron Collins,
person—you are Aaron Collins, commodity. It’s a job.61

NFL hopefuls who attend the Combine all sign broad authorizations for
the release, disclosure, and use of their otherwise private medical and mental
health information.62 In addition, these documents give permission to release
and to disclose the entirety of a player’s physical and mental health records (with
the exception of psychotherapy notes) and direct a wide range of entities—
including both physicians and mental health care professionals, as well as athletic
trainers and amateur and professional sports organizations—to provide and to
discuss that information with National Football Scouting, the NFL, the clubs
and their affiliates, and certain third parties under contract with the NFL.63
The authorizations are in effect for two years following signing, and a player
maintains a limited right to revoke the authorization for information that has
not yet been released.64
See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
Aaron Collins with Geoffrey Scott, Mental and Emotional Preparation: A Realistic View of
Talent, Perseverance, and Turning Defeat into Victory, in FOOTBALL: RISING TO THE CHALLENGE:
THE TRANSITION FROM COLLEGE TO PRO 137, 140 (Geoffrey R. Scott ed., 2005).
62 Participants in the Combine are asked to sign two documents: (1) an authorization for the
use and disclosure of records and information and (2) an authorization for release and disclosure of
medical and mental health records. These are reproduced in Online Appendix C. Jessica L. Roberts,
I. Glenn Cohen, Christopher R. Deubert & Holly Fernandez Lynch, Evaluating NFL Player Health
and Performance: Legal and Ethical Issues: Online app. C (2017), https://www.pennlawreview.com
/print/165-U-Pa-L-Rev-Appendix-C.pdf [hereinafter Online Appendix C]. While execution of
these waivers is ostensibly voluntary, it is not believed that any players refuse to sign them.
DEUBERT, COHEN & LYNCH, supra note 1, at 99 n.k.
63 Online Appendix C, supra note 62.
64 Id. at 4, 7-8.
60
61
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The medical exams continue after the player has been drafted and joined a club.
Every player undergoes a standard minimum preseason physical—conducted by
the club doctors—that covers a general medical examination, an orthopedic
examination, flexibility testing, an EKG, an echocardiogram, blood testing, baseline
neuropsychological testing, urinalysis, vision testing, hearing testing, a dental
examination, a chest X-ray, and an X-ray of all previously injured areas.65 During
the season, players often undergo a variety of medical exams if they have been
injured or potentially injured. Additionally, the CBA requires players to submit to
physicals at their club’s request.66 And finally, players receive a physical at the
conclusion of the season, also conducted by the club doctor.67
The results of the medical examinations described above can have a real impact
on a player’s career. Take, for example, the case of Star Lotulelei who, during the
2013 Combine, dropped from being one of the top projected draft picks to number
fourteen after an irregular echocardiogram.68 While a subsequent MRI showed no
evidence of a heart abnormality, 69 the damage was already done. That result
arguably cost Lotulelei millions of dollars, as he was drafted lower than expected.70
Similarly, in the 2016 NFL Draft, Notre Dame linebacker Jaylon Smith, UCLA
linebacker Myles Jack, and Alabama linebacker Reggie Ragland all went from
projected first-round draft picks to second-round draft picks because of suspected
medical issues: Smith and Jack had knee injuries, while Ragland was diagnosed with
an enlarged aorta during pre-draft medical exams.71
Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 32, art. 39, § 6; id. app. K.
Id. app. A, para. 8.
See, e.g., Michael Phillips, Sour End to Skins’ Bitter Season, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH,
Dec. 29, 2014, at C1 (explaining that each player on the Washington Football Club was required to
report for end-of-season physicals following the final game of the season); Joe Reedy, Offseason
Questions to Focus on Assistants – Coordinators Zimmer, Gruden Already Are Attracting Interest, DAYTON
DAILY NEWS, Jan. 9, 2012, at C1 (same).
68 See David Newton, Teams that Passed on Lotulelei Will Regret It, ESPN (Sept. 28, 2013),
http://www.espn.com/blog/carolina-panthers/post/_/id/804/teams-that-passed-on-lotulelei-will-regret-it
[https://perma.cc/29QF-Z77U] (“Lotulelei was considered the top-rated player in the draft by many
before an echocardiogram administered by the NFL scouting combine . . . .”); Gregg Rosenthal,
Star Lotulelei Drafted at No. 14 by Carolina Panthers, NFL: AROUND THE NFL (Apr. 25, 2013, 10:06
PM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap1000000163626/article/star-lotulelei-drafted-at-no-14-by-caro
lina-panthers [http://perma.cc/9KLM-SY3F] (“The top [defensive lineman] on a lot of boards fell
to [the Carolina Panthers] at No. 14.”).
69 Kevin Patra, Top Prospect Star Lotulelei Gets Positive News on Heart, NFL: AROUND THE NFL
(Apr. 2, 2013, 5:38 AM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap1000000156468/article/top-prospect-starlotulelei-gets-positive-news-on-heart [http://perma.cc/8RXF-VPJG].
70 See 2013 NFL Draft First-Round Picks’ Signing Status, NFL (July 30, 2013, 9:15 AM),
http://www.nfl.com/draft/story/0ap1000000168476/article/2013-nfl-draft-firstround-picks-signingstatus [https://perma.cc/GBG4-QW6B] (showing that first-year players’ salaries correspond with
their draft order).
71 See Michael David Smith, Jaylon Smith Will Receive Insurance Payment, Myles Jack Won’t, NBC
SPORTS: PROFOOTBALL TALK (Apr. 29, 2016, 10:33 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/
2016/04/29/jaylon-smith-will-receive-insurance-payment-myles-jack-wont/ [https://perma.cc/P29E-ECHZ]
65
66
67
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b. Drills
In addition to the medical examinations, the players participate in
multiple athletic drills at the Combine, including the forty-yard dash, bench
press, vertical jump, broad jump, three-cone drill, twenty-yard shuttle, and
sixty-yard shuttle.72 While these drills demonstrate a player’s speed, agility,
and athleticism, they can also serve a medical purpose by exposing physical
limitations the player might have due to past or current injuries. Clubs
certainly have an interest in testing players with injury histories at the
Combine to see if they have fully healed from a particular injury or surgery
and to judge whether the player will ever be able to be in the same condition
he was prior to the injury.
Like the medical exams, this kind of testing does not end at the Combine.
Players are often subjected to more of the same athletic drills leading up to
the NFL Draft in private meetings and workouts with clubs.73 Athletic drills
are also a central part of the player’s employment once he is with an NFL
club. Training camps and practices consist of all kinds of athletic drills and
football-related activities. While football is the primary focus of these drills,
they can also have a medical component. The drills will constantly demonstrate
the player’s current physical health and ability, including whether he has any
injuries or has not fully recovered from previous injuries.
The evaluations might be even more intensive if the player is not yet a
member of the club. Typically every Tuesday during the regular season
(which is the players’ normal rest day following a Sunday game), clubs will
hold tryouts for unemployed players that play positions where either the club

(explaining that Jaylon Smith and Myles Jack, “the two best linebackers in college football . . . suffered
serious knee injuries that caused them to drop in the draft”). Compare Josh Alper, Report: Reggie Ragland
Flagged for Enlarged Aorta, NBC SPORTS: PROFOOTBALLTALK (Apr. 28, 2016, 1:50 PM), http://
profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2016/04/28/report-reggie-ragland-flagged-for-enlarged-aorta/ [https://
perma.cc/G4QB-3XNP] (“Alabama linebacker Reggie Ragland pops up in the first round of most
mock drafts, but a medical issue may cause some teams to think twice about picking him.”), with
Michael David Smith, Bills Trade Up for Reggie Ragland, NBC SPORTS: PROFOOTBALLTALK (Apr.
29, 2016, 7:59 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2016/04/29/bills-trade-up-for-reggie-rag
land/ [https://perma.cc/E7K7-NZ7S] (“Alabama linebacker Reggie Ragland fell further in the draft
than most expected.”).
72 2016 Combine Tracker, NFL, http://www.nfl.com/combine/tracker [http://perma.cc/3CXMWHQM] (hover mouse over the icons under “Monday Results” to see the names of the drills).
73 See, e.g., John McClain, Scouting Combine Presents Deep Pool at Key Positions for Texans, HOUS.
CHRON. (Feb. 22, 2015, 10:10 PM), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/sports/texans/article/Scouting-com
bine-presents-deep-pool-at-key-6095721.php [https://perma.cc/BY2Q-G42R] (explaining that NFL clubs
begin to hold private workouts following the Combine in advance of the draft); Jim Thomas, Rams Sign 15
Rookie Free Agents, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (May 13, 2014), http://www.stltoday.com/sports/footba
ll/professional/rams-sign-rookie-free-agents/article_8a74b47f-f095-518b-8975-a688eb5b2c82.html [https://
perma.cc/9CCR-E684] (discussing a private pre-draft workout held by the St. Louis Rams).
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has recently suffered an injury or where the club is looking to upgrade.74 The
tryouts typically consist of a variety of football drills, sometimes against other
prospective players. While these assessments are focused on the player’s skill
level, like the other athletic drills, they also reveal a player’s physical condition,
including recovery from prior injuries. As part of the tryout, the club also
generally subjects the player to a basic physical and, assuming that goes well, signs
the player to a contract. 75
Although the Tuesday tryouts are generally for the players fighting to get
back into the NFL, star players are also occasionally subjected to similar
evaluations. Beginning in March of every year, unrestricted free agents76 are
able to offer their services to any and all clubs but first must pass a physical.
If the player does not pass the physical, any contract offer will be revoked and
the player is once again a free agent, but now with the black mark of a failed
physical as reported by the media.77
In sum, both before they are hired to play NFL football and throughout their
playing careers, players are constantly subjected to medical examinations and
athletic drills. These are high stakes events, with careers and significant sums of
money on the line each time. These examinations and drills—particularly
those conducted at the pre-employment stage—are not primarily aimed at
protecting player health, but instead are done with the business purpose of
evaluating a player’s ability to perform successfully on the field and enable
the club to win. In other words, while they may have some benefit to the
74 See Mike Florio, Falcons Bring in 10 for Workouts on Tuesday, NBC SPORTS:
PROFOOTBALLTALK (Oct. 1, 2014, 9:36 AM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2014/10/01/falc
ons-bring-in-10-for-workouts-on-tuesday/ [http://perma.cc/Z93P-5BPL] (“The tradition known as
Tryout Tuesday went double digits in Atlanta this week, with 10 players coming to town for a kicking
of the tires.”); Mike Florio, Giants Try Out 15 on Tuesday, NBC SPORTS: PRO FOOTBALL TALK
(Oct. 21, 2014, 7:16 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2014/10/21/giants-try-out-15-ontuesday/ [http://perma.cc/36M9-3USB] (describing “Tryout Tuesday”).
75 Turn to “Tryout Tuesdays” for Success with “Street Free Agents,” FOOTBALL EDUCATOR,
http://www.thefootballeducator.com/turn-to-tryout-tuesdays-for-success-in-free-agency [https://perma.cc/X
8VA-V3YR].
76 An unrestricted free agent is “any player with four or more Accrued Seasons . . . at the expiration
of his Player Contract.” He is “completely free to negotiate and sign a Player Contract with any Club, and
any Club shall be completely free to negotiate and sign a Player Contract with such player, without penalty
or restriction.” Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 32, art. 9, § 1(a).
77 See Art Stapleton, Super Bowl: O’Brien Schofield Getting Second Chance, NORTH JERSEY.COM
(Jan. 31, 2015, 1:21 AM), http://www.northjersey.com/sports/football/super-bowl/getting-a-secondchance-1.1262114 [https://perma.cc/JS2N-G2CB] (explaining how the New York Giants revoked
O’Brien Schofield’s $8 million contract offer after he failed his physical and how Schofield eventually
ended up signing a $730,000 contract with the Seattle Seahawks); see also Saffold Re-Signs with Rams
After Failing Raiders’ Physical, COLUM. DAILY TRIB. (Mar. 13, 2014), http://www.columbiatribune.
com/sports/saffold-re-signs-with-rams-after-failing-raiders-physical/article_8064eef0-aadd-11e3-b2c
5-.0017a4362370.html [https://perma.cc/FZ9N-4792] (describing how Rodger Saffold signed a contract of
around $30 million with the St. Louis Rams after a failed physical cost him his $42.5 million contract with
the Oakland Raiders).
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players, the primary interest of the NFL and its clubs in the medical
evaluations and athletic drills is to obtain as much information as possible
about a player’s current and future ability to help the club. For example,
before offering a long-term contract to a player, a club would want to examine
the player’s injury history to evaluate the likelihood of future injury.
2. Nongenetic Technologies
Medical examinations and athletic drills are traditional forms of health
surveillance by NFL clubs. In the last several years many technology companies
have been creating new products to measure player health.78 We focus our
analysis here on products that NFL clubs are already using or are likely to use in
the future, including at the Combine.79 While no categorization is perfect, the
products these companies produce generally fall into eight categories: (1) player
tracking, (2) heart rate, (3) sleep, (4) readiness, (5) body temperature, (6) force,
(7) hydration, and (8) head impact sensors. Clubs may use these technologies for
evaluating and improving performance, as well as for preventing or minimizing
injury. For example, in 2015, the Philadelphia Eagles held their star running back
out of practice because his hydration level was too low.80
In what follows, we provide summaries of four examples of technologies we
believe are the most relevant to the legal and ethical issues discussed in this
Article, though many others are detailed in Online Appendix B: (1) Catapult
Sports (Catapult) / Zebra Technologies (Zebra); (2) Fatigue Science; (3) BioForce
HRV; and (4) X2 Biosystems.
First, tracking technologies are of interest to the NFL. Catapult is an
Australian company that provides matchbook-sized GPS devices, known as the
OptimEye system, that can be worn on a player’s uniform.81 The devices contain
sensors capable of measuring and collecting data about the player’s performance,
including agility, force, and acceleration.82 The data is transmitted by radio to
78 Online Appendix B includes detailed information about thirteen companies that have
developed such technologies for use in professional or elite-level sports and their effects on players.
79 See Tom Pelissero, NFL Ponders Changes to Tests Given at Annual Scouting Combine, USA
TODAY (Feb. 22, 2016, 12:13 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/2016/02/21/scoutingcombine-changes/80700052/ [https://perma.cc/V6QC-BQYU] (describing the steps the NFL is
taking to integrate new technology into the Combine).
80 See Josh Alper, Chip Kelly: DeMarco Murray Was Held Out of Practice Because of Hydration Issue,
NBC SPORTS: PRO FOOTBALL TALK (Aug. 4, 2015, 1:15 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports
.com/2015/08/04/chip-kelly-demarco-murray-held-out-of-practice-because-of-hydration-issue/ [http://perma.cc/
ZWZ3-B48R] (explaining the team’s decision and highlighting the coach’s comment that “[i]t’s not just for
[Murray], we treat every player on a daily basis” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
81 Jen Cohen Crompton, Philadelphia Eagles Tap into Tech for Training, D!GITALIST MAG. (July
25, 2013), http://www.digitalistmag.com/industries/sports-and-entertainment/2013/07/25/philadelphia-eag
les-tap-into-tech-for-training-0305701 [https://perma.cc/VLZ8-ZVKP].
82 Id.
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cloud-based software for analysis.83 Similarly, San Diego–based Zebra produces
a wearable Real Time Locating System (RTLS) sensor for a player’s shoulder
pads.84 Zebra’s technology collects data such as position, speed, and distance
that are registered and compiled into a database.85 Unlike Catapult’s devices, the
Zebra technology does not measure force, so it does not help players avoid
injury.86
As of November 2016, seventeen NFL clubs use Catapult’s devices.87 Clubs
are principally focused on using the technology to prevent injuries.88 The device
enables the club to identify which players have exerted high amounts of force
and, as a result, have them participate less or at a lower intensity in future
practices.89 It also enables the club to design practices that are more efficient and
less strenuous for the players, as well as create practice regimens that suit the
needs of each position.90 Some players will suffer because of the technology: it
will identify which players are moving slower and less forcefully than others,
which could cause a club to terminate those players’ contracts.91
By contrast, Zebra is “The Official On-Field Player Tracking Provider” of
the NFL.92 In July 2014, the NFL announced that it would install Zebra’s
technology in seventeen stadiums during the 2014 NFL season.93 Specifically, the
NFL installed the technology in the fifteen stadiums that hosted Thursday Night
Football games that season.94 In a 2015 New York Times article, an official with the
company that distributes Zebra’s data described the technology as “the future of
sports” given the amount of data that is currently available.95 Coaches and
trainers certainly seem interested in putting that newly available information to
Id.
Press Release, NFL Commc’ns, National Football League and Zebra Technologies to
Provide ‘Next Gen Stats’ for the 2014 Season (July 31, 2014), https://web.archive.org/web/201509261
32155/http://nflcommunications.com/2014/07/31/national-football-league-and-zebra-technologies-to
-provide-next-gen-stats-for-the-2014-season [http://perma.cc/6LUV-SE8T].
85 Id.
86 See id. (noting that the technology “capture[s] precise location measurements”).
87 See Our Clients, CATAPULT USA, http://catapultsports.com/united-states/clients [https://
perma.cc/F5EJ-6BLM] (listing Catapult’s current NFL club clients); see also Catapult Sports, Buffalo
Bills Player Monitoring Goes High Tech, YOUTUBE (July 24, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch
?v=kjfti4Um14I&feature=youtube (providing an example of an NFL club using Catapult technology
during a practice).
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
92 Zebra Sports Solutions, ZEBRA, https://www.zebra.com/us/en/solutions/location-solutions/ze
bra-sport-solution.html [https://perma.cc/F3CA-RRAC] (internal quotation marks omitted).
93 NFL Commc’ns, supra note 84.
94 Id.
95 Ken Belson, In a Data-Driven N.F.L., the Pings May Soon Outstrip the X’s and O’s, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/23/sports/football/in-a-data-driven-nfl-the-pingsmay-soon-outstrip-the-xs-and-os.html [https://perma.cc/Y4BL-5WTT] (internal quotation marks omitted).
83
84
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use. The Seahawks’ director of player health and performance, Sam Ramsden,
explained that Zebra’s technology could help him assess whether his players are
injured or tired based on their speed and other factors.96 Ramsden noted, “I look
at it more as segue to have a conversation with the player . . . . The data is
basically saying, ‘Looks like you weren’t cutting as hard today—is there
something going on?’”97 Thus, technologies like those produced by Catapult and
Zebra can empower players by giving them more information, which could in
turn enhance performance or prevent injury. However, that same data could
result in their being benched, traded, or terminated.
Second, Fatigue Science is a Canadian company that offers a wrist-worn
device called a Readiband that is worn while sleeping to collect data about an
athlete’s sleep, including quality, quantity, and timing.98 The Readiband captures
actigraphy data by taking sixteen 3D measurements of the tiny movements in the
wearer’s wrist per second and uses the acquired data to determine when a person
is sleeping.99 The data is then analyzed using a web-based application.100 The
Seattle Seahawks and the New York Giants currently use the Readiband, and
news reports indicate that other NFL clubs may be using similar technology.101
Fatigue Science’s technology could both benefit and harm players. The
importance of sleep from a medical and scientific viewpoint is well-established.102
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
See Team Platform, FATIGUE SCI., http://fatiguescience.com/team-platform/ [https://perma.cc/
N9J2-K5PF].
99 See C.A. RUSSELL ET AL., ARCHINOETICS, LLC, VALIDATION OF THE FATIGUE SCIENCE
READIBANDTM ACTIGRAPH AND ASSOCIATED SLEEP/WAKE CLASSIFICATION ALGORITHMS 7
(undated), https://fatigue-science.squarespace.com/s/Readiband_Validation.pdf [https://perma.cc/
R8W8-GBHC] (describing how actigraphy can be used to monitor sleep).
100 Team Platform, supra note 98 (discussing coaches’ access to data from the Readiband via
coaching dashboards).
101 See Tania Ganguli, Texans Treat Their New Sports Science Department as a Closely Guarded
Secret, ESPN (June 23, 2016), http://www.espn.com/blog/nflnation/post/_/id/206348/texans-treattheir-new-sports-science-department-as-a-closely-guarded-secret [https://perma.cc/F8RK-VLCG]
(noting that the Houston Texans collect information about their players’ sleeping habits); New York
Times Cover Story: Seattle Seahawks Rely on Fatigue Science for Performance Edge, FATIGUE SCI.: BLOG
(Oct. 3, 2016), http://www.fatiguescience.com/blog/new-york-times-cover-story-seattle-seahawks-re
ly-on-fatigue-science-for-performance-edge [https://perma.cc/R5QX-YHQT] (noting that the Seattle
Seahawks use the Readiband technology); Aditi Pai, Fatigue Science’s Wearable Helps Workers,
Pro Athletes Track Sleep, MOBIHEALTHNEWS (July 6, 2015), http://www.mobihealthnews.com/
45047/fatigue-sciences-wearable-helps-workers-pro-athletes-track-sleep [https://perma.cc/L9
Y6-YJEG] (claiming that the New York Giants use the Readiband). But see Enrico Campitelli,
Chip Kelly No Longer Tracking Eagles’ Sleep with Wearables, CSN PHILLY (Nov. 20, 2015, 10:45
AM), http://www.csnphilly.com/the700level/chip-kelly-no-longer-tracking-eagles-sleep-weara
bles [https://perma.cc/Q2NR-XWXX] (noting that Eagles players no longer track their sleep
with wearable technology).
102 See Cheri D. Mah et al., The Effects of Sleep Extension on the Athletic Performance of Collegiate
Basketball Players, 34 SLEEP 943, 943 (2011) (“Several studies have also demonstrated the negative
impact of sleep restriction on physical performance . . . .”).
96
97
98
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Studies link better sleep with improved athletic performance.103 Unfortunately, a
2003 study found that 34% of offensive linemen (the biggest players on each club)
suffered from sleep apnea.104 Yet one possible downside is that clubs may learn that
a player is failing to get good sleep because of off-the-field behaviors, such as
staying out late. Such data might also lead the club to reconsider the player’s
short-term or long-term employment.
Third, BioForce HRV (BioForce), a Washington-based company founded by
the Seahawks’ former strength and conditioning coach,105 offers an online and
smartphone application that collects data to measure heart rate variability (HRV).106
BioForce claims that HRV is a measure of an athlete’s “readiness and fatigue.”107
The software is designed to work with other heart rate monitors.108
BioForce’s technology, which it claims is used by NFL clubs,109 could help
both players and their clubs. Heart rate can be a useful measure of an athlete’s
exertion levels. By knowing his heart rate, the player (or his coach) can either
increase or decrease the intensity of the workout as appropriate. Moreover, as
with Fatigue Science’s Readiband, the player may learn of a medical condition
that he should take steps to address. However, the club might learn medical
information about the player, such as an irregular heartbeat, that could cause the
club to reconsider the player’s employment in the short or long term.
Fourth, X2 Biosystems (X2), another Washington-based company, offers
two types of sensors designed to measure the force of hits sustained by players
and to transmit that data wirelessly to a mobile device.110 The first sensor is
embedded into the player’s mouthguard, and the second is worn as a patch
103 See id. at 946 (describing how several members of the Stanford University men’s basketball
team demonstrated an improvement in performance after sleep extension over five to seven weeks);
Roger S. Smith et al., The Impact of Circadian Misalignment on Athletic Performance in Professional
Football Players, 36 SLEEP 1999, 2000 (2013) (“Sleep deprivation can impair performance in athletes
and can increase the risks of accidents and morbidity/mortality in the general public.”).
104 See L. ELAINE HALCHIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34439, FORMER NFL PLAYERS:
DISABILITIES, BENEFITS, AND RELATED ISSUES 14 (2008).
105 See HRV Explained Part 3: How to Measure HRV, HRVTRAINING (Jan. 20, 2012), https://
hrvtraining.com/2012/01/20/hrv-explained-part-3-how-to-measure-hrv/ [https://perma.cc/PV5R-867R] (noting
that Bioforce HRV was designed by “former NFL strength coach . . . Joel Jamieson”); Joel Jamieson, MMA
TRAINING, http://www.mmatraining.com/joel-jamieson/ [https://perma.cc/AJU9-TAKE] (explaining that
Joel Jamieson worked for the Seattle Seahawks).
106 BIOFORCE HRV, http://www.bioforcehrv.com/ [http://perma.cc/H9WX-DM42].
107 Id.
108 See Winslow Jenkins, Product Review: BioForce HRV, BREAKING MUSCLE, http://breaking
muscle.com/equipment/product-review-bioforce-hrv [https://perma.cc/5DWP-PE7X] (“You may also
purchase a Polar heart rate monitor from the BioForce website or use any variety of heart rate strap
that you already own.”).
109 See Pro Trainer Certification, BIOFORCE HRV, http://www.bioforcehrv.com/pro-trainer-course
[http://perma.cc/8BDL-X6QN] (identifying “top teams in the NFL” as BioForce HRV clients).
110 Katie Linendoll, Could X2’s Skin Patch Detect Concussions?, ESPN (Jan. 7, 2013), http://
espn.go.com/blog/playbook/tech/post/_/id/3547/could-x2s-skin-patch-detect-concussions [https:
//perma.cc/U8TJ-ETVK].
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behind the player’s ear.111 X2 also offers software that can gather data to help
diagnose concussions.112
Since the 2013 season, the NFL has required all clubs to use X2’s software to
evaluate possible concussions.113 If these products are accurate, they may protect
the health of players. However, players and the NFLPA have expressed resistance
to the sensors.114 Specifically, players are concerned that the data might not be
reliable and will result in players being removed from games unnecessarily.115
Additionally, players are concerned that clubs will use the data to avoid
employing players with a history of concussions.116
The NFLPA is aware of these shifts in technology. NFLPA Vice President of
Business and Legal Affairs, Sean Sansiveri, has expressed an interest in monetizing
new technologies, noting that the NFLPA’s licensing arm has followed emerging
technologies, such as wearable technologies, with great interest.117 Not surprisingly,
the CBA specifically addresses wearable technologies:
The NFL may require all NFL players to wear during games and
practices equipment that contains sensors or other nonobtrusive tracking
devices for purposes of collecting information regarding the performance of
NFL games, including players’ performances and movements, as well as
medical and other player safety-related data. Sensors shall not be placed on
helmets without the NFLPA’s consent. Before using sensors for health or
medical purposes, the NFL shall obtain the NFLPA’s consent.118

As mentioned, the line between a technology being used for “performance”
purposes, as opposed to “health or medical” purposes is not clear. 119 Relatedly, the

Id.
See X2 Head-Trax Head Impact Management Solution, X2 BIOSYSTEMS, http://x2biosystems
.com/x2_integrated_concussion/ [https://perma.cc/F7HX-8DRM] (describing X2’s Head-Trax head
impact management solution and X2’s Integrated Concussion Evaluation (ICE) app).
113 NFL COMMC’NS DEP’T, NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, NFL KICKOFF 2016: INFORMATION
GUIDE 44 (2016), https://nflcommunications.com/Documents/2016%20Kickoff%20Guide%20update.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7VAG-Y3WF].
114 Steve Fainaru, No Helmet Sensors for NFL in ‘15, ESPN (Feb. 20, 2015), http://www.espn
.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/12348395/nfl-teams-use-concussion-sensors-helmets-2015 [https://perma.cc/X
H5F-26NE].
115 Id.
116 See, e.g., id. (“[F]ormer Steeler Hines Ward [said] that . . . sensors would open up a
‘Pandora’s box’ by providing data that could be used to remove players from games or even in
contract negotiations.”).
117 Liz Mullen, Plugged in: Sean Sansiveri, NFLPA, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTSBUSINESS J.
(Mar. 30, 2015), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2015/03/30/People-and-Pop-Cu
lture/Plugged-In.aspx [https://perma.cc/BR82-KFTR].
118 Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 32, art. 51, § 13(c).
119 See supra Section I.B.
111
112
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NFLPA has recently filed a grievance over the use of sleep monitors, alleging
that clubs must obtain NFLPA approval before employing such devices.120
Next, we turn to genetic tests, another area of technology that presents both
opportunities and concerns for NFL players.
3. Genetic Tests
It is undeniable that genes have a major influence in the biological
processes required for athletic success, including but not limited to muscle
and cartilage formation, metabolism, and blood oxygenation.121 Thus, genetic
testing may detect both genetic advantages and barriers to successful athletic
performance.122 The genetic technologies available at present can be divided
into two major categories: (1) those associated with performance and (2) those
associated with risk of injury.
Of course, genetic potential does not ensure athletic success, or vice
versa—it is well known that genotype does not always express itself in
phenotype—and the science to test relevant genotypes for sports is still in its
infancy. Thus, currently available testing can merely help to predict who will
be more successful on the playing field.123 A 2013 article summed up the state
of research: “[F]ew genes are consistently associated with elite athletic
performance, and none are linked strongly enough to warrant their use in
predicting athletic success.”124 A 2013 British Journal of Sports Medicine article
went even further: “Current genetic testing has zero predictive power on
talent identification and should not be used by athletes, coaches or parents.”125
Whatever their prognostic accuracy or lack thereof, such technologies
continue to attract the attention of sports stakeholders who will try almost
anything to find an edge.
Several companies have already begun to commercialize the potential
connection between genetics and athleticism. A 2011 study in the Journal of
120 Michael David Smith, As Teams Monitor Players’ Sleeping Habits, NFLPA Cries Foul, NBC
SPORTS: PROOOTBALLTALK (Oct. 22, 2015, 4:28 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2015
/10/22/as-teams-monitor-players-sleeping-habits-nflpa-cries-foul/ [https://perma.cc/R4Z9-EL4E].
121 See Mario Kambouris et al., Predictive Genomics DNA Profiling for Athletic Performance, 6
RECENT PATENTS ON DNA & GENE SEQUENCES 229, 229 (2012).
122 Id.
123 See Reeves Wiedeman, Searching for the Perfect Athlete, NEW YORKER: SPORTING SCENE
(July 31, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/the-sporting-scene/searching-for-the-perfect-athlete
[https://perma.cc/L2JJ-ZWMU] (“[P]rofessional teams, which rise and fall on their ability to
judge which athletes are worth spending time and money on, are starting to take genetics
seriously.”).
124 Lisa M. Guth & Stephen M. Roth, Genetic Influence on Athletic Performance, 25 CURRENT
OPINION IN PEDIATRICS 653, 653 (2013).
125 Yannis Pitsiladis et al., Genomics of Elite Sporting Performance: What Little We Know and
Necessary Advances, 47 BR. J. SPORTS MED., Apr. 2013, at 1, 5.
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Personalized Medicine found that thirteen companies were providing sportsrelated DNA tests or analyses to consumers.126 The tests were given names
such as “Sports DNA Test,” “Sports X Factor Standard Panel,” “Athletic Gene
Test,” “Sports Gene Test,” and “Athletics Profile Test” and ranged in price
from $79 to about $1100.127
Things changed in November 2013 when the FDA ordered one of the
leading companies offering sports-specific DNA tests, 23andMe, to stop
advertising its health-related genetic tests without FDA authorization.128 At
that time, the FDA had not developed any rules for direct-to-consumer (DTC)
genetic testing.129 Thus, the FDA was concerned about whether the tests were
clinically validated and how consumers would interpret their results. Shortly
thereafter, 23andMe ceased offering the DTC health-related genetic tests.130
However, in February 2015, the FDA approved 23andMe’s DTC test for
Bloom Syndrome—a rare genetic condition—leading to speculation that the
Agency might approve other DTC genetic tests related to health.131 Indeed,
by the end of the year, the FDA had permitted 23andMe to offer carrier tests
for thirty-five other conditions.132
While the future of DTC genetic testing in United States remains
uncertain, several foreign companies have continued to offer sports-specific
genetic tests.133 In 2005, an Australian professional rugby club tested eighteen

126 Jennifer K. Wagner & Charmaine D. Royal, Field of Genes: An Investigation of Sports-Related
Genetic Testing, 2 J. PERSONALIZED MED. 119, 122 tbl.1 (2012) (identifying 23andMe, Inc.; Advanced
Health Care Inc.; American International Biotechnology Services; Asper Bio Tech; Athleticode, Inc.;
Atlas Sports Genetics, LLC; Cosmetics DNA; CyGene Direct; DNA4U; Family Tree DNA; Genetic
Technologies Limited; My Gene; and Warrior Roots as direct-to-consumer genetic testing companies).
127 Id. at 123-24 tbl. 2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
128 George J. Annas & Sherman Elias, 23andMe and the FDA, 370 N. ENG. J. MED. 985, 985 (2014).
129 Id. Since then, the FDA has proposed draft guidance that, if adopted, would apply to directto-consumer tests. Framework for Regulatory Oversight of Laboratory Developed Tests; Draft
Guidance for Industry, Food and Drug Administration Staff, and Clinical Laboratories; Availability,
79 Fed. Reg. 59776 (proposed Oct. 3, 2014).
130 Annas & Elias, supra note 128.
131 Matthew Herper, What 23andMe’s FDA Approval Means for the Future of Genomics, FORBES
(Feb. 20, 2015, 1:10 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2015/02/20/what-23andmesfda-approval-means-for-the-future-of-genomics/ [https://perma.cc/65VH-EC6H].
132 Alice Park, Genetic Testing Company 23andMe Returns to Market, TIME (Oct. 21, 2015),
http://time.com/4080583/23andme-dna-genetic-testing/ [https://perma.cc/AEY7-E4WH].
133 See, e.g., DNAFIT http://www.dnafit.com/ [https://perma.cc/XD58-WD54] (offering a “fitness
and nutrition” test by DNAFit, a British company); Genetic Test of Athletic Abilities, SPORTS GENE http://
sportsgene.ee/genetic-test-of-athletic-abilities [http://perma.cc/43T3-6FAY] (offering a “genetic test of
athletic abilities” from SportsGene, LLC, an Estonian company); Nutrigenomics, DNALIFE, http://www.
dnalife.healthcare/nutrigenomics/ [https://perma.cc/6LU3-GQLB] (offering a “DNA Sport” test from
dnalife, a Mauritian company); Sports Gene Test, ASPER BIOTECH, http://www.asperbio.com/sp
orts-gene-test/asper-wellness/athletic-performance-test [https://perma.cc/QB5C-JCQ2] (offering the “Athletic
performance” test from Asper Biotech, an Estonian company).
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of its twenty-four players for eleven exercise-related genes.134 In 2011, an
unidentified Premier League (one of the world’s leading professional soccer
leagues) club was reported to have tested its athletes for genes related to
injury risk.135 In March 2014, the British company DNAFit announced that it
was conducting genetic testing of two Premier League soccer clubs and one
“leading” European club, although the names of the clubs remained
confidential.136 DNAFit’s testing would reportedly “disclose the players’
balance of speed and endurance genes, whether they have injury-prone genes,
and the best nutrition to fit their DNA.”137 DNAFit has also provided genetic
testing to British track athlete Jenny Meadows.138 Finally, in 2015,
Uzbekistan’s Academy of Sciences began testing children for fifty genes to
measure their athletic potential.139
At present, genetic testing in elite or professional American sports has been
more limited than abroad. For example, Major League Baseball (MLB),
following prior incidents of fraud, now uses DNA testing in rare cases—and only
with the player’s permission—to prove the identity and age of certain Latin
American prospects.140 The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)
currently requires that all Division I student–athletes be tested for the sickle cell
gene trait or sign a waiver exempting the school and the NCAA from liability
should he or she be harmed as a result of the trait.141 Sickle cell trait can cause
problems for athletes during periods of intense exercise, and while a studentathlete will not be disqualified because of a positive test, he or she will be made
aware of the possible complications and taught how to best avoid such
complications.142 NFL clubs test for sickle cell as part of the standard preseason
physical if the player has not previously been tested.143
Carina Dennis, Rugby Team Converts to Give Gene Tests a Try, 434 NATURE 260, 260 (2005).
Nick Collins, Premier League Team Reads Players’ DNA, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 16, 2011, 12:00
PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/science/science-news/8829894/Premier-League-team-reads
-players-DNA.html [https://perma.cc/8EE4-9VEQ].
136 Martyn Ziegler, Two Premier League Teams Commission Genetic Profiles of Their Players,
INDEPENDENT (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/news-and-comment/two-pre
mier-league-teams-commission-genetic-profiles-of-their-players-9196470.html [https://perma.cc/DD64-E653].
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Ron Synovitz & Zamira Eshanova, Uzbekistan Is Using Genetic Testing to Find Future
Olympians, ATLANTIC (Feb. 6, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/02/
uzbekistan-is-using-genetic-testing-to-find-future-olympians/283001/ [https://perma.cc/M399-7429].
140 Michael S. Schmidt & Alan Schwarz, Baseball’s Use of DNA Raises Questions, N.Y. TIMES
(July 21, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/22/sports/baseball/22dna.html [https://perma.cc/
MC9H-8WL3].
141 Sickle Cell Trait, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/health-and-safety/medical-conditions/sicklecell-trait [https://perma.cc/AG28-YCXJ].
142 Id.; see also DAVID EPSTEIN, THE SPORTS GENE 177-78 (2013) (explaining that athletes
who carry the sickle cell trait gene are “genetically disadvantaged for long-distance sports”).
143 Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 32, app. K.
134
135
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Genetic testing for certain conditions has been most controversial in the
National Basketball Association (NBA), particularly regarding heart
abnormalities. The Chicago Bulls refused to re-sign Eddy Curry based on the
possibility that he had hypertrophic cardiomyopathy (HCM), a heart ailment
responsible for the death of NBA star Reggie Lewis in 1993.144 Similarly,
following a positive HCM test, the New York Knicks declared Cuttino Mobley
unfit to play, leading him to retire. Mobley sued the Knicks for allegedly
violating state antidiscrimination laws.145 After a federal court denied the
Knicks’ motion to dismiss an amended complaint in March 2013,146 the parties
settled the case on undisclosed terms in August 2013.147 Similarly, in 2014, NBA
prospect Isaiah Austin withdrew from the draft and gave up his NBA dreams
when a pre-draft physical revealed that he suffered from Marfan syndrome, a
rare genetic disorder that can weaken the heart and cause it to rupture during
strenuous activity.148
Despite these public controversies, interest in genetic testing in sports
remains extremely high. In 2012, ESPN, in collaboration with 23andMe,
tested the DNA of 100 former and current NFL offensive linemen.149 The
results did not indicate that the players had a higher number of genes thought
to be associated with athletic performance than the general population.150
However, researchers have claimed that there are more than 200 genes
associated with physical performance and that at least twenty of them might
be tied to elite athletic performance.151 The purpose of this discussion is not
to identify the genes that are (or might be) tied to athletic performance, but
rather to point out that the possibility of linking genetics with athletic
performance remains an area of interest for players and companies.

144 See Andrew E. Rice, Eddy Curry and the Case for Genetic Privacy in Professional Sports, 6 VA.
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 2-3 (2006) (noting that the Chicago Bulls would not re-sign Curry until he
received a genetic test to rule out HCM); see also EPSTEIN, supra note 142, at 242-51 (discussing the
problems that HCM poses for athletes and listing examples of professional athletes with HCM).
145 See Mobley v. Madison Square Garden LP, No. 11-8290, 2012 WL 2339270, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
June 14, 2012) (alleging that the Knicks forced him to retire so that insurance would pay the
remainder of his contract and to avoid having to pay the NBA’s luxury tax, which is imposed on
teams that maintain a payroll of more than a certain threshold).
146 Mobley v. Madison Square Garden LP, No. 11-8290, slip op. at 2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2013).
147 See Stipulation of Discontinuance with Prejudice, Mobley v. Madison Square Garden LP, No. 118290 (S.D.N.Y. dismissed Aug. 9, 2013) (agreeing to dismiss the case unconditionally with prejudice).
148 See Baylor Center Out of N.B.A. Draft, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com
/2014/06/24/sports/basketball/baylor-center-out-of-nba-draft.html [https://perma.cc/7GUD-GDSK].
149 See Shaun Assael, Cheating Is So 1999, ESPN (July 10, 2012), http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/
magazine/archives/news/story?page=magazine-20101019-article30 [http://perma.cc/HQ36-6DRJ] (describing
the study as the “largest-ever genetic examination of professional American athletes”).
150 See id. (“Our theory that NFL linemen might be genetic outliers was fl at-out [sic] wrong.
Every way that 23andMe looked at it, the pros were just like the [average] Joes.”).
151 Pitsiladis et al., supra note 125, at 1.
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*
*
*
Analyzing how the NFL and its clubs evaluate player health and ability
requires background on the various stakeholders in the NFL, as well as the
types of evaluative technologies that are currently available. Having laid this
groundwork, in Part II, we turn to the ways in which existing federal
employment discrimination protections might regulate the abilitity of the
NFL and its clubs to evaluate their current and aspiring players.
II. WHAT LAWS REGULATE THE USE OF HEALTH AND
PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS BY EMPLOYERS?
As explained above, NFL players are employees of their clubs.152 As
employers, the clubs must comply with relevant state and federal
employment laws. Additionally, at least one state trial court has found that
the NFL (and not just the clubs) exercises the requisite control to be
considered an employer of players pursuant to a state drug testing statute,
though the decision is controversial.153 Thus, it is possible that courts may
treat the NFL as an employer under certain circumstances as well. However,
whether the league has an employment relationship with the players is an
issue that courts likely decide on a case-by-case basis.
Furthermore, National Football Scouting, which runs the Combine, may
also have to abide by certain employment-related laws. As noted in Part I,
two-thirds of the NFL’s clubs jointly own and manage National Football
Scouting.154 Thus, the Combine appears to be under substantial NFL control,
and all of the league’s clubs significantly benefit from the medical exams
conducted.155 While National Football Scouting is technically a separate
corporate entity, it too might have to comply with employment discrimination
legislation to the extent that it operates as an extension of the NFL and its
clubs.156 In any event, the clubs use information obtained from the Combine to
Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 32, pmbl.
See Williams v. The Nat’l Football League, No. 27-CV-08-29778, slip op. at 16 (Dist. Ct. Minn.
May 6, 2010) (finding that, for purposes of Minnesota’s Drug and Alcohol Testing in the Workplace
Act (DATWA), an employment relationship exists between the players and the NFL). This case was
appealed in 2011, and the appellate court agreed with the lower court’s conclusion on the issue,
explaining, “The district court’s findings in this regard are not clearly erroneous, and we agree that the
NFL is an employer, and appellants its employees, within the meaning of DATWA.” Williams v. The
Nat’l Football League, 794 N.W.2d 391, 396 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011). But see Brown v. Nat’l Football
League, 219 F. Supp. 2d 372, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (explaining that plaintiff, a former NFL player, was
an employee of his specific club—and not the league—for the purpose of determining whether the
mandatory arbitration provision of the Collective Bargaining Agreement applied).
154 See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text.
155 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
156 See Wilson v. MVM, Inc., 475 F.3d 166, 172-73 (3d Cir. 2007) (outlining multiple tests courts
use to determine whether an employer that contracts with another employer exercises sufficient
152
153
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make hiring decisions. Thus, regardless of National Football Scouting’s potential
status as an arm of the clubs or the NFL, the clubs and the NFL cannot use the
Combine as a mechanism to violate employment discrimination laws.
This Part outlines the existing law that applies to inquiring about,
obtaining, and acting on information about employee health, with a particular
focus on NFL players and the evaluative technologies described in Part I.
Specifically, this Part explores the protections and the applicability of the
employment portions of the ADA and GINA, which govern the ability of
employers to collect and to consider applicants’ and employees’ health-related
and genetic information. Given the players’ employment relationship with the
clubs, as well as possibly with the NFL itself, these laws would apply when those
entities evaluate players as described in Part I. While many individual states have
their own legislation governing disability and genetic-information discrimination
in employment, we focus on the federal protections for simplicity.
A. Americans with Disabilities Act
The first relevant federal employment discrimination provision is Title I of
the ADA. With respect to NFL players, the most significant protections relate
to discrimination and to medical examinations and inquiries. Importantly, the
ADA also prevents employers and unions from engaging in collective bargaining
that discriminates against individuals protected by the ADA.157
Title I prohibits covered entities from discriminating against qualified
individuals on the basis of disability.158 Significantly, the ADA does not cover all
employment-related relationships. Covered entities only include employment

control over the latter’s employees so as to qualify as their employer as well). For example, in
deciding whether the Rehabilitation Act, a law governing federal employees with disabilities, should
apply to the employees of private security firms that contract with the federal government, some
courts have applied the “joint employment test,” asking whether “one employer while contracting in
good faith with an otherwise independent company, has retained for itself sufficient control of the
terms and conditions of employment of the employees who are employed by the other employer.”
Id. at 173 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Pa., Inc.,
691 F.2d 1117, 1123 (3d Cir. 1982)). Others use a multifactor balancing test to determine if the federal
agency controls the “means and manner” of the employee’s performance. Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751 (1989)).
157 See Condon A. McGlothlen & Gary N. Savine, Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp.:
Reconciling the ADA with Collective Bargaining Agreements: Is This the Correct Approach?, 46 DEPAUL
L. REV. 1043, 1044 (1997) (claiming that the ADA “obviously prohibits an employer and union from
entering into a collective bargaining agreement which, for instance, restricts the hiring of persons
with AIDS” or members of other protected classes).
158 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012) (“No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified
individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement,
or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment.”).
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agencies, labor organizations, joint labor-management committees,159 and
employers with fifteen or more employees.160 While establishing that the
defendant is a covered entity is usually rather straightforward, demonstrating that
the plaintiff has eligibility to sue can be more complex.
While some ADA provisions apply to all individuals regardless of disability
status, in other cases, a plaintiff must first show that he has a “disability” as
defined by the statute161 and second, that he meets the legal definition of a
“qualified individual.”162 The ADA defines disability as “(A) a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of
such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as
having such an impairment.”163 An individual is qualified if he can perform the
essential job functions with or without reasonable accommodation.164 We
discuss both the disability and qualified requirements at greater length later in
this Part.165
To sue for a violation of Title I, a plaintiff must have filed a complaint
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) or the
relevant state employment agency.166 A plaintiff can proceed to court only
after exhausting these administrative remedies.167 Because the ADA largely
relies on individual claimants filing complaints for enforcement, an employer
can theoretically discriminate without consequence, as long as none of its
applicants or employees take action. This reality is particularly salient in the
hyper-competitive environment of the NFL and other professional sports,
where players are likely to be extremely hesitant to do anything that would
jeopardize their already slim chances of success. Hence, the ADA’s private
enforcement mechanism, which requires self-selection, might explain why so
few professional athletes have filed cases despite the presence of widespread
potential violations.

Id. § 12111(2).
Id; id. § 12111(5)(A)–(B).
Id. § 12102(1)
Id. § 12111(8).
Id. § 12102(1).
Id. § 12111(8).
See infra subsections II.A.2.a.i–ii.
THE BUREAU OF NAT’L AFFAIRS, INC., FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES MANUAL
§ 431:5 (2016). The ADA adopts the same pre-lawsuit procedures as Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act with respect to its employment discrimination provisions. See Filing a Lawsuit in Federal Court,
U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/federal/fed_employees/
lawsuit.cfm [https://perma.cc/63VE-CH6N] (explaining that the “law requires that you first try to
settle your discrimination complaint by going through the administrative complaint process” and
noting that the same applies for Title VII claims).
167 2 AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: PRACTICE AND COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 7:336 (rev. 2011).
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
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To be clear, employees—including NFL players—cannot prospectively waive
their legal rights under the ADA168 or GINA.169 For example, while the CBA and
the players’ contracts contain clauses requiring arbitration of employment-related
disputes,170 the EEOC will accept and process charges regardless of whether the
complainant is bound by an arbitration clause. Indeed the EEOC “may pursue
injunctive relief and seek any other relief not available in the arbitral forum even
on behalf of a party that signed a pre-dispute arbitration agreement.”171
We now turn to the types of claims available under Title I: (1) claims for
unlawful disability-related inquiries and medical examinations and (2) claims for
discrimination on the basis of actual, past, or perceived disability.
1. Medical Exams and Disability-Related Inquiries
The statute includes a section specifically governing “medical examinations
and inquiries.”172 It prohibits employers from asking questions or ordering a
medical examination to determine whether an applicant or an employee is a
person with a disability.173 Importantly, Title I’s medical examination provisions
168 See EEOC, EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE 915.002 (Apr. 10, 1997), https://www.eeoc
.gov/policy/docs/waiver.html [https://perma.cc/J2NX-33KW] (noting that the ADA allows individuals to
waive personal claims that have already arisen but does not permit individuals to waive their rights under
the statute in advance). In other words, an employer cannot ask an employee to give the employer
the right to act in a discriminatory way.
169 See infra note 324.
170 Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 32, art. 43; id. app. A, para. 19. The law
distinguishes between arbitrating and waiving claims. While antidiscrimination claims cannot be
waived, agreements to arbitrate antidiscrimination claims are generally enforceable unless the
statute specifically states otherwise. Compare 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 274 (2009)
(“We hold that a collective-bargaining agreement that clearly and unmistakably requires union
members to arbitrate ADEA claims is enforceable as a matter of federal law.”), with id. at 265 (“The
decision to resolve ADA claims by way of arbitration instead of litigation does not waive the
statutory right to be free from workplace age discrimination.”). However, because no provision of
the Collective Bargaining Agreement explicitly requires the arbitration of GINA claims, it is
unlikely that players would be required to arbitrate them. Jennifer K. Wagner, Sidelining GINA: The
Impact of Personal Genomics and Collective Bargaining in Professional Sports, 12 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L. J.
81, 114-15 (2012). Moreover, even if the Collective Bargaining Agreement did lawfully require the
arbitration of GINA claims, such a requirement would only apply to current players and not players
participating at the NFL Combine, as they are not yet part of the bargaining unit covered by the
Collective Bargaining Agreement. See Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 32, pmbl.
(defining the bargaining unit as players currently and previously employed by an NFL club, rookie
players who have already been selected in the NFL draft, and undrafted rookie players who have
commenced contract negotiations with an NFL club).
171 2 JOHN F. BUCKLEY IV & MICHAEL R. LINDSAY, DEFENSE OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
CLAIMS § 19:3 (2d ed. Supp. 2013).
172 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(1) (2012) (“The prohibition against discrimination as referred to
in subsection (a) of this section shall include medical examinations and inquiries.”).
173 Id. § 12112(d)(2), (4). The statute does, however, allow employers to require a medical exam
or make an inquiry when doing so is “shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity.”
Id. § 12112(d)(4).

258

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 165: 227

apply with equal force to applicants and employees both with and without
disabilities.174 As a result, an individual does not have to establish a statutorily
defined disability or show that he is a qualified individual when suing for an
improper exam or inquiry.175
At the end of this Part, Table 1 summarizes the ADA provisions
concerning medical examinations and disability-related inquiries.
a. Claims
While the statute and its accompanying regulations do not contain a clear
definition of a disability-related inquiry or medical examination, the EEOC has
offered some guidance. According to the EEOC, a disability-related inquiry is a
“question (or series of questions) that is likely to elicit information about a
disability.”176 Disability-related inquiries include asking about information that
would clearly be of interest to NFL clubs, such as whether an individual takes
medication or if he has ever been disabled.177 Likewise, the EEOC guidance
defines a “medical examination” as a “procedure or test that seeks information
about an individual’s physical or mental impairments or health.”178
The EEOC lists seven criteria for determining whether a particular
evaluation constitutes a medical exam:
(1) whether the test is administered by a health care professional; (2) whether
the test is interpreted by a health care professional; (3) whether the test is
designed to reveal an impairment or physical or mental health; (4) whether the
test is invasive; (5) whether the test measures an employee’s performance of a
task or measures his/her physiological responses to performing the task ; [sic]
(6) whether the test normally is given in a medical setting; and, (7) whether
medical equipment is used.179

174 See Michelle A. Travis, Lashing Back at the ADA Backlash: How the Americans with Disabilities Act
Benefits Americans Without Disabilities, 76 TENN. L. REV. 311, 337 (2009) (highlighting that the pre-offer
medical examination provisions of the ADA refer to all “‘job applicant[s],’ rather than just to qualified
individuals with a disability, as found in other ADA sections” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1211(d)(2)(A))).
175 See LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 154.07(4)(a) (2d ed. 2011) (“Questions
have arisen as to who has standing to enforce the ADA provisions governing the employer’s access to and
the use of medical information. The few circuits addressing these questions have determined that to have
standing under these provisions, a plaintiff need not establish that he or she is a qualified individual with
a disability.” (citations omitted)). Larson specifically cites the Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits,
and several district courts, as examples of courts without any such requirement. Id.
176 EEOC, EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE 915.002 (July 27, 2000), https://www.eeoc
.gov/policy/docs/guidance-inquiries.html [https://perma.cc/6SXM-Y9BC] (emphasis omitted).
177 Id.
178 Id. (emphasis omitted).
179 Id.

2017]

Evaluating NFL Player Health and Performance

259

Examples include a wide range of familiar medical screenings and procedures
like vision tests, blood pressure and cholesterol evaluations, range-of-motion
tests designed to measure strength and motor function, psychological tests,
and diagnostic procedures like MRIs and CAT scans.180
Because the ADA covers both physical and mental disabilities, its medical
inquiry and examination provisions apply with equal force to assessments of
psychological health.181 The ADA, therefore, covers a wide range of evaluations,
including many examinations and inquiries that are currently part of the Combine,
as well as the NFL physicals described in Part I.182 Moreover, as mentioned,
collective bargaining agreements cannot prospectively waive substantive
antidiscrimination rights.183
To summarize, to the extent that the CBA—or the common practices of the
NFL, the clubs, and National Football Scouting—require players or prospective
players to submit to medical examinations or answer questions that might reveal
an impairment, those entities could be in violation of the ADA. Whether or not
those evaluations are lawful will depend at least in part on the timing of the
examination or inquiry because the law has different legal standards for similar
practices: (1) pre-employment, (2) post-offer, and (3) during employment.
i. Pre-Employment
Title I forbids pre-employment medical exams or inquiries regarding whether
an applicant is “an individual with a disability or as to the nature or severity of such
disability.”184 However, the law explicitly allows “preemployment inquiries [but not
medical exams] into the ability of an applicant to perform job-related functions.”185
For example, an employer might explain the physical rigors of the job to the
prospective employee and then ask the applicant whether he or she could perform
those functions, with or without reasonable accommodation. In addition to
inquiring about specific job-related functions, an employer could also make a
general inquiry regarding whether the individual has a physical or mental
impairment that would prevent him or her from performing essential job
Id.
NFL clubs are very concerned about the psychological health of prospects. See, e.g., Mike
Florio, Confusing Reports Emerge About Randy Gregory, NBC SPORTS: PROFOOTBALLTALK (Apr. 29,
2015, 2:43 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2015/04/29/confusing-reports-emerge-about-randygregory/ [http://perma.cc/P9UE-443U] (reporting that prospect Randy Gregory’s draft status was falling
due to “concern about [his] ability to handle the mental rigors of professional football” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
182 See supra subsection I.B.1.
183 See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
184 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(A) (2012).
185 Id. § 12112(d)(2)(B). Unfortunately, the ADA does not explicitly define applicant, leaving
some question about whether a participant at the Combine qualifies as an applicant for employment
by the NFL or NFL clubs. We assume that the participant does.
180
181
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functions.186 Thus, an employer might ask whether there is anything the
applicant thinks could impede his or her ability to perform the job in question.
Again, these provisions apply to all job applicants, not just qualified individuals
with disabilities.187
As will be discussed at greater length below, these provisions are
particularly relevant to the activities of the NFL and its clubs at the Combine,
which include a number of medical examinations before clubs draft or actually
offer any of the prospects employment.188 The Combine is an invite-only
recruiting event: approximately 300 of the best college players are invited to
participate.189 Additionally, the authorizations the players sign before the
Combine authorize parties to use the released information only in relation to
the players “actual or potential employment in the National Football
League.”190 Given the targeted and elite nature of the Combine, the
screenings that take place are reasonably likely to be deemed pre-employment
exams (in contrast to a step even before that), although the issue has never
been litigated.191
ii. Post-Offer (Employee Entrance Examination)
The ADA permits post-offer medical examinations when (1) they are
imposed on all entering employees regardless of disability; (2) their results are
kept confidential, meaning the information is collected and maintained in a
medical file separate from the employee’s personnel file and not shared except
for accommodation, first aid and safety, or compliance reasons; and (3) the
information obtained is used only in accordance with the statute (i.e., not to
screen out individuals with disabilities or otherwise discriminate unless related
to job performance).192 While the results of the post-offer exam are confidential,
an employer can require that an employee sign an authorization disclosing all of
her health records as a condition of employment193 (with the exception of genetic

186 Mark A. Rothstein, Occupational Health Law, in OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH SERVICES: A
PRACTICAL APPROACH 36, 41 (Tee L. Guidotti et al. eds., 2d ed. 2013).
187 See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
188 See infra subsection II.A.1.b.i.
189 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
190 Online Appendix C, supra note 62, at 3, 7.
191 While Title I of the ADA applies to stages of review that are potentially earlier than
pre-employment, such as open casting calls, remains unclear. Some, however, have advanced such an
argument. See, e.g., Carley G. Mak, Fame, Fortune, and . . . Fourteen-Hour Days? Open Casting Calls for
Reality TV Contestants Are Pre-Employment Tests and Public Accommodations Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 26 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 523, 544 (2006) (arguing that the ADA’s pre-employment
provisions apply to open casting calls for reality television programs).
192 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3) (2012).
193 Rothstein, supra note 186, at 41-42.
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information pursuant to GINA, as discussed below194). Put simply, an employer
can condition an offer of employment on releasing otherwise private personal
health information.
Technically, post-offer exams need not be job-related as long as they meet the
three criteria above. However, if the employer revokes the offer of employment
because an employee fails to fulfill a particular qualification standard, it must
show that the exclusionary qualification standard is job-related and consistent
with business necessity.195 For instance, a truck driving company might condition
job offers on the candidate having 20/20 vision. As long as all employees have to
pass a vision test, the results of the exam are confidential, and the company does
not use them to violate the ADA, the examination is lawful under the ADA’s
medical exam provisions. But if an employee who fails the vision test sues, the
employer would have to demonstrate that the standards for passing that exam
are job-related and consistent with business necessity. In other words, the
truck driving company would have to prove that 20/20 vision relates to
driving trucks and that the vision test serves a legitimate business purpose in
assuring that the company runs safely and efficiently. During litigation, the
employee may be able to establish that 20/40 vision—not 20/20 vision—is
sufficient for driving a truck. Thus, while the vision test might not be an
unlawful medical exam, the underlying qualification standard could violate
the ADA. Ironically then, the law technically allows employers to obtain
information during preplacement examinations that cannot ultimately be
used to make decisions.196
iii. During Employment
Title I also regulates medical exams and inquiries after the employment
relationship has been established. With respect to current employees, it provides,
A covered entity shall not require a medical examination and shall not
make inquiries of an employee as to whether such employee is an individual
See infra notes 341–42 and accompanying text.
See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b)(3) (2015) (“Medical examinations conducted in accordance with
this section do not have to be job-related and consistent with business necessity. However, if certain
criteria are used to screen out an employee or employees with disabilities as a result of such an
examination or inquiry, the exclusionary criteria must be job-related and consistent with business
necessity, and performance of the essential job functions cannot be accomplished with reasonable
accommodation as required in this part.”); see also EEOC, supra note 176 (stating these conditions
to answer the question of whether “an employer [may] ask an employee for documentation when s/he
requires a reasonable accommodation” (emphasis omitted)).
196 See Mark A. Rothstein et al., Limiting Occupational Medical Evaluations Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 41 AM. J.L. & MED. 523, 541
(2015) (“The preplacement rules established by the ADA lead to the anomalous result that employers
are legally permitted to obtain health information that they are not legally permitted to use in the
decision-making process.”).
194
195
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with a disability or as to the nature or severity of the disability, unless such
examination or inquiry is shown to be job-related and consistent with
business necessity.197

Generally, an employer-mandated medical inquiry is both “job-related”
and “consistent with business necessity” if the employer “has a reasonable
belief, based on objective evidence, that: (1) an employee’s ability to perform
essential job functions will be impaired by a medical condition; or (2) an
employee will pose a direct threat due to a medical condition.”198 Thus,
job-relatedness requires that the inquiry pertain to the specific job in
question, whereas business necessity speaks to whether the particular
examination is necessary to achieve a legitimate business purpose.
The statute’s implementing regulations include certain exceptions,
allowing “voluntary medical examinations and activities, including voluntary
medical histories,”199 in conjunction with employee health programs200 such
as employer-provided wellness initiatives and “inquiries into the ability of an
employee to perform job-related functions.”201 Yet for reasons discussed
below, we do not think this exception is especially relevant to our context. 202
b. Specific NFL Evaluative Technologies
The ADA’s disability-related inquiry and medical exam provisions apply
to several of the kinds of evaluations described in Part I, including traditional
medical examinations and athletic drills, as well as burgeoning nongenetic
and genetic technologies.
i. Medical Examinations and Athletic Drills
The ADA could apply to many of the traditional medical examinations and
athletic drills conducted by the NFL, the clubs, and National Football Scouting,
both before and during a player’s employment. As discussed, pursuant to the
EEOC’s guidance, medical examinations include vision, blood pressure, and
range-of-motion tests. 203 The statute covers most mental and physical

42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A).
EEOC, supra note 176, at n.40 (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d).
Information obtained from these voluntary exams is subject to the same confidentiality
requirements and exceptions as the results of the employee entrance exams described above. 42
U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(C). See supra note 192 and accompanying text for the requirements.
201 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(B).
202 See infra text accompanying notes 231–32.
203 See supra note 180 and accompanying text. For a detailed description of the various types
of medical screenings covered by the ADA, see supra subsection II.A.1.a.
197
198
199
200

2017]

Evaluating NFL Player Health and Performance

263

assessments.204 Moreover, questions related to a current or prospective player’s
health and fitness could constitute disability-related inquiries as they are “likely
to elicit information about a disability.”205 It is more likely that the ADA will
apply to medical examinations and physicals, which assess health and fitness, as
opposed to athletic drills, which principally assess skills and performance.
However, given the EEOC’s broad construction of medical examinations and
inquiries, the ADA might cover an athletic drill that reveals or could reveal
information about a potential disability. Whether an athletic drill could be
construed as a disability-related inquiry or a medical examination would have to
be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
Of course, the ADA does not create an outright ban on these kinds of
evaluations. It simply requires that they meet certain standards. For example,
the NFL or a club could ask a prospective player about his health, as it
pertains to his ability to play football—i.e., to perform “job-related
functions.”206 Similarly, the club may make disability-related inquiries and
require medical examinations after making a conditional offer of employment, as
long as it requires all entering employees to undergo the same evaluations and
the results are kept confidential and are not used to discriminate.207 Finally, once
a player begins employment, the NFL or a club can make disability-related
inquiries and impose medical examinations that are job-related and consistent
with business necessity.208
The upshot of this analysis is that at present, various parts of the NFL scouting process
may violate the ADA. As mentioned, the Combine includes pre-employment
medical examinations, such as x-rays, MRIs, EKGs, and blood tests.209
Additionally, players may be asked sensitive questions during Combine interviews,
including queries that relate to current or previous disabilities.210 Indeed, one of
the principal purposes of the Combine is to determine whether a player is
“injury prone.”211 In reviewing other work from the Football Players Health
Study, the NFL stated that the comprehensive medical examination at the

See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
EEOC, supra note 176; see also supra text accompanying note 176.
See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
See supra note 192 and accompanying text. Recall that an employer can lawfully condition an offer
on passing a medical exam. Consequently, if a club has complied with ADA’s employee entrance exam
provisions but withdraws its employment offer after a prospective player fails a post-offer medical
examination, that action would not violate the statute.
208 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A) (2012).
209 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
210 See Josh Alper, Paxton Lynch Says a Couple of Teams Were “Spooked” by Combine Medical Exam,
NBC SPORTS: PROFOOTBALLTALK (Feb. 26, 2016, 5:26 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/
2016/02/26/paxton-lynch-says-a-couple-of-teams-spooked-by-combine-medical-exam/ [https://perma.cc/C38
J-7NE8] (explaining that a prospect was asked questions about previous knee and shoulder injuries).
211 Hunsinger Benbow, supra note 54.
204
205
206
207
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Combine is “a traditional employer ‘fit-for-service’ examination, common
across numerous industries.”212 While job-related inquiries are permissible,
however, any pre-employment medical examinations violate the ADA.213
It might be argued that National Football Scouting’s status as a legally
distinct entity214 could insulate it (and the NFL) from liability, as National
Football Scouting itself does not employ players. Yet if a court determined
that National Football Scouting is under the control of the NFL or some or
all of its clubs (or—if short of actual control—its activities are legally imputed to
those entities under the ADA), the evaluations conducted at the Combine would
seem to constitute clear violations of the ADA’s ban on pre-employment medical
exams. Moreover, even if National Football Scouting is not acting as an arm of
the NFL or of the clubs, it nonetheless provides the venue for the NFL and the
clubs to conduct activities that violate the ADA. The Combine allows the NFL
and the clubs to obtain exactly the type of health-related information that the
ADA is designed to regulate. It would defeat the purpose of the ADA’s medical
exam and inquiry provisions if an employer could claim it did not violate the law
because, instead of conducting the exam directly, it contracted with a third-party
medical professional. Similarly, it would defeat the purpose of the ADA’s medical
exam and inquiry provisions if the NFL and its clubs could place themselves
outside the scope of the ADA by contracting with National Football Scouting to
perform evaluations. While this particular issue has not yet been litigated—and
may reflect a statutory gap—our view is that pre-employment exams conducted
at the Combine likely violate the ADA.
Furthermore, the clubs’ post-offer customs might also violate the ADA in
that they are not universal and confidential. Specifically, the clubs may violate
the ADA to the extent that the post-offer medical examinations are not
administered uniformly. Thus, any special screening of an individual player
would be highly suspect. Moreover, the widely publicized nature of the results
calls their confidentiality into question.215

212 Comments and Corrections from the Nat’l Football League, to I. Glenn Cohen & Holly
Fernandez Lynch Concerning the Report, Protecting and Promoting the Health of NFL Players:
Legal and Ethical Analysis and Recommendations (June 24, 2016) (on file with authors).
213 See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
214 See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text.
215 A federal district court rejected the National Hockey League’s argument that player health
information is not discoverable due to the ADA’s confidentiality provisions and implied that the
league itself may be violating the ADA. See In re Nat’l Hockey League Players’ Concussion Injury
Litig., 120 F. Supp. 3d 942, 951 (D. Minn. 2015) (“[T]he U.S. Clubs disclose players’ medical
information to parties other than simply supervisors and managers, whether those parties are
retained by the U.S. Clubs or are true third parties, such as the media. This redisclosure of players’
medical information by the U.S. Clubs themselves could arguably be violative of the ADA’s
confidentiality provisions, applying the U.S. Clubs’ reading of the statute.” (citation omitted)).
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ii. Nongenetic Technologies
The ADA’s limitations on medical examinations may also apply to some of
the innovative, nongenetic technologies described in Part I.216 As a threshold
matter, one must first determine if those evaluations constitute medical
examinations within the meaning of the statute. Again, courts would likely asses
these cases individually by assessing whether a particular technology meets the
relevant criteria outlined by the EEOC.217
Insofar as technology relies on traditional medical assessments, like blood
testing or imaging techniques, they would appear to have at least some of the
defining characteristics of ADA-covered medical examinations.218 However, with
regard to wearable technologies like Catapult’s GPS device, Fatigue Science’s
wristband, BioForce’s app, and X2’s sensors, the ADA’s applicability is less clear.
This ambiguity revolves around the question of whether these sensors are
medical devices (or are collecting medical or health-related data) when they
monitor speed, force, movement, sleep, and heart rate.
Perhaps not surprisingly, the NFL and the NFLPA are currently in
negotiations concerning whether the information collected by wearable
sensors merely measures performance or is for “health and medical
purposes.”219 Specifically, collecting data on “performance” is permissible
under the CBA, whereas collecting data for “health or medical purposes”
requires NFLPA consent.220
Whether wearable technologies are deemed medical devices or found to
collect health or medical information will determine if the ADA applies.
Using these new technologies does not clearly meet the definition of a
medical examination. They do not require the expertise of a healthcare
professional and do not need to be employed in a medical setting. With some
exceptions (such as the pill described earlier221), many of the technologies are
not invasive, nor are they obviously medical equipment. While some wearable
technologies could reveal an impairment, devices that measure speed or heart
rate are not designed for this purpose. Of the seven defining characteristics of
ADA-regulated medical exams, wearable technology appears to consistently meet
only one: it “measures an employee’s performance of a task or measures his/her
physiological responses to performing the task.”222 Although the EEOC’s criteria

See supra subsection I.B.2.
See supra notes 178–80 and accompanying text.
For example, they could be administered and interpreted by healthcare professionals,
capable of revealing impairments or measuring performance, and involve medical equipment.
219 This information was confidentially provided by the NFLPA on June 28, 2016.
220 Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 32, art. 51, § 13(c).
221 See supra subsection I.B.2.
222 EEOC, supra note 176.
216
217
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weigh against designating these technologies as medical examinations, this area
lacks robust precedent leading to a clear resolution.
In theory, assessing performance could detect the presence of an impairment,
even if the technique being used is not considered medical. For example, having a
player wear a monitor while sleeping could detect signs of previously undiagnosed
sleep apnea. Additionally, collecting performance-related data over time could also
lead to the discovery of an impairment if the player experiences subtle declines in
ability that would have otherwise gone unnoticed. Thus, whether the ADA applies
to the kinds of innovative technologies described in Part I would depend on how
broadly courts apply the term “medical examination.”
iii. Genetic Tests
Although some genetic testing, such as paternity, ancestry, or forensic
tests, do not relate to health, the varieties that would be of most interest to
the NFL and its clubs include tests designed either to predict or enhance
performance or to determine the propensity for injury. By revealing a player’s
susceptibility to injury or disease, they arguably constitute medical
examinations, thereby triggering the ADA’s restrictions on medical
examinations and inquiries. As with other kinds of medical examinations, the
ADA prohibits pre-employment genetic tests. Thus, a club that administers a
pre-offer genetic test for the sickle cell disease or trait violates the law. Genetic
testing would be ADA-permissible post-offer if everyone is tested, the tests are
confidential, and the results are used in accordance with the statute.223 Finally,
genetic testing during employment would need to be job-related and consistent
with business necessity.224 However, as will be discussed below, GINA regulates
genetic testing in employment far more strictly.225
c. Possible Responses and Defenses
While the ADA’s protections appear robust at first blush, various
exceptions and defenses may allow the NFL, the clubs, and National Football
Scouting to lawfully obtain health-related information about current and
prospective players. To illustrate, let us return to our hypothetical player,
James, introduced at the beginning of this Article. Suppose that, as a
prospective player, he went to the Combine and was asked to provide his
family medical history, to agree to an EKG, to perform a running drill, to
swallow a sensory pill, and to take a genetic test. Whether any—or perhaps
all—of these kinds of evaluations would violate the ADA’s prohibition on pre223
224
225

42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3) (2012).
See id. § 12112(d)(4)(A).
See infra Section II.B.
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employment disability-related inquiries and medical examinations depends
on how the EEOC and the courts interpret the scope of the statute.
To start, if the court determines that National Football Scouting is completely
distinct from the NFL and the clubs, National Football Scouting would not be a
covered entity under Title I because it is not an employer of NFL players, an
employment agency, a labor organization, or a joint-management committee.226
However, if a court determines that Title I of the ADA covers National Football
Scouting, the statute would prohibit any pre-employment medical examinations at
the Combine. Perhaps, National Football Scouting, the NFL, and the clubs could
defend the request for family medical history as a job-related inquiry; however, the
EKG and the genetic test would be strictly forbidden as medical examinations.
Whether the running drills or the pill violate the ADA would depend on how
expansively the court in question interpreted the meaning of a medical
examination. The NFL and the clubs could, of course, argue that these measures
indicate performance, not health, putting them outside the reach of the statute.
Given the level of fitness required to play professional football, a wide-range
of health-related questions could potentially be related to a prospective player’s
ability to perform job-related functions. Thus, the NFL and the clubs likely do
not violate the ADA by asking interview questions that might reveal
disability-related information before the individual has an employment offer;
put differently, the NFL and its clubs could very likely defend most inquiries by
establishing their relevance to an individual’s ability to play football. These
inquiries could range from specific (e.g., the average wide receiver runs a
forty-yard post route in under five seconds: is that something you would be able
to do?) or general (e.g., is there anything that would impede your ability to
perform the essential functions of an NFL football player?). If challenged, the
NFL or the clubs could assert that the inquiries speak to the individual’s
ability to play professional football. Recall, however, that this exception is for
job-related inquiries, not medical exams. Pre-offer medical examinations are
forbidden regardless of job-relatedness.
That said, pursuant to the ADA, the NFL and the clubs could conduct
medical examinations of prospective players after those individuals receive
employment offers from the clubs (since the Combine is pre-hiring, its
medical examinations would always be pre-offer). Importantly, to comply
with the law, the NFL and the clubs would have to ensure that the results of
the post-offer medical examinations are kept confidential, that the post-offer
medical examinations are universal, and that the results are only used in
accordance with the ADA. However, news stories about medical examinations
conducted during NFL free agency indicate that the results of at least some

226

See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2) (2012) (defining covered entities under the ADA).
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players’ medical examinations are currently released to the press.227 As
mentioned in Part I, players sign broad authorizations before participating in the
Combine.228 While it is possible that the players are waiving their legally
protected confidentiality right in the hopes of signing a particular contract, they
cannot consent to violations of the law.229 Thus, to avoid running afoul of the
ADA, the clubs likely need to institute more robust confidentiality protections
for the results of post-offer medical examinations.
Thus, depending on how expansively the court interprets the meaning of
a medical examination, the NFL or the clubs could perform those same five
evaluations described above post-offer. (Of course if the drill and the pill are
not considered “disability-related” or “medical,” the ADA would not apply
and the NFL and the clubs could administer them at any time.) In fact, the
NFL and the clubs could condition an individual’s offer on a prospective
player’s passing a particular evaluation, as well as on releasing his medical
records. However, insofar as the evaluations are not universal or confidential,
the ADA would forbid them. Thus, should James be singled out for an EKG
or have the results from the EKG released to the press, he could sue and the
NFL and the clubs would not have a clear defense.
Finally, should the NFL or the clubs decide to evaluate players
throughout their employment—which given the physical nature of the sport,
they certainly will want to do so—they may conduct medical examinations
that are job-related and consistent with business necessity. In other words, a
wide variety of evaluations could relate to playing football. Because health
and athletic performance are linked, those entities could easily argue that
medical examinations of the players serve the legitimate business purpose of
ensuring safe and effective play. This exception is broad enough to cover
medical examinations following an injury because an injury could affect an
individual’s ability to play (job-related), and treating the current injury, as
well as preventing re-injury, are legitimate concerns for the player’s health
and safety (business necessity). For example, a club could authorize an MRI
of a player who suffered a knee injury. Thus, most medical examinations of
current NFL players would most likely be allowed under the ADA, as they
would tend to be both job-related and consistent with business necessity.

See, e.g., Stapleton, supra note 77.
See supra note 62 and accompanying text. For copies of these waivers, see Online Appendix C,
supra note 62.
229 A player himself could certainly disclose his results to the press. See 1 GARY S. MARX WITH
DEBORAH ROSS, DISABILITY LAW COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 3:40 (2d ed. 2016) (“The ADA does
not prohibit an individual with a disability from voluntarily disclosing his or her own medical
information to persons beyond those to whom an employer can disclose such information.”).
However, his employer cannot pressure him to do so. Id.
227
228
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As noted, applicants and employees cannot consent to violations of the law.230
While the statute does allow employees and applicants to volunteer health and
medical information under certain circumstances, such as wellness programs
designed to lower health insurance costs,231 none of the exceptions look like fertile
ground for an argument that otherwise unlawful evaluations are voluntary.
However, it is worth noting that a player could voluntarily offer medical
information, for example to assuage the concerns of a club. Yet even if a
prospective player voluntarily provides the NFL or the clubs with
information regulated by the ADA, the voluntariness of the disclosure does
not immunize the NFL or the clubs from the statute’s antidiscrimination
provisions: they still could not use that information to discriminate on the
basis of an actual, past, or perceived disability.232
It is true that upon joining an NFL club (post-offer, and actually employed),
players are required to make certain health-related disclosures pursuant to their
contracts and the CBA. The standard NFL player contract contains a disclosure
provision stating,
Player represents to Club that he is and will maintain himself in excellent
physical condition. Player will undergo a complete physical examination by
the Club physician upon Club request, during which physical examination
Player agrees to make full and complete disclosure of any physical or mental condition
known to him which might impair his performance under this contract and to respond
fully and in good faith when questioned by the Club physician about such condition.
If Player fails to establish or maintain his excellent physical condition to the
satisfaction of the Club physician, or make the required full and complete
disclosure and good faith responses to the Club physician, then Club may
terminate this contract.233

Further, the collectively bargained Notice of Termination lists “fail[ing]
to make full and complete disclosure of your physical or mental condition
during a physical examination” as an accepted ground for termination.234
230 See LARSON, supra note 175, § 157.06 (“Since the ADA enforcement procedures are taken
from Title VII, and it is well-settled that under Title VII there can be no prospective waiver of an
individual’s claims, there can be no prospective waiver of an individual’s ADA claims. However, the
waiver of an ADA claim as part of a settlement or severance agreement will be considered valid
provided that the waiver is knowing and voluntary, as evidenced by the totality of the circumstances.”
(footnotes omitted)).
231 See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
232 See supra note 200.
233 Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 32, app. A, para. 8 (emphasis added). The
NFL Practice Squad Player Contract contains a similar provision. See id. app. J, para. 6.
234 Id. app. H (“You are hereby notified that effective immediately your NFL Player Contract(s)
with the Club covering the football season(s) has (have) been terminated for the reason(s) checked below:
. . . You have failed to make full and complete disclosure of your physical or mental condition during a
physical examination.”).
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These provisions put players in a difficult position, as they create an incentive
to avoid being formally diagnosed with a condition to avoid triggering the
obligation to disclose. But avoiding diagnostic tests and medical exams could
delay treatment and lead to further harm as the illness or injury worsens over
time. Additionally, the collectively bargained nature of these disclosures and
releases creates additional pressure on the players, further undermining their
purported voluntariness.
Moreover, a failure to adequately disclose can undermine a player’s
potential injury grievance.235 Because of the players’ disclosure obligations,
the CBA presumes that any player who passed the club physical is fit to play.236
Consequently, alleging that “the player failed to make full and complete
disclosure of his known physical or mental condition when questioned during a
physical examination by the Club” is a special defense that a club can raise in its
answer to a player’s injury grievance.237
From a practical perspective, given the physical nature of the job, insofar
as the ADA allows employers to make job-related inquiries (both before and
during employment) and conduct medical exams post-offer and during
employment, the NFL and its clubs would have a robust defense to
demanding such inquiries and exams at the permissible times. That is not to
say, however, that the NFL and its clubs can simply require any and all
medical inquiries and examinations. While assessing the range of motion of
a quarterback’s arm quite clearly pertains to his ability to perform his job,
conducting a dental exam appears less relevant. Courts would likely make
these determinations on a case-by-case basis.
2. Discrimination
In addition to its medical examination and disability-related inquiry
provisions, the ADA also forbids adverse employment actions against
qualified individuals on the basis of a disability. At the end of this Section,
Table 2 summarizes the ADA provisions concerning discrimination against
qualified individuals with disabilities.

235 An injury grievance is “a claim or complaint that, at the time a player’s NFL Player
Contract or Practice Squad Player Contract was terminated by a Club, the player was physically
unable to perform the services required of him by that contract because of an injury incurred in the
performance of his services under that contract.” Id. art. 44, § 1.
236 See id. art. 44, § 12 (“If the player passes the physical examination of the Club prior to the
preseason training camp for the year in question, having made full and complete disclosure of his
known physical and mental condition when questioned by the Club physician during the physical
examination, it will be presumed that such player was physically fit to play football on the date of
such examination.”).
237 Id. art. 44, § 3(a)(2).
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a. Claims
Title I contains a rather lengthy description of what constitutes discrimination.
Section 12112(a) states, “No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified
individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the
hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.”238 The statute
includes several subsections explaining how to construe its antidiscrimination
mandate. Section 12112(b) explains that discrimination against a qualified individual
with a disability covers a wide range of employer actions that both intentionally
and unintentionally have an adverse effect on people with disabilities, including
classifying individuals on the basis of disability; participating in discriminatory
contracts or other agreements with employment-related entities; and adopting
qualification standards that tend to screen out individuals with disabilities, unless
those standards are job-related and consistent with business necessity.239
i. Disability
Unlike the medical examination provisions,240 the ADA’s discrimination
sections require litigants to establish that they are qualified individuals with
disabilities. Recall that the ADA defines disability as “(A) a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such
individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as
having such an impairment.”241 It goes on to explain that
[a]n individual meets the requirement of “being regarded as having such an
impairment” if the individual establishes that he or she has been subjected to
an action prohibited under this chapter because of an actual or perceived
physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is
perceived to limit a major life activity.242

Consequently, to be a person “with a disability” pursuant to the ADA, an
individual does not have to be currently experiencing a substantially limiting
impairment if she has previously had such an impairment (record of) or is

238 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). At present, courts are split on the question of whether claimants must
establish that the disability was simply a motivating factor or whether it must be a but-for cause of
the discrimination. See LARSON, supra note 175, § 156.02 (citing the Second, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits as examples of courts that have adopted the “widely recognized [view] that . . . it is not
necessary . . . to demonstrate that the disability was the sole cause of the adverse employment
decision” but noting that the Sixth and Tenth Circuits follow the sole cause standard).
239 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b).
240 See supra notes 174–75 and accompanying text.
241 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).
242 Id. § 12102(3)(A).
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perceived by her employer to be impaired (regarded as). Impairments cover a
wide range of both physical and mental conditions,243 including addiction.244
With respect to major life activities, in the ADA Amendments Act of 2008
(ADAAA),245 Congress added a nonexhaustive list to the statute. Accordingly,
“major life activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing
manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending,
speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating,
and working,”246 as well as “major bodily function[s].”247 Major bodily functions
“includ[e] but [are] not limited to, functions of the immune system, normal cell
growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory,
endocrine, and reproductive functions.”248 These additions to the law were
intended to counteract previously restrictive court interpretations of “major life
activity.”249 Lastly, the “regarded as” prong, as defined by the ADAAA, could
potentially capture a wide range of conduct.250 This definition of disability is
intentionally broad.251
At first blush, it may seem counterintuitive that NFL players—elite athletes in
peak physical condition—might meet the legal definition of “individuals with
disabilities.” However, Congress used “disability” as a term of art in the statute with
a specific meaning. In addition to players with chronic conditions like heart
problems or diabetes, the ADA could potentially cover injured players, depending
on the degree of the injury (actual impairment), the history of injuries (record of),

See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1)–(2) (2012) (providing examples of physical and mental impairments).
See JOHN F. BUCKLEY, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY: 2016 COMPLIANCE GUIDE
§7.08[A][3] (2016) (“Persons addicted to drugs, but who are no longer using drugs illegally and are
receiving treatment for drug addiction . . . are protected by the ADA . . . on the basis of past drug
addiction.”).
245 ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified in scattered
sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C) (amending Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104
Stat. 327).
246 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
247 Id. § 12102(2)(B).
248 Id.
249 See Jessica L. Roberts, Healthism and the Law of Employment Discrimination, 99 IOWA L.
REV. 571, 596 n.163, 597 (2014) (citing Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534
U.S. 184, 200-01 (2002), superseded by statute, § 2(b)(4)–(5), 122 Stat. at 3554—which restricted the
scope of major life activities to those “central to most people’s daily lives,” as opposed to “merely a
task, or class of tasks, that are required for the claimant’s job,” as an example of the kind of restrictive
Supreme Court interpretation of disability that the ADAAA was meant to counteract).
250 While the “regarded as” prong appeared in the original ADA, the Supreme Court
introduced an element of mistaken belief into that definition in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527
U.S. 471, 489 (1999), superseded by statute, § 2(b)(2)–(3), 122 Stat. at 3554. Congress rejected this
construction of “regarded as” when it amended the ADA in 2008. § 2(b)(3), 122 Stat. at 3554.
251 See id. § 2(a)(4), 122 Stat. at 3553 (“[T]he holdings of the Supreme Court in Sutton v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) and its companion cases have narrowed the broad scope of protection
intended to be afforded by the ADA.”).
243
244
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or the player’s risk of injury (regarded as). As a result, a player does not have to be
experiencing an actual impairment to be considered an individual with a disability.
For example, imagine a player injures himself seriously but not
permanently.252 Short-term impairments constitute disabilities when they are
“sufficiently severe.”253 Hence, under existing law, he might be able to assert
that his temporary injury is severe enough to qualify as a disability.254
However, courts will make these determinations on a case-by-case basis. For
example, while the inability to walk for seven months could constitute a
disability for ADA purposes, a torn ACL might not.255 Likewise, if a
prospective or current player at some point had a substantially limiting
impairment and subsequently healed, the history of injury would qualify as a
disability under the “record of ” prong.
Finally, the breadth of the “regarded as” provision means it could be
particularly useful to NFL players. While “regarded as” may not apply to
temporary disabilities,256 it would cover instances in which individuals are
perceived as having disabilities, regardless of whether they are actually
impaired or actually limited in a major life activity.257
For example, Star Lotulelei, discussed above, 258 was arguably “regarded
as” being disabled after an echocardiogram detected a cardiovascular
abnormality. A player who experiences a limitation in a major bodily function
that might not directly affect his current ability to play, such as a congenital
heart problem, diabetes, or cancer, could also qualify as an individual with a
disability. For instance, a federal court found that professional golfer Stephen
Barron had established a strong likelihood of success on his claim that he was
disabled under the ADA based on low testosterone production.259 Consequently,
the “regarded as” prong might be the most powerful avenue of relief for NFL

If the injury is severe enough, he might acquire a permanent impairment.
29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix) (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 154
Cong. Rec. H8294–96 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 2008) (statement of Reps. Hoyer & Sensenbrenner)).
254 Following the 2008 amendments, the ADA applies to some temporary impairments. See
Summers v. Altarum Inst. Corp., 740 F.3d 325, 333 (4th Cir. 2014) (holding that an accident which
left a plaintiff unable to walk for seven months was sufficiently severe to qualify as a disability
following the ADAAA expansions).
255 See Koller v. Riley Riper Hollin & Colagreco, 850 F. Supp. 2d 502, 514 (E.D. Pa. 2012)
(holding that the plaintiff failed to establish that his torn ACL, which required surgery, rose to the
level of a disability under the statute).
256 See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B) (2012) (stating that the regarded as prong “shall not apply to
impairments that are transitory and minor” and that “[a] transitory impairment is an impairment
with an actual or expected duration of 6 months or less”).
257 Id. § 12102(3)(A).
258 Newton, supra note 68.
259 Barron v. PGA Tour, Inc., 670 F. Supp. 2d 674, 685 (W.D. Tenn. 2009). However, the court
ultimately denied his request for a temporary restraining order to require the PGA tour to allow
him to compete. Id. at 691.
252
253
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players under the ADA. Even players who are completely free of impairments
both past and present may be considered people with disabilities if they can
establish that the NFL or the clubs treated them in a discriminatory manner.
The regarded as prong may also be the most comfortable fit, as the players
themselves loathe portraying themselves as impaired.
Still, it is not sufficient to show that one has a “disability” to proceed with
a claim under the ADA’s antidiscrimination provisions.
ii. Qualified
Under Title I of the ADA, a “qualified individual” is “an individual who, with
or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
employment position that such individual holds or desires.”260 In determining
which job functions are essential, the statute gives deference to the employer.261
EEOC regulations define essential job functions as “the fundamental job duties
of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires,” not
including marginal functions.262 For example, the essential functions of an
administrative assistant might include printing, filing, scanning, delivering mail,
and moderate lifting.
The regulations go on to indicate that a job function could be “essential”
for purposes of the ADA for at least three reasons:
(i) The function may be essential because the reason the position exists
is to perform that function;
(ii) The function may be essential because of the limited number of
employees available among whom the performance of that job function can
be distributed; and/or
(iii) The function may be highly specialized so that the incumbent in
the position is hired for his or her expertise or ability to perform the
particular function.263

Hence, whether a job function is essential depends on its importance and not
its frequency.
Of course, in addition to establishing a disability, an individual who wishes to
pursue an ADA claim must also establish that he is qualified. The “qualified
individual” inquiry is especially challenging in the context of professional sports
42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
See id. (“For the purposes of this subchapter, consideration shall be given to the employer’s
judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, and if an employer has prepared a written
description before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this description shall be
considered evidence of the essential functions of the job.”).
262 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1) (2015).
263 Id. § 1630.2(n)(2).
260
261
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where excellence, not mere competence, is the necessary standard. There is very
little guidance or case law on this issue. The applicable regulations allow courts
to look to written job descriptions and collective bargaining agreements when
assessing which job functions are essential.264 The standard NFL player contract
states that the “Club employs Player as a skilled football player.”265 It goes on to
explain that “Player represents that he has special, exceptional and unique knowledge,
skill, ability, and experience as a football player, the loss of which cannot be estimated
with any certainty and cannot be fairly or adequately compensated by damages.”266
Additionally, the contract states,
Player understands that he is competing with other players for a position on
Club’s roster within the applicable player limits. If at any time, in the sole
judgment of Club, Player’s skill or performance has been unsatisfactory as compared
with that of other players competing for positions on Club’s roster, or if Player has
engaged in personal conduct reasonably judged by Club to adversely affect or reflect
on Club, then Club may terminate this contract. 267

Thus, according to the standard contract, whether an individual is
qualified to play NFL football is a relative—not an absolute—inquiry. Thus,
the qualified individual inquiry likely is more of a moving target in the case
of an elite athlete than it is in the case of an administrative assistant.
In terms of relevant case law, two cases potentially address how to
determine essential job functions of professional athletes. First, in 2006, Roy
Tarpley, a former basketball player whom the NBA banned for violating its
drug and alcohol policies, filed an ADA claim with the EEOC after the NBA
denied his request to reenter the league.268 The EEOC found reasonable
cause that the NBA had violated his rights under the ADA and issued a right
to sue letter, placing Tarpley “in an advantaged position, particularly [for]
settlement talks.”269 Tarpley sued the league in a Texas federal court, but the
case settled before the court made any substantive rulings.270 Nevertheless,
documents indicate that Tarpley would have argued that the essential job
functions of an NBA player include “not only the ability to play NBA

Id. § 1630.2(n)(3).
Collective Bargaining Statement, supra note 32, app. A, para. 2 (2011).
Id. para. 3 (emphasis added).
Id. para. 11 (emphasis added).
Michael A. McCann, Do You Believe He Can Fly? Royce White and Reasonable Accommodations
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act for NBA Players with Anxiety Disorder and Fear of Flying, 41
PEPP. L. REV. 397, 419 (2014).
269 Id. at 420.
270 Id.
264
265
266
267
268
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basketball, but also the capability of being a role model.”271 Given the
language of the standard NFL player contract, there would be a strong
argument that the essential functions of being an NFL player include
exceptional skills and performance, as well as a behavioral element off of the
field akin to being a role model.
The other potentially relevant case, PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, is actually a
Title III (public accommodations) case, not a Title I (employment) case.272
Still, the Supreme Court analyzed the essential aspects of golf to determine
whether the plaintiff ’s request for a modification—that he be allowed to drive
a golf cart during play—would “fundamentally alter the nature” of PGA Tour
tournaments.273 In so doing, the Court looked to the “Rules of Golf ” that
govern both amateur and professional golf, the “Conditions of Competition
and Local Rules” that govern the PGA’s professional tournaments, and the
“Notices to Competitors” that issued for specific tournaments.274
Thus, a court asked to assess whether an individual is qualified to play
professional football would likely look to analogous sources like a player’s
contract, the CBA, official NFL rules and regulations, and the descriptions
of the player’s position from the NFL and its clubs. “Qualified” in these
circumstances would necessarily mean performing at an elite, superior level.
To be sure, the qualified inquiry for professional athletes is more complex
than for traditional jobs. However, NFL clubs’ need to seek out the best
available players does not necessarily mean that anyone less than the best
must be unqualified per se. If that were true, the qualification standard would
be meaningless given that every employer seeks the best available candidate.
Again, whether a player is elite is a relative question—not an absolute one.
For example, an individual whose level of skill and performance might have
been elite in the past may no longer be qualified relative to the current group
of players. Thus, NFL players challenging clubs or the league under the ADA
may have difficulty establishing both the aspects of play that constitute
“essential functions” of professional football and whether they can perform
those essential functions with comparative excellence.
271 Id. However, it is questionable whether Tarpley would have been able to meet the first function
because he had not played in the NBA for eight years and would have been—if reinstated—the second
oldest player in the league. Moreover, he also had a history of serious knee problems. Id. at 420-21.
272 See 532 U.S. 661, 675-76 (2001) (“At issue now, as a threshold matter, is the applicability of
Title III [of the ADA] to petitioner’s golf tours . . . .”).
273 Id. at 682 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court ultimately explained that the use
of carts to play golf is not inconsistent with the fundamental characteristic of the game and that the
essence of golf is shotmaking. Id. at 683. Additionally, the Court explained that the PGA’s walking
requirement for professional tournaments is likewise not an “indispensable feature” of tournament golf
since the rule’s purpose is to fatigue players and Martin already tired more easily than his able-bodied
opponents Id. at 685, 690.
274 Id. at 666-67.
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b. Specific NFL Evaluative Technologies
We now apply these principles of the ADA to the various types of
traditional NFL examinations and drills, as well as to the cutting edge
evaluative technologies described in Part I.
i. Medical Examinations and Athletic Drills
The ADA prohibits adverse employment actions on the basis of an actual
or perceived disability if the employee can still perform his or her essential
job functions.275 If the person can no longer perform those essential job
functions, he or she is not qualified and, therefore, cannot sue for
discrimination. Thus, if the NFL or a club chooses not to hire, not to renew,
or to otherwise disadvantage a player who can perform the essential job
functions of playing football on the basis of medical or health-related
information, they could be liable for discrimination.
For example, imagine that our hypothetical player, James, has diabetes but
can still play at an elite level (i.e., the diagnosis does not affect his performance
in any negative way).276 Pursuant to the ADA, it is unlikely that National
Football Scouting could reject him from the Combine—nor could the NFL
or the club fail to hire him on the basis of his diabetes—unless it could show
some threat to his health and safety or to the health and safety of others. The
same would be true for a player with a congenital heart defect, a player with
a record of a severely limiting injuries, or a player, like Star Lotulelei,277 who
had been perceived as having an impairment.278 Thus, for their qualification
standards to be lawful, the NFL and the clubs must establish that their
selection criteria are both “job-related” and “consistent with business
275 See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A) (2012) (noting that the ADA applies to both actual and
perceived impairments); id. § 12111(8) (defining a qualified individual under the ADA as one who
can still perform the essential functions of the job).
276 This hypothetical is not mere conjecture. In 2012, the New England Patriots released
defensive tackle Kyle Love after he was diagnosed with diabetes and “struggled to keep on weight.”
Rich Hill, Former Patriots DT Kyle Love Wants to Face His Old Team in the Super Bowl, SB NATION:
PATS PULPIT (Jan. 15, 2016, 5:28 PM) http://www.patspulpit.com/2016/1/15/10777188/former-patriots-dtkyle-love-wants-to-face-his-old-team-in-the-super-randy-moss [http://perma.cc/J9M9-EFH3].
277 See supra text accompanying note 258.
278 In 2015, a somewhat similar situation unfolded with wide receiver Bud Sasser. The St. Louis
Rams drafted Sasser in the sixth round of the NFL Draft before learning that he had a heart
condition. Since Sasser had not been invited to the Combine, his condition was not discovered until
after he was drafted. The Rams’ doctors recommended that Sasser not play while Sasser’s agent
declared that another doctor had cleared him. The Rams still signed Sasser to a contract
commensurate with his draft position (including a $113,737 signing bonus) even though they were
under no such obligation. Nevertheless, the club ultimately terminated the contract, leaving Sasser’s
NFL future in doubt. Mike Florio, Agent Says Bud Sasser Has Been Cleared to Play, NBC SPORTS:
PROFOOTBALLTALK (June 5, 2015, 7:44 AM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2015/06/05/ag
ent-says-bud-sasser-has-been-cleared-to-play/ [http://perma.cc/YFR9-LJ2W].
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necessity.”279 Even assuming that the NFL, the club, and National Football
Scouting are performing medical examinations and athletic drills in
accordance with the ADA’s restrictions on disability-related inquiries and
medical exams (e.g., not conducting pre-offer examinations), they must still
take care to not engage in illegal discrimination upon receipt of post-offer
examination information.
It is worth pausing to emphasize that if a medical examination (post-offer
or during employment) or inquiry (at any time) reveals that a person cannot
perform the essential job functions of a professional football player, the NFL
or the club can refuse to hire him or can terminate him lawfully since he is
not “qualified” as required by the statute.
ii. Nongenetic Technologies
Should wearable technology reveal a disability, Title I’s antidiscrimination
provision would prevent discrimination on the basis of that disability. That
said, if a player’s performance declines so substantially that he can no longer
meet the rigorous standards of professional football, he would no longer be
qualified to play and would thus be outside the scope of Title I’s protection.280
If the technology only measures performance—without detecting
impairment281—the ADA offers no meaningful protection. An adverse
employment action based on performance data alone would not constitute
discrimination on the basis of disability. To the contrary, it would most likely
be justifiable if the performance data indicated that the individual was no
longer capable of performing the essential functions of NFL football. Put
another way, anything less than peak performance could be taken as an
indication of the person’s relative inferiority as a player, making it an
acceptable ground for an adverse employment action.
That said, given the often extensive injury history of NFL players, the
line between performance data and impairment detection is a murky one. For
example, a sensor that measures the amount of force a player creates might
typically be construed as a performance metric, but if the player has a history
of knee injuries, a reduction in force might be indicative of the player’s level
of impairment. Courts will likely struggle to distinguish the two should these
issues be litigated.

279
280
281

42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6).
See supra notes 274–75 and accompanying text.
See supra subsection II.A.1.b.i. for a discussion of the importance of the difference.
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iii. Genetic Tests
The ADA’s antidiscrimination provisions might also apply to genetic
tests. Arguably, to discriminate against an individual on the basis of genetic
information is to regard that person as disabled. Moreover, recall that being
regarded as disabled requires only that an individual face discrimination
“because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or
not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.”282
Hence, a plaintiff could argue that in addition to discrimination on the basis
of genetic information under GINA, he or she also faces discrimination on
the basis of a perceived disability.
While the ADA may technically apply to scenarios related to genetic testing
and genetic-information discrimination, GINA will likely be the primary legal
tool for such circumstances. While GINA does not preempt the ADA—and
claimants can and do assert violations of both statutes283—it specifically includes
genetic test results and excludes the type of manifested conditions that the ADA
covers,284 thereby implying complementary protections.
c. Possible Responses and Defenses
In cases of alleged discrimination, the NFL or a club could use a multitude
of defense strategies, such as arguing that the player is not qualified, that an
exclusionary qualification standard is job-related and consistent with a business
necessity, or that the player poses a direct threat to the health or safety of himself
or others. One response to a discrimination claim is to assert that the plaintiff
is not a qualified individual with a disability. Thus, the NFL or the club could
challenge James regarding how much his alleged impairment currently limits
him (substantially limiting impairment), has limited him in the past (record
of), or whether he has ever been perceived as being disabled (regarded as).
Although the ADAAA’s broader definition of disability makes it harder for
employers to establish the absence of a disability,285 they can still assert that
the person cannot perform essential job functions—even with reasonable
accommodations—and is therefore not “qualified.” Since elite athletic ability
is essential to playing professional football, this defense could be strong for
the NFL or the clubs. The NFL or the club might then argue that while James
is at an absolute level of excellence with respect to playing football, he still
42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A).
See, e.g., Complaint at 1, EEOC v. Fabricut Inc., No. 13-CV-248-CVE-PJC (N.D. Okla.
filed May 7, 2013) (seeking relief “to correct unlawful employment practices on the basis of disability
and genetic information” under both “Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990” and
“Title II of the Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act of 2008”).
284 See infra notes 325–36.
285 See supra notes 245–50 and accompanying text.
282
283
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falls comparatively short compared to other aspiring professional players
competing for the position.
Challenging whether an individual is disabled or qualified are responses
that cut across the various definitions of discrimination in Title I. Yet, some
of the specific constructions of discrimination found in § 12112(b) have their own
separate statutory exceptions or defenses.286 Suppose James has established that
he is qualified to play football at the elite level (as well as to conform to the
necessary behavioral norms) and also that he is a person with a disability as
defined by the ADA. In response to his claim for failing to accommodate a
qualified individual with a disability, James’s employer could argue that the
requested accommodation is not reasonable,287 or that even if the requested
accommodation were reasonable, it would create an undue hardship.288 Say
James has a learning disability and requests extra time than is normally
provided for taking the Wonderlic test at the Combine.289 James would have
to demonstrate that his request for additional time is reasonable; then the
NFL or the clubs (through National Football Scouting) could argue his
request would impose some kind of unacceptable burden.
The ADA includes specific statutory defenses to allegations that a qualification
standard disproportionately screens out individuals with disabilities.290
Importantly, essential job functions (the touchstone for the qualified individual
inquiry) are distinct from qualification standards. As noted, essential job
functions are the fundamental duties of the job,291 while qualification standards are
the selection criteria the employer uses to assess whether an individual is qualified.
Thus, a person who could perform the essential functions of the job (i.e., is
qualified) might be screened out by discriminatory qualification standards.292 For
example, playing elite football is an essential job function for an NFL player. In
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b).
See id. § 12111(8) (defining a qualified individual as one who, “with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions” of the job (emphasis added)). To demonstrate that an
accommodation is reasonable, a plaintiff “need only show that an ‘accommodation’ seems reasonable on its
face, i.e., ordinarily or in the run of cases.” US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 401 (2002).
288 Illegal discrimination includes “not making reasonable accommodations” for “an otherwise
qualified individual . . . unless [the employer] can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose
an undue hardship on the operation of [its] business.” 42 U.S.C. § (b)(5)(A) (emphasis added). An “undue
hardship” is “an action requiring significant difficulty or expense.” Id. § 12111(10)(A).
289 Prospective players with learning disabilities have not been given extra time to take the
Wonderlic test at the Combine, as would be required by the ADA. See, e.g., Lowell Cohn, NFL Fails
to Protect Player with Learning Disability, PRESS DEMOCRAT (Apr. 9, 2012), http://www.pressdem
ocrat.com/news/2310726-181/nfl-fails-to-protect-player [https://perma.cc/26EY-HK9X] (explaining
that Morris Claiborne was not afforded any testing accommodations during his Wonderlic examination
despite having a documented learning disability).
290 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a).
291 See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
292 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (b)(6) (noting that illegal discrimination includes using qualification
standards that “screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability”).
286
287
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screening for the most elite football players, the NFL or its clubs could
theoretically adopt a hearing requirement due to a belief that the best football
players need to be able to hear one another in a huddle, hear the officials’ whistles,
and respond to verbal signals from the coach. While there might be some
correlation between hearing and football playing, a hearing requirement could
nonetheless screen out qualified players, such as former Seattle Seahawk Derrick
Coleman, who is deaf.293
An employer can potentially defend a qualification standard that screens
out individuals with disabilities by showing it is (1) job-related, (2) consistent
with a business necessity, and (3) that the job cannot be accomplished with
reasonable accommodation.294 Thus, the NFL or its clubs can adopt qualification
standards that disparately impact people with disabilities as long as those
standards relate to the job of playing football, further a legitimate business
purpose, and have no viable reasonable accommodation. For example, if James
failed a hearing test at the Combine and was not hired as a result of a hearing
policy, the club would have to assert that a certain degree of hearing is job-related
and consistent with business necessity and that James could not be adequately
accommodated, say through hearing aids or by using sign language or some other
visual means of communication.295
Additionally, the ADA allows employers to adopt qualification standards
that require that “an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or
safety of other individuals in the workplace.”296 The ADA defines a “direct
threat” as “a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be
eliminated by reasonable accommodation.”297 According to the Supreme
Court, the presence or absence “of a significant risk must be determined from
the standpoint of the [discriminator], and the risk assessment must be based
on medical or other objective evidence.”298 Thus, employers cannot invent
hypothetical risks to invoke the defense.
While, on its face, the statute only provides a defense when employing an
individual with a disability that could harm others, the Supreme Court has
293 See Tom Friend, Derrick Coleman Misses Nothing, ESPN (Jan. 31, 2014), http://espn.go.com/nfl
/playoffs/2013/story/_/id/10372203/super-bowl-xlviii-deafness-deter-seattle-derrick-coleman [http://perma.cc
/PF3Z-75EL] (explaining that Coleman was the third deaf player in NFL history and the first to play
offense, which requires more quick and last-minute communication with teammates than defense).
294 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a).
295 The NHL actually excludes players who are blind in one eye. See Bill Littlefield, David-Alexandre
Beauregard: One Eye, 20 Years, 540 Goals, ONLY GAME (Dec. 21, 2013), http://onlyagame.wbur.org/2013/
12/21/david-alexandre-beauregard-blind-hockey-player [http://perma.cc/TQJ3-5E4F] (discussing the twentyyear career of minor hockey player David-Alexandre Beauregard, who has never reached the NHL, in part
due to a league rule prohibiting players who are blind in one eye).
296 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b).
297 Id. § 12111(3).
298 Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 649 (1998).
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extended Title I’s direct threat defense to the employees themselves.299 In
other words, employers can screen out individuals with disabilities to avoid
putting those individuals at significant risk. In the leading Supreme Court case
in this area, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, the Court held that Chevron
could lawfully refuse to hire respondent Echazabal due to a medical exam that
revealed liver damage, which Chevron’s doctors believed could be exacerbated
by exposure to toxins while working in the refinery.300 Thus, one possible
defense for the NFL and the clubs would be to argue that making decisions
based on players’ actual, past, or perceived disabilities would in fact benefit
the players themselves by keeping them out of harm’s way.
Imagine that James’s Combine EKG has revealed abnormal heart function,
he is forced to leave the Combine, and—as a result—is not ultimately drafted or
signed. James could allege discrimination based on an actual or a perceived
cardiac impairment. However, the clubs could raise the direct threat defense,
arguing that to employ an individual with compromised heart function as a
professional football player would place him at a significant health risk and, given
the nature of the sport, that the risk cannot be eliminated by a reasonable
accommodation. Therefore, the direct threat defense is potentially powerful for
these defendants with respect to health-related screenings because they can argue
that adopting health-related qualification standards is necessary to avoid putting
players at serious risk. But to succeed, they would have to demonstrate that the
risk in question is “significant”—based on objective evidence—and that it cannot
be eliminated through reasonable accommodation.
Spinal stenosis, a narrowing of the spinal canal, provides another useful
hypothetical for the direct threat defense. David Wilson, a running back for
the New York Giants, was advised by team doctors to retire based on his
spinal stenosis.301 Ostensibly, the doctors based their advice on the belief that
Wilson was endangering himself by continuing to play. However, while they
may face greater risk of discomfort and ultimately decide that continuing to play is
not worth it, at least one article reports “research shows that players with spinal
stenosis are at no greater risk of devastating spinal cord injury.”302 Nonetheless,
many players with that condition are encouraged to stop playing football.303 While
perhaps well-meaning, recommendations to leave professional football because of
299 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 76 (2002) (finding that an EEOC
regulation “authoriz[ing] [a] refusal to hire an individual because his performance on the job would
endanger his own health, owing to a disability,” was permissible under the ADA).
300 Id. at 76.
301 Zach Schonbrun, Spinal Issues Loom Over the N.F.L., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2014), http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/08/06/sports/football/david-wilsons-retirement-from-nfl-raises-injury-awaren
ess.html [http://perma.cc/8S3K-TWD7].
302 Alex Dunlap, ‘The NFL Beat’: Spinal Stenosis, AUSTIN CHRON. (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.austin
chronicle.com/daily/sports/2013-01-23/the-nfl-beat-spinal-stenosis/ [http://perma.cc/X7LF-M5ZM].
303 Id.
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spinal stenosis are therefore based on perceived—not actual—risk. Thus, should a
club dismiss a player on the basis of spinal stenosis, a direct threat defense would
mostly likely fail due to the absence of an actual risk of heightened injury. Thus,
the direct threat defense may be available in the context of professional football,
but there are limits to its applicability.
3. ADA Summary
Navigating the goals of the ADA and its application to the NFL context is
no easy feat, so we summarize it: Title I of the ADA could apply to the clubs or
the NFL (1) by prohibiting certain medical examinations or inquiries and (2) by
forbidding both intentional and unintentional adverse employment actions on
the basis of an actual, past, or perceived disability. The NFL and its clubs could
assert a variety of defenses.304 For example, they could assert that qualification
standards or medical inquiries and exams for current employees are job-related
and consistent with business necessity. For certain actions, they could challenge
whether the individual is qualified or has a disability. Lastly, if a player is
endangering himself or others, the club or the NFL may be able to use the direct
threat defense.

304 While the NFL and the clubs might have multiple defenses, National Football Scouting’s
activities are exclusively pre-employment and only related to medical examinations and inquiries,
not employment-related actions. See supra notes 43–45, 47–54 and accompanying text. This means
that the only statutory exception available to it would be for pre-employment, job-related inquiries.
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Table 1: Medical Examinations and Inquiries305
Coverage

Types of Screening

Defenses

Applicants

Pre-employment medical
examinations

None

Applicants

Pre-employment
inquiries

Inquiry is job-related

Applicants (post-offer)

Employee entrance exam

Exams must be (1) universal (all
entering employees are subject);
(2) confidential; and (3) used
only in accordance with ADA

Current employees

Medical examinations
and inquiries

Exams and inquiries must be
(1) job-related and (2) consistent
with business necessity

Table 2: Discrimination Against Qualified Individuals with Disabilities306
Violations
Limit, segregate, or classify
on the basis of disability307

Defenses
•
•
•
•

Failure to accommodate308

•
•
•
•
•

Discriminatory qualification
standards309

•

•

No disability
Not qualified
Did not discriminate / adversely affect
No disability
Not qualified
Accommodation not reasonable
Undue hardship
No Disability
Not Qualified
(1) Job-related; (2) consistent with
business necessity; and (3) cannot be
eliminated with reasonable
accommodation310
Direct threat311

The information contained in the table summarizes 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(1)–(4) (2012).
Unless otherwise noted, the statutory support for the defenses included in the table
corresponds with the provision describing the violation. These provisions apply to all qualified
individuals with disabilities at all stages of employment. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
307 Id. § 12112(b)(1).
308 Id. § 12112(b)(5).
309 Id. § 12112(b)(6).
310 Id. § 12113(a).
311 Id. § 12113(b).
305
306
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B. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act
Apart from the ADA, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act312
is another federal statute that could apply to the collection and use of players’
health-related information.
Title II of GINA prohibits both acquiring and acting on genetic
information in employment.313 The law applies to various types of employers
covered by other federal statutes such as Title VII,314 as well as employment
agencies,315 labor organizations,316 and training programs.317 The sections
most relevant to NFL players are the employer and labor organization
provisions.318 Like the ADA,319 GINA does not exempt sports-related
employers.320 To the contrary, proponents of the law cited Eddy Curry’s story
as evidence of the need for legal regulation.321 Both GINA’s prohibitions on
genetic discrimination and its restrictions on requests for genetic information
could apply to efforts of the NFL or its clubs to evaluate and monitor player
health. As is the case under the ADA,322 plaintiffs must exhaust their
administrative remedies before pursuing a lawsuit,323 and they cannot
prospectively waive their claims.324
The statute adopts a fairly expansive definition of genetic information. GINA
defines an individual’s “genetic information” as “information about—(i) such
individual’s genetic tests, (ii) the genetic tests of family members of such
individual, and (iii) the manifestation of a disease or disorder in family members

312 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881
(codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
313 See § 202(a)–(b), 122 Stat. at 907-08 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a)–(b)) (prohibiting
discrimination in employment based on the employee’s genetic information and prohibiting
employer requests for such information except under certain conditions).
314 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff(2)(B) (incorporating the definition of employer from 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e (Title VII)—among other statutes—into the definition of employer under GINA).
315 Id. § 2000ff-2.
316 Id. § 2000ff-3.
317 Id. § 2000ff-4.
318 See Wagner, supra note 170, at 94 (“GINA defines covered entities broadly enough to include
the clubs and teams (as employers) as well as the players’ associations (as labor organizations).”).
319 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
320 Wagner, supra note 170, at 93.
321 Id. For more about Eddy Curry’s story, see supra note 144 and accompanying text.
322 See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
323 GINA’s process and remedies are modeled on those of Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-6(a)(1)
(applying the “powers, procedures, and remedies” of Title VII to GINA claimants). As explained above,
the ADA also adopts the same pre-lawsuit procedures as Title VII, which includes an administrative
remedy exhaustion requirement. See supra note 166.
324 Given that the precedent for Title VII applies to the ADA and that GINA adopts the same process
and remedies as Title VII, it follows that individuals cannot prospectively waive their GINA claims. See
EEOC, supra 168 (noting that the ADA does not permit advance waiver of the rights it guarantees).
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of such individual.”325 The statute focuses exclusively on genetic testing, not other
health-related tests. Although the statute does not explicitly state that family
medical history constitutes genetic information, the inclusion of manifested
conditions of family members has been read to extend the statute to family
medical history, 326 a rather common type of health-related information.
Regarding the family member provision, the plain language of neither the
statute nor the regulations restrict the scope to conditions with specific hereditary
components.327 Nonetheless, some courts have read this provision more
restrictively, finding that GINA does not cover family medical history lacking a
genetic component.328 Regardless, family medical history—and not genetic test
results—have been the most frequent basis for GINA claims to date.329
Importantly, while the statute covers the manifested conditions of a person’s
relatives, GINA does not cover an individual’s own manifested genetic
conditions.330 The law’s primary focus is therefore pre-symptomatic or
asymptomatic individuals. The EEOC regulations define the terms
“manifestation” or “manifested” to mean “that an individual has been or could
reasonably be diagnosed with the disease, disorder, or pathological condition by
a health care professional with appropriate training and expertise in the field of
medicine involved” and specifies that “a disease, disorder, or pathological
325 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff(4)(A). The definition of genetic information excludes any information
about sex or age. Id. § 2000ff(4)(C).
326 Rothstein et al., supra note 196, at 526-27.
327 The EEOC regulations define “family member” to include dependents through marriage—
including spouses and stepchildren—and adoption. 29 C.F.R. § 1635.3(a)(1) (2015). Moreover, in
issuing its final rule on employer-provided wellness programs, the EEOC clarified that a spouse “is
a ‘family member’ under GINA.” Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,143,
31,144 (May 17, 2016) (quoting 42 U.S.C. 2000ff(4)(a)(ii)). The regulations themselves explain that
“[a] program is not reasonably designed to promote health or prevent disease if it imposes a penalty
or disadvantage on an individual because a spouse’s manifestation of disease or disorder prevents or
inhibits the spouse from participating or from achieving a certain health outcome,” which indicates
that a spouse’s manifested condition qualifies as genetic information. 29 C.F.R. §1635.8(b)(2)(i)(A)
(2016). The inclusion of stepchildren, adopted children, and spouses in the definition of family
member indicates that the EEOC understands GINA’s family member disease manifestation prong
to encompass more than just hereditary risk.
328 See, e.g., Poore v. Peterbilt of Bristol, L.L.C., 852 F. Supp. 2d 727, 731 (W.D. Va. 2012)
(“[T]he fact that an individual family member merely has been diagnosed with a disease or disorder
is not considered ‘genetic information’ if ‘such information is taken into account only with respect
to the individual in which such disease or disorder occurs and not as genetic information with respect
to any other individual’” (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 110-28, pt. 2, at 27 (2007))); see also Maxwell v.
Verde Valley Ambulance Co., No. CV-13-08044-PCT-BSB, 2014 WL 4470512, at *16 (D. Ariz. Sept.
11, 2014) (citing Poore for that proposition); Allen v. Verizon Wireless, No. 3:12-cv-482(JCH), 2013
WL 2467923, at *23 (D. Conn. June 6, 2013) (also citing Poore for that proposition).
329 Rothstein et al., supra note 196, at 553-54.
330 See EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
REGARDING THE GENETIC INFORMATION NONDISCRIMINATION ACT 3 (2010), http://www.dol.gov/ebs
a/faqs/faq-GINA.html [https://perma.cc/2NGG-TMEX] (“[I]nformation about an individual’s manifested
disease or disorder is not genetic information with respect to that individual.”).
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condition is not manifested if the diagnosis is based principally on genetic
information.”331 Yet even with this clarification, ambiguities remain. While
seemingly logical to Congress, drawing the line at manifestation is far more
challenging in practice. Consider symptomatic individuals who go on diagnostic
odysseys searching for answers and finally discover an atypical genetic variation
that could be responsible. Those people have “manifested” the condition in the
sense that it caused impairment, but healthcare professionals were unable to
provide answers without genetic testing.
Marfan syndrome, the disease that likely ended Isaiah Austin’s professional
basketball career,332 provides a useful example. Physicians with experience in
connective tissue disorders can diagnose that condition with a physical exam, but
genetic testing can be helpful in some cases.333 How much protection would
GINA offer? Individuals with Marfan syndrome are already experiencing the
deleterious effects of the disease; in that sense, it is manifested. However, in
certain circumstances, doctors may be unable to confirm the exact diagnosis
without the aid of genetic technology. In that case, is the diagnosis “based
principally on genetic information,”334 meaning that it is not manifested as
defined by that statute? Or can Marfan syndrome always be reasonably diagnosed
by other means, meaning the condition has manifested? These questions will
remain unanswered until the courts weigh in on these kinds of cases.
Furthermore, the statute expressly allows covered entities to acquire, use,
and disclose medical information that is not genetic. It specifies that covered
entities do not violate the statute by “the use, acquisition, or disclosure of
medical information that is not genetic information about a manifested disease,
disorder, or pathological condition of an employee or member, including a
manifested disease, disorder, or pathological condition that has or may have
a genetic basis.”335 Of course, any acquisition, use, or disclosure of nongenetic
information would have to be in accordance with other governing statutes,
such as the ADA and perhaps the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA).336
Genetic information, as defined by the statute, is of potential interest to
the NFL and its clubs. First, basic medical examinations, such as preseason
physicals, involve collecting information about family medical history,337
29 C.F.R. § 1635.3(g) (2015).
See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
Getting Diagnosed, MARFAN FOUND., http://www.marfan.org/expectations/diagnosis [http://
perma.cc/M7JD-LMK5].
334 29 C.F.R. § 1635.3(g).
335 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-9 (2012) (emphasis added).
336 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–191, 110 Stat.
1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code.).
337 See infra note 357 and accompanying text.
331
332
333
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which implicates an individual’s genetic information. Additionally, while the
NFL and its clubs seemingly have not used genetic testing as aggressively as
the NBA,338 they could at some point adopt such tests to screen players for
genetic risk. As discussed in Part I, genetic tests purporting to evaluate
athletic potential are already on the market and could also be of interest to
the NFL and its clubs.339
GINA includes both privacy and antidiscrimination protections. Unlike
the ADA, GINA does not have specific statutory defenses for safety and
job-relatedness. Still, it does include a number of provisions related to the
valid acquisition of genetic information.340
1. Privacy
This subsection outlines GINA’s privacy protections, applies them to
professional football, and explores the possible exceptions or responses to a
claim for the unlawful acquisition of genetic information.
a. Claims
GINA contains protections for privacy and confidentiality. Title II’s
privacy protection prohibits employers from “request[ing], requir[ing], or
purchas[ing] genetic information with respect to an employee or a family
member,” regardless of whether the employer actually acquires the
information.341 The accompanying EEOC regulations further explain that
there is no exception for medical examinations related to employment:
The prohibition on acquisition of genetic information, including family medical
history, applies to medical examinations related to employment. A covered
entity must tell health care providers not to collect genetic information,
including family medical history, as part of a medical examination intended
to determine the ability to perform a job, and must take additional reasonable
measures within its control if it learns that genetic information is being
requested or required. Such reasonable measures may depend on the facts
and circumstances under which a request for genetic information was made,
338 See, e.g., Adi Joseph, Isaiah Austin, NBA Draft Prospect, Has Career-Ending Genetic Disorder, USA
TODAY (June 22, 2014, 3:03 PM), www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nba/draft/2014/06/22/isaiah-austingenetic-disorder-marfan-syndrome-baylor-bears/11236699/ [https://perma.cc/E74Z-UABT] (explaining how
the discovery of Isaiah Austin’s Marfan syndrome following pre-draft genetic testing ended his basketball
career); Rice, supra note 144 (explaining that the Bulls refused to re-sign Eddy Curry until he received a
genetic test to determine whether he had a heart condition).
339 See supra subsection I.B.3.
340 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(b) (laying out exceptions to the prohibition on employers requesting,
requiring, or purchasing genetic information).
341 Id.
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and may include no longer using the services of a health care professional
who continues to request or require genetic information during medical
examinations after being informed not to do so.342

Thus, even the employment-related inquiries and examinations that are
lawful under the ADA would violate GINA if they involved requests for
genetic testing or family medical history.
GINA’s privacy provision is unique.343 Other federal employment
discrimination statutes contain no comparable language; in fact, the closest parallel
is the ADA’s medical inquiry and examination provisions,344 discussed above.345
However, GINA’s enforcement and remedy provisions mirror those of Title VII.346
Thus, while claimants can recover for pure privacy violations without associated
adverse employment actions, the remedies available in such cases will remain
unclear until the case law is more established.347
GINA also includes a stand-alone confidentiality provision, separate from
its antidiscrimination sections. It provides that if a defendant possesses
“genetic information about an employee . . . , such information shall be
maintained on separate forms and in separate medical files and be treated as
a confidential medical record of the employee or member.”348 GINA further
provides that an employer “shall be considered to be in compliance with” the
Act by treating the relevant genetic information “as a confidential medical
record under section 12112(d)(3)(B) of [42 U.S.C.].”349
29 C.F.R. § 1635.8(d) (2015) (emphasis added).
See Jessica L. Roberts, Protecting Privacy to Prevent Discrimination, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV.
2097, 2130-31 (2015) (describing GINA as “atypical” given its ban on requesting, requiring or
purchasing genetic information and distinguishing it from “the vast majority of federal
[antidiscrimination] law” that merely prohibits adverse employment actions on the basis of the
protected trait without “prohibit[ing] employers from seeking—or even disclosing—information
related to [the trait]”).
344 See id. at 2131 (“The statute provides that, pre-employment, . . . ‘a covered entity shall not
conduct a medical examination or make inquiries of a job applicant as to whether such applicant is
an individual with a disability or as to the nature or severity of such disability.’” (quoting 42 U.S.C.
12112(d)(2)(A))).
345 See supra subsection II.A.1.
346 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-6.
347 One, if not the first, of these cases resulted in a very generous award to the plaintiffs. See
Lowe v. Atlas Logistics Grp. Retail Servs. (Atlanta), LLC, 102 F. Supp. 3d 1360, 1362-63, 1370 (N.D.
Ga. 2015) (finding that defendant warehouse operator violated GINA by requiring employees to
provide genetic information as part of its attempt meant to identify which employees had been
defecating in the warehouse, even though plaintiff employees were not deemed a match and no
adverse employment action was ultimately taken); Gina Kolata, Georgia: $2.2. Million Penalty for Illegal
DNA Testing, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/23/us/georgia-dollar2-2million-penalty-for-illegal-dna-testing.html [https://perma.cc/PE5M-HS55] (reporting that the jury in
Lowe awarded $2,225,000 to the plaintiffs).
348 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-5(a).
349 Id.
342
343
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The statute states that covered entities cannot disclose an individual’s
genetic information except to the individual himself—or the family member
who is the receiving genetic services—with the individual’s written request;
a researcher doing lawful research; government officials for compliance
purposes; a public health agency if it relates to a deadly contagious disease or
life-threatening illness; or to respond to a court order or comply with the
relevant family medical leave laws.350 In many respects, the allowable
disclosures mirror the privacy section’s exceptions governing acceptable
requests for and acquisitions of genetic information.
GINA also complicates occupational medical recordkeeping. Recall that
after a conditional offer of employment, the ADA permits employers to
request access to an individual’s full medical records.351 However, under
GINA, employers must exclude genetic information from those requests.352
While this requirement may, at first blush, seem relatively straightforward, it
is far more complex. Given the broad definition of genetic information and
its potential to appear throughout an individual’s health records, Professor
Mark Rothstein deems it “practically impossible for custodians of health
records to comply with GINA’s disclosure limitations.”353 Thus, even
employers that make their best efforts to comply with both the ADA and
GINA may still violate GINA’s privacy provisions.
b. Specific NFL Evaluative Technologies
While more limited in its application than the ADA since it concerns only
genetic information, GINA is nonetheless relevant to a number of the
evaluating technologies that the NFL or its clubs could use to evaluate the
health of both current and aspiring players.
i. Medical Examinations and Athletic Drills
Routine physical exams or medical questions could trigger GINA’s Title II
protections to the extent they entail asking players to provide family medical history,
which constitutes an unlawful request for genetic information.354 The extent of liability
will depend on the specific circumstances, how broadly the courts construe the
scope of protected family medical history (i.e., whether it is limited to
information about genetic risk), and the scope of the applicable exceptions.

Id. § 2000ff-5(b).
See Rothstein, supra note 186, at 44.
Id.
Id.
See 29 C.F.R. § 1635.8(d) (2015) (noting that GINA’s prohibition on the acquisition of
genetic information includes family medical history).
350
351
352
353
354
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To illustrate how the existing practices may be unlawful, consider the following
passage from a 2001 book describing the medical treatment and evaluation of NFL
players: “It says here that you have a family history of heart trouble.” “Well yeah,
that’s right . . . in my family.” “Well, what exactly kind of heart trouble is that? A
heart murmur?” “No, sir.” “Some congenital condition?”355
While such questions may have been lawful when the book was published
in 2001 (assuming those inquiries are job-related pursuant to the ADA), they
would clearly violate GINA today. Again, it is important to emphasize that
the law prevents physicians from asking prospective and current players about
family medical history, regardless of whether such questions relate to the
player’s ability to play football.356 Thus, the NFLPA, the NFL, the clubs, and
likely National Football Scouting as well are prohibited from asking players
to provide family medical history. In contrast, the Standard Minimum
Preseason Physical Examination, as outlined in the CBA, expressly includes
the collection of family medical history as part of the general medical
examination.357 By requiring players to provide genetic information in the form of
family medical history, the CBA would seem to violate GINA.
As with medical examinations under the ADA, individuals cannot
prospectively waive their legal rights under GINA.358 Hence, the fact that the
NFLPA agreed to a standard physical that involves requests for family
medical history does not insulate the NFL or its clubs from potential liability.
Similarly, the fact that the NFLPA has made such an agreement could itself
give rise to a GINA Title II claim against the NFLPA. With respect to other
employment discrimination statutes, such as Title VII, courts have held that
unions cannot collectively bargain to violate the law.359 Thus, insofar as the
NFLPA collectively bargained to violate GINA, albeit inadvertently, the
union may be found to have violated Title II.360
While traditional medical examinations or physicals might trigger GINA as
requests for family medical history, the statute would not apply to athletic drills.
Since those metrics generally measure individual performance, they do not deal
with genetic testing or family medical history and therefore do not constitute
requests for genetic information. We discuss below how GINA would apply to

355 PIERCE E. SCRANTON, JR., PLAYING HURT: TREATING AND EVALUATING THE
WARRIORS OF THE NFL 16 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).
356 See supra note 342 and accompanying text.
357 Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 32, app. K.
358 See supra note 324.
359 See, e.g., EEOC v. Pathmark Inc., No. CIV. A. 97-3994, 1998 WL 57520, at *4 (E.D. Pa.
Feb. 12, 1998) (explaining that unions “do not have the right to negotiate away statutorily created
individual rights”).
360 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-3(c) (2012) (prohibiting labor organizations from requesting or requiring
genetic information with respect to a member).
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circumstances in which National Football Scouting, the NFL, or its clubs choose
to adopt genetic tests in conjunction with medical exams or physicals.361
ii. Nongenetic Technologies
Given the very specific definitions of “genetic information” and “genetic
test,”362 GINA would most likely not apply to the wearable technologies
described in Part I.363 While genetic material can be obtained in a number of
different ways—such as through buccal swabs, blood, semen, and other bodily
materials and tissues—collecting and analyzing data relating to speed, agility,
impact, sleep patterns, and heart rate does not involve DNA, RNA,
chromosomes, proteins, or metabolites and would not independently reveal
information about the content of an individual’s genotype. Thus, the innovative,
nongenetic technologies described in Part I are squarely outside the scope of
GINA’s protections. James would be unable to challenge them under GINA.
iii. Genetic Tests
If National Football Scouting, the clubs, or the NFL develop a further
interest in genetic information (i.e., for injury prevention or enhancement
through target training), assuming no exception applies, GINA prevents those
organizations from requesting or requiring players to take genetic tests, even if the
tests would reveal information related to playing elite football.364 Thus, requesting
that James provide his family medical history or take a genetic test would
violate GINA on its face.
Although GINA does allow occupational monitoring, it does so only with
respect to toxic substances.365 Additionally, the wellness program exception,
detailed below,366 is also unlikely to apply. Thus, even if protecting players
from future injury were the sole purpose, National Football Scouting, the
NFL, or its clubs may not be able to mandate genetic testing, regardless of
the possible benefits to player health. Furthermore, even if National Football
Scouting, the NFL, or a club lawfully obtained genetic information through
See infra subsection II.B.1.b.iii.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff(4)(A) (defining genetic information as information about “(i) such
individual’s genetic tests, (ii) the genetic tests of family members of such individual, and (iii) the
manifestation of a disease or disorder in family members of such individual”); id. § 2000ff(7)(A)
(defining a genetic test as “an analysis of human DNA, RNA, chromosomes, proteins, or metabolites,
that detects genotypes, mutations, or chromosomal changes”).
363 See supra subsection I.B.2.
364 See 29 C.F.R. § 1635.8(d) (2015) (explaining that GINA does not contain an exception for
examinations related to employment).
365 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff(5) (limiting the definition of genetic monitoring to monitoring
“exposure to toxic substances in the workplace”).
366 See infra note 375 and accompanying text.
361
362
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an expansive reading of the exceptions, the statute’s antidiscrimination
provisions still forbid acting on that knowledge.
c. Possible Responses and Defenses
GINA’s privacy protection is particularly salient with respect to the interests
of both the NFL and its clubs in player health. This point is worth emphasizing: the
clubs and the NFL could violate GINA simply by requesting genetic information,
including family medical history. Unlike the ADA, under GINA’s outright
prohibition, even job-related genetic tests that serve a legitimate business
purpose are unacceptable.367 Thus, even genetic testing that comports with the
ADA would still violate GINA. Similarly, the labor organization and training
program provisions include prohibitions on requesting, requiring, or purchasing
the genetic information of an employee or her family member.368 However,
GINA does include some possible exceptions and defenses that merit discussion.
Let us again return to James at the Combine and the example of him
providing his family medical history, submitting to an EKG, performing a
running drill, swallowing a sensory pill, and taking a genetic test. The first
potential line of defense against a GINA claim would likely be that the
information does not meet the statute’s definition of “genetic information”
such that James cannot challenge the EKG, the running drill, or the pill under
GINA. But genetic testing quite clearly implicates genetic information.369 In
the context of family medical history, the clubs and the NFL could use recent
case law to assert that the requested family medical history is not genetic
information because it does not demonstrate genetic risk per se.370 James
could, of course, respond by arguing that a plain reading of the statute and
the regulations support the contrary,371 or by attempting to establish that the
requested family medical history does in fact implicate genetic risk.
Regarding requesting, requiring, or purchasing genetic information,
the clubs and the NFL could argue that their actions fall within one of the
statute’s several exceptions. A covered entity does not violate GINA in
the following six circumstances: (1) when the employer inadvertently requests
or requires the family medical history of an employee or an employee’s
family member; (2) when the employer offers health or genetic services—
such as in the context of a wellness program—and participation is voluntary
and any individually identifiable genetic information is only disclosed to the
See supra note 342 and accompanying text.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000ff-3, 2000ff-4.
See id. § 2000ff(4)(A)(i) (listing an individual’s genetic tests as part of the definition of
“genetic information”).
370 See supra note 328 and accompanying text.
371 See supra note 327 and accompanying text for examples of arguments that he could make.
367
368
369
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employer in the aggregate; (3) when the employer requests family medical
history to comply with family and medical leave laws; (4) when the
employer purchases commercially and publicly available documents (i.e.,
newspapers but not medical databases or court records) that include
family medical history; (5) when the employer requests the information
for genetic monitoring of toxic substances in the workplace and follows
the appropriate procedures for such monitoring; and finally, (6) when the
employer conducts DNA analysis for law enforcement purposes or to
identify human remains and requires employee genetic information for
quality control reasons.372 None of these exceptions clearly apply to the
NFL or the clubs in the contexts discussed herein. The statute further
provides that the use of any genetic information acquired lawfully under
one of these exceptions is still governed by GINA’s antidiscrimination and
confidentiality provisions.373
Of GINA’s six exceptions, the wellness program exception has the greatest
potential applicability. Like the ADA,374 GINA allows employers to obtain
health-related information when providing voluntary health services. The statute
sets out a number of criteria for lawfully acquiring genetic information.375 While
this exception arguably seems primarily geared toward the kinds of wellness
programs encouraged by the Affordable Care Act,376 the language of the statute
might be read to indicate that if an employer provides medical services, it can ask
for genetic information. Yet for several reasons, the clubs and the NFL are
unlikely to be able to use this exception. This exception targets wellness
programs, not the occupational kind of medicine—medical examinations done
for the benefit of the employer—that is provided at the Combine and by the NFL
and its clubs. Moreover, the exception requires “prior, knowing, voluntary, and
written authorization.”377 Recall that in addition to the broad authorizations
signed before participating in the Combine,378 a player, upon joining a club, is
required by his contract and the CBA to make various health-related
disclosures.379 Failing to make those disclosures is grounds for termination and

42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(b)(1)–(6).
Id. § 2000ff-1(c).
Id. § 12112(d)(4)(B).
See id. § 2000ff-1(b)(2) (conditioning the wellness program exception upon the individual’s consent;
the information being limited to the individual, her family, and the healthcare professional; and the
information being provided to the employer only in aggregate terms).
376 See Jessica L. Roberts & Leah R. Fowler, How Assuming Autonomy Undermines Wellness
Programs, 26 HEALTH MATRIX (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 6-10), https://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2816924 (explaining how the ACA encourages wellness programs).
377 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(b)(2)(B).
378 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
379 See supra notes 233–34 and accompanying text.
372
373
374
375
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could undermine a player’s injury grievance.380 Far from voluntary disclosure,
these requirements contractually obligate a player to disclose and seem to directly
conflict with GINA’s prohibition on requesting or requiring genetic information.
Further, the exception provides that only the individual or an authorized
family member and the healthcare professional can receive individually
identifiable genetic information.381 The employer can only receive that
information in the aggregate,382 and the regulations imply that an
employer that seeks to disaggregate employee genetic information violates
GINA.383 In sum, James would have strong GINA claims for the requests
for family medical history and genetic testing, and the clubs and the NFL
would have little means to counter those claims.
As noted, individuals cannot prospectively waive their GINA claims by
consenting to discrimination.384 But, the aforementioned exceptions to
GINA’s privacy provision could nonetheless allow the lawful disclosure of
genetic information. Of course, even if the NFL or its clubs could lawfully
obtain genetic information as part of health or genetic services that it offers,
Title II’s antidiscrimination provision would still restrict the ability to act on
that information.
While the above arguments could potentially shield an employer from
liability under GINA, the employer would face the additional obstacle of
justifying its actions in accordance with the ADA.
2. Discrimination
GINA’s antidiscrimination provision forbids employers from taking adverse
employment actions on the basis of genetic information.385 Specifically, it makes
it unlawful for an employer

See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(b)(2)(C).
See 29 C.F.R. § 1635.8(b)(2)(i)(D) (2015) (“Any individually identifiable genetic information . . . is
not disclosed to the covered entity except in aggregate terms that do not disclose the identity of specific
individuals . . . .”).
383 See id. (“[A] covered entity will not violate the requirement that it receive information only in
aggregate terms if it receives information that, for reasons outside [its control], makes the genetic information
of a particular individual readily identifiable with no effort on the covered entity’s part . . . .” (emphasis added)).
384 See supra note 324 .
385 While no court has yet addressed whether GINA covers mixed-motive claims, some
scholars speculate that genetic information must be the “but-for” cause of the discrimination. See,
e.g., Brian S. Clarke, Grossly Restricted Pleading: Twombly/Iqbal, Gross, and Cannibalistic Facts in
Compound Employment Discrimination Claims, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 1101, 1125-26 (2010) (arguing that
GINA should be interpreted as requiring a showing of but-for causation since it prohibits
discrimination “because of” genetic information (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a))).
380
381
382
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(1) to fail or refuse to hire, or to discharge, any employee, or otherwise
to discriminate against any employee with respect to the compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment of the employee, because of
genetic information with respect to the employee; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify the employees of the employer in any
way that would deprive or tend to deprive any employee of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect the status of the employee as an
employee, because of genetic information with respect to the employee.386

Unlike the ADA,387 GINA does not cover disparate impact (i.e., facially neutral
policies that disproportionately exclude individuals on the basis of their genetic
information).388 GINA does, however, include an anticlassification provision,389
which could limit both negative and positive differential treatment.390 For example,
if a club or the NFL decides to dictate which positions individuals play based in
part on their genetic information, the players could arguably challenge the
policy as an unlawful classification. Thus, if a defendant differentiates between
current or prospective players on the basis of genetic tests results or family
medical history, that entity would run afoul of the statute, even if the genetic
information in question speaks to the individual’s ability to play professional
football. Additionally, GINA prevents labor organizations from discriminating
on the basis of genetic information.391 It forbids them from “caus[ing] or
attempt[ing] to cause an employer to discriminate against a member in violation
of [the Act].”392 GINA also prohibits discrimination and classification in the
context of training programs.393
a. Specific NFL Evaluative Technologies
Given this background on GINA’s antidiscrimination provisions, we now turn
to how those protections would apply to the use of evaluative technologies in
professional football.

42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a).
See id. § 12112(b)(6) (prohibiting employers from adopting qualification standards that “tend to”
screen out individuals with disabilities).
388 See id. § 2000ff-7(a) (clarifying that “‘disparate impact’ . . . on the basis of genetic information
does not establish a cause of action under this Act”).
389 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a)(2).
390 See Bradley A. Areheart, GINA, Privacy, and Antisubordination, 46 GA. L. REV. 705, 709-10
(2012) (“GINA . . . does not allow the strategic consideration of genetic information to counter
future genetic subordination . . . . Nor does the statute allow any positive consideration of genetic
information through programs like genetic diversity initiatives.”).
391 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-3.
392 Id. § 2000ff-3(a)(3).
393 Id. § 2000ff-4.
386
387
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i. Medical Examinations and Athletic Drills
GINA’s antidiscrimination provision prevents any adverse employment
actions on the basis of genetic information, even when the information is
lawfully obtained. Hence, even if the NFL or the clubs could legally obtain
family medical history or genetic test results, they still could not act on that
knowledge. James would therefore be able to challenge any job-related
decision based on his genetic information, such as whether to hire him,
whether to terminate him, or where to play him. Moreover, the NFL and the
clubs have fewer legal responses at their disposal for GINA claims because
the statute lacks the job-relatedness and direct threat defenses of the ADA.
As with violations of genetic privacy, GINA would not prohibit adverse
employment actions based on information obtained through athletic drills,
leaving James without actionable GINA claims related to those evaluations.
ii. Nongenetic Technologies
Turning now to the nongenetic technologies from Part I, physiological
data, even insofar as it might reveal a genetic defect, would not be considered
genetic information because the condition would already have manifested.
For example, imagine that BioForce’s heart rate monitoring technology over
time revealed an athlete’s genetic heart condition. While the heart condition
might have been caused by a genetic variation, it would have already
manifested in the particular athlete in order to be detected by the technology.
Thus, while the condition might constitute an actual or perceived disability
pursuant to the ADA, it would fall outside of GINA’s definition of genetic
information. GINA therefore offers little protection with respect to wearable
technologies. James’s best strategy would be to argue that these evaluations
were medical examinations under the ADA.
iii. Genetic Tests
As already discussed, genetic test results unequivocally constitute genetic
information.394 Thus, any employment-related decision by the NFL or one of
its clubs based on the results of genetic tests would be challengeable pursuant
to GINA.
b. Possible Responses and Defenses
Should James allege that he suffered an adverse employment action on the
basis of genetic information, such as being dismissed from the Combine or
not being hired as a player, the club or the NFL could argue that the
394

See supra note 362.
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information they used was not genetic or that the action they took did not
rise to the level of an adverse employment action. As mentioned, data from
traditional medical examinations, athletic drills, or wearable technologies are
outside the scope of GINA. With respect to what constitutes an adverse
employment action, say a club wanted to use James’s lawfully obtained genetic
information to construct a training and eating plan designed to maximize his
potential. If James challenged the plan as an unlawful classification, the club
could respond that the specialized training and eating plan does not adversely
affect his status as an employee.
Significantly, GINA does not restrict its coverage to qualified individuals,
unlike the ADA’s employment discrimination protections that only apply to
individuals who can perform the essential functions of the job despite having
a disability.395 Thus, GINA litigants can avoid the potential issue of
establishing which aspects of NFL football constitute essential functions and
whether they can perform those functions with comparative excellence.
GINA also does not include statutory defenses designed to ensure safety
or efficiency. Title II has no equivalent to the ADA’s direct threat or jobrelated / business necessity defenses. It likewise does not include a bona fide
occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense found in statutes like Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act.396 Thus, even if genetic information relates to an individual’s
ability to safely perform a particular job, at present, a covered entity cannot use that
fact to defend a decision to act on that person’s genetic information.

395 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (defining a qualified individual under the ADA as one who “can perform
the essential functions” of the job).
396 Wagner, supra note 170, at 92 & n.72. While our focus is on NFL players, it is worth noting
that GINA potentially poses unique challenges with respect to the practice of occupational
medicine. Occupational physicians providing care to players (rather than exams only) would likely
request family medical history and possibly genetic testing and act on the information to improve
player care. However, GINA prevents them from doing so, even when the genetic information could
speak to the employee’s health and safety. Not surprisingly, then, the American College of
Occupational and Environmental Medicine (ACOEM) has expressed concern that GINA could
place occupational physicians in ethical quandaries. In a position statement on genetic screening in
the workplace, it explained,

It seems reasonable to expect that, in the future, some forms of genetic testing will
provide a basis for more effective methods to ensure the health of individual workers,
but that preventive actions taken on the basis of such testing might violate GINA. In
such situations, both acting on the basis of genetic information to better protect the
worker and not acting on that information, and thereby failing to protect the worker,
would violate standards of ethical conduct. ACOEM hopes that such potential
conflicts can be preemptively resolved without recourse to litigation and the federal
court system.
Paul Brandt-Rauf, Jonathan Borak, & David C. Deubner, ACOEM Position Statement: Genetic Screening in
the Workplace, 57 J. OCCUPATIONAL AND ENVTL. MED. e17, e17 (2015) (emphasis in original).
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3. GINA Summary
To summarize, Title II of GINA has two relevant kinds of protections:
privacy and antidiscrimination. From the perspective of litigating these
claims, NFL players would probably enjoy more success under GINA
because, unlike the ADA, it lacks both a qualification requirement and jobrelatedness and direct threat defenses. At the same time, GINA’s coverage of
genetic information is far narrower than the ADA’s coverage of current, past,
and perceived disabilities, so instances of genetic-information discrimination
would likely be less frequent. For example, GINA would only apply to two
of the hypothetical evaluations James was asked to agree to—providing family
medical history and taking a genetic test—but he could argue that the ADA
should cover most, if not all of them, including submitting to an EKG,
performing a running drill, and swallowing a sensory pill. The applicability
of and possible defenses under GINA are summarized in Table 3.
Table 3: Genetic-Information Protection
Coverage397

Protections398

(1) Genetic test results
(2) Genetic test results of
family members
(3) Manifested disease or
disorder in family
members (i.e., family
medical history)

Protection against
discrimination

Defenses
•
•

•
•

Protection of
privacy

*

*

•

Not genetic information
Did not discriminate /
adversely affect
Not genetic information
Statutory exceptions399
Did not request,
require, or purchase

*

Current law appears to limit the ability of the NFL, its clubs, and
National Football Scouting to obtain and act on information related to player
health. Both the ADA and GINA include limitations on acquiring and using
knowledge that relates to either disability or genetic information,
respectively. With regard to acquisition, the ADA’s medical examination and
inquiry provisions and GINA’s ban on requesting, requiring or purchasing
genetic information, limit the ability of the NFL and its clubs to seek
information, even if it could speak to an individual’s ability to play football. Both

397
398
399

42 U.S.C. § 2000ff(4)(A) (2012).
Id. § 2000ff-1(a)–(b).
Id. § 2000ff-1(b)(1)–(6).
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statutes allow applicants and employees to volunteer health-related information
under certain circumstances. However, prospective and current players, as well
as the NFLPA, cannot simply waive all of the relevant protections. With
regard to discriminatory actions, the ADA contains some health- and safetyrelated exceptions that the NFL or the clubs could use to obtain pertinent
information and to act on it in the name of health and safety. GINA, by
contrast, contains fewer exceptions and defenses. Thus, the NFL and its clubs
should consider whether their actions and policies violate one or both of these
federal employment discrimination statutes.
III. GOING FORWARD
When we began working on this project, we imagined its chief import
would be to help determine which, if any, of the new types of wearable
technologies and genetic testing that are being considered or currently used
in the NFL (among other professional sports leagues) violate existing laws,
in particular GINA and the ADA. This concern remains an important part of
the project, but we were surprised in our research: first on the way in which
the testing of professional sports players violates or accords with these laws
and second, to learn that even more basic and “lower tech” testing mechanisms
that have been in place for a long time in the NFL may be problematic. For that
reason, our recommendations going forward pertain both to the new technologies
as well as their predecessors still in place.
Admittedly, antidiscrimination claims—a category that includes those alleged
under the ADA or GINA—are notoriously hard to win and frequently do not
make it past summary judgment.400 Moreover, the ADA may well be especially
pro-defendant.401 We have no reason to believe that professional athletes would
fare any better than other litigants. We do however think litigation by players is
special because even if it proves ultimately unsuccessful, filing a case against very
public entities like the NFL and its clubs—with attendant media coverage—may
be more likely to cause policy change than a typical employment discrimination
lawsuit. Moreover, regardless of an individual’s ability to prevail in court, we
believe all employers—including the NFL and its clubs—should comply fully
with the current law. To that end, our recommendations center around four “C”s:
compliance, clarity, circumvention, and changes to existing statutory schemes as
400 See Denny Chin, Summary Judgment in Employment Discrimination Cases: A Judge’s
Perspective, 57 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 671, 673 (2012–2013) (“[S]ummary judgment [in favor of
defendants] was granted, in whole or in part, in employment discrimination cases approximately
seventy-seven percent of the time . . . .”).
401 See Sharona Hoffman, Settling the Matter: Does Title I of the ADA Work?, 59 ALA. L. REV. 305, 308
(2008) (“Numerous studies have confirmed that plaintiffs experience extremely low win rates in cases
decided under Title I of the ADA.”).
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applied to the NFL (and perhaps other professional sports leagues). In making all
of these recommendations, we believe our suggestions to be the best solutions to
the problems we have identified, but we also recognize that the current state of
politics makes implementing some of our proposals challenging. Thus, it is not our
goal to provide definitive solutions to the issues identified throughout the Article
but to begin a conversation that we hope will benefit NFL players and perhaps also
the rest of the working population.
A. Compliance
The first upshot of our analysis is that it appears that some of the existing
testing of NFL players, both at the Combine and once drafted and playing
for a club, seem to violate existing federal employment discrimination laws.
Specifically,
(1) the medical examinations at the Combine potentially violate the ADA’s
prohibitions on pre-employment medical exams;
(2) post-offer medical examinations that are made public potentially violate
the ADA’s confidentiality provisions;
(3) post-offer medical examinations that reveal a disability and result in
discrimination—e.g., the rescission of a contract offer—potentially violate the
ADA provided the player can still perform the essential job functions;
(4) Combine medical examinations that include a request for a player’s
family medical history potentially violate GINA; and
(5) the preseason physical’s requirement that a player disclose his family
medical history potentially violates GINA.
While we discuss the possibility of an exemption for professional sports
below,402 the ADA and GINA currently apply to professional football.
Accordingly, the NFL, its clubs, and National Football Scouting should not
wait for lawsuits alleging violations but should instead proactively work to
bring themselves in compliance with the law. In particular, we believe it is
essential for the NFL, the clubs, and National Football Scouting to ensure
they comply with the statutes’ confidentiality requirements so that current
and prospective players do not have private health information about
themselves and their families released to the press. We also believe it is
important to amend the CBA to no longer require players to disclose their
family medical history as part of physicals.

402

See infra subsection III.D.1.
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B. Clarity
Beyond this set of practices that seem to contravene the ADA and GINA,
there is another set of practices for which there is ambiguity in the application
of the existing legislative and regulatory standards, with many issues left
untested by litigation. It would therefore be useful for the EEOC or even
Congress to weigh in on several different legal issues. Additionally, the NFL
itself could issue official statements explaining its position on how to best
resolve these ambiguities.
As noted in the Compliance section,403 the legality of the various
employment-related medical examinations is our primary concern. Many of
the evaluations performed at the Combine appear to be exactly the kind that
the ADA (and possibly GINA) prohibit. Similar open questions relate to the
defenses available to employers for post-offer (employee entrance)
examinations, done by the clubs themselves after a player has been drafted.
Recall that employers can conduct post-offer exams as long as they are
universal, confidential, and the results are used in accordance with the
ADA.404 Thus, insofar as the clubs target particular players for additional
medical screening, or release the results of the examinations to the press, they
are not complying with the ADA. But certain ambiguities render these
judgments difficult. We therefore invite the various stakeholders to offer
clarification with respect to professional football as employment, the
independence of National Football Scouting, the scope of ADA-covered medical
examinations, and the scope of GINA’s definition of family medical history.
1. Job-Relatedness and Qualified Individual
Playing for the NFL is not a typical job. Hence, the meaning of legal terms
that are intuitive or self-evident in most employment claims becomes stubbornly
difficult to define in the context of professional football. Two such examples are
essential job functions and what it means for a particular inquiry or qualification
standard to be job-related or consistent with business necessity.
Recall that the ADA allows both pre-employment inquiries regarding
whether an applicant can “perform job-related functions”405 and medical
examinations and inquiries during employment, so long as they are “job-related
and consistent with business necessity.”406 Moreover, if an employer complies
with the statute’s requirements for lawful employee entrance exams, it can legally
withdraw an offer of employment if the prospective employee cannot meet a
403
404
405
406

See supra Section III.A.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3).
Id. § 12112(d)(2)(B).
42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A)–(B) (2012).
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qualification standard that is “job-related and consistent with business
necessity.”407 And finally, the ADA’s employment discrimination provisions apply
only to “qualified individuals with disabilities,” that is, individuals who can perform
“the essential functions of the employment position.”408 Thus, understanding the
scope of the job and which functions are job-related and essential is crucial for
applying the ADA.
The statutory text suggests that defining the contours of a particular job
is a threshold matter. With a clear definition of the core functions of the
specific job in question, an employer can go on to design inquiries or
examinations that relate to those core functions, and any individual who
cannot meet that basic threshold cannot sue for discrimination. But what are
the essential, job-related functions of an NFL player?
The NFL or its clubs might define the essential job function of playing
professional football as “being the best—the strongest, the fastest, the
healthiest, etc.,—possible player,” making any health- or performance-related
inquiry or examination job-related (and also perhaps consistent with business
necessity). Moreover, if “being the best” is an essential job function, then any
person who is not the highest performing player on his club, or perhaps in
the league, will arguably not be a qualified individual entitled to the ADA’s
antidiscrimination protections. Thus, under that reading, the clubs or the
NFL could lawfully take adverse employment actions against all but a handful
of players. Finding the best possible players appears to be what the clubs are
really after in the Combine. But adopting a relativist definition of a given job
position—i.e., wanting only the best—poses problems for the ADA. Its
statutory requirements are transsubstantive across industries, such that
absent sports-specific amendments to the law, whatever definition applies to
the NFL will apply equally in all other employment settings.
To show why a relativist job description could be problematic, it may be
helpful to go outside the NFL context for a moment. Suppose that Stanford
Law School asked prospective law professors for medical information during
the Association of American Law Schools (AALS) Faculty Recruitment
Conference.409 When challenged that its actions violate the ADA or GINA,
Stanford could adopt a relativist definition and defend its practices as jobrelated. It could argue that as an elite law school, it only wants the best
professors who will perform at the highest level for the duration of their
29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b)(3) (2015)
42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
AALS is a nonprofit organization consisting of nearly all of the law schools in the United States.
About, ASS’N AM. L. SCHOOLS, http://www.aals.org/about/ [http://perma.cc/W8JQ-4QK6]. The Faculty
Recruitment Conference is a place for law school recruiting teams to interview prospective faculty
members. Faculty Recruitment Conference, ASS’N AM. L. SCHOOLS, https://www.aals.org/services/facultyrecruitment-services/faculty-recruitment-conference/ [https://perma.cc/4KYE-HV4U].
407
408
409

304

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 165: 227

careers. Thus, an applicant’s family medical history of Alzheimer’s could
speak to the quality of a candidate’s scholarship across her lifetime
appointment; the strength of her heart and her chance of cardiac arrest could
speak to her chances of having to miss a semester due to a heart attack; and
so on. Similarly, if “being the best” is an essential job function and a current
professor suffers a heart attack or a stroke that lowers her productivity—
causing it to fall below that of her colleagues—she would no longer be qualified,
as she is no longer the best. Arguably, Stanford could then terminate her, even if
she were still able to write and teach. Just like NFL clubs, Stanford has a limited
number of available slots and would have an understandable preference to fill
those slots with the absolute best possible candidates—not only those who will
produce the best scholarship and be the best teachers, but those who will also be
productive for the longest amount of time with the fewest distractions, healthrelated or otherwise. As this example indicates, if jobs are defined in terms of
one’s ability to be the “best possible” person for the job and not simply as the
ability to meet a certain basic threshold of performance, the job-related
exceptions for medical examinations and inquiries will swallow the rule that
prohibits them, and the ADA’s employment discrimination provisions will lose
their teeth. In other words, the ADA’s protections would essentially disappear.
For this reason, we think the “threshold” model reading of the statute is
the better fit. The ADA demands that employers define job positions and
their requirements in absolute, not relative terms. That is not to say that an
NFL club (or indeed a law school) cannot look at the “whole player,” but they
need to do so in a way that is specific and defensible: they should articulate
specific standards for the questions they ask at the Combine, identify a
threshold value, and defend that value as related to a function of the job. In
this way there is no “blank check” for asking any medical question a club may
find useful. Instead, the law should require them to generate a carefully
articulated and justified list of acceptable inquiries that invade the medical
privacy of the player to the least extent possible.
Of course, any threshold requirements for being a professional football
player would have to be carefully constructed. Every position is different,
and the players are of different sizes and skill levels and fit within their
teams differently. Thus, to be useful, any description of the essential, jobrelated functions of football would have to account for these variations.
Although professional football is unique as an occupation, other professions
with physical requirements that may want to recruit the best employees
have adopted threshold physical requirements and designed their preemployment and post-offer screenings accordingly. For example, fire
departments tend to include extensive descriptions of the physical, mental,
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and interpersonal requirements.410 Essential job requirements include
knowledge of firefighting and good communication skills, as well as physical
abilities.411 In Mesa, Arizona, specific physical essential job functions, for
example, include “[w]ear[ing] personal protective equipment weighing
approximately 70 pounds . . . in high humidity (up to 100 percent)
situations . . . [while] rel[ying] on [a] self-contained breathing apparatus
for respiratory ventilation.”412 In Farmington, New Mexico, the job
description includes both general requirements related to physical ability—
such as being “frequently required to stand; walk; use hands to finger,
handle, or operate objects, tools, or controls; and reach with hands and
arms” and “occasionally [being] required to sit; climb or balance; stoop,
kneel, crouch, or crawl; talk or hear; and taste or smell”—and specific
requirements regarding lifting ability and vision.413 Thus, while defining
specific baselines for physical performance in highly selective and physical
jobs may be challenging, it is not impossible. Consequently, to fully comply
with the law, the NFL and its clubs may require some clarification regarding
how to apply basic employment law concepts like essential job functions
and job-relatedness to professional football.
2. Independence of National Football Scouting
Another difficulty warranting further clarification is the way in which the
Combine is run. Many of the evaluations described above are not being directly
administered by the NFL, or the individual clubs. Instead, National Football
Scouting functions as a separate corporate entity, which enters into a contractual
agreement with the NFL for the operation of the Combine.414 The Combine is a
scouting service used by the clubs and the NFL to make hiring decisions. It
obtains information those entities can use when assessing prospective players.
Moreover, while IU Health doctors test players at the Combine,415 clubs (and
their medical staffs) also perform their own examinations and interviews.416
However, it is not clear whether National Football Scouting itself
independently qualifies as an employer, an employment agency, a labor
organization, or a joint labor-management committee. Thus, to argue liability
under the ADA or GINA, one would have to assert that National Football
410 See, e.g., Firefighter, CITY MESA, http://apps.mesaaz.gov/JobDescriptions/Documents/Job
Descriptions/cs4111.pdf [http://perma.cc/R3KD-8FEL]; Lateral Firefighter, CITY FARMINGTON
NM https://fmtn.applicantpro.com/jobs/260378.html [http://perma.cc/GJ72-6ANQ].
411 Firefighter, supra note 410; Lateral Firefighter, supra note 410.
412 Firefighter, supra note 410.
413 Lateral Firefighter, supra note 410.
414 See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text.
415 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
416 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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Scouting is effectively operating as an agent or an extension of the NFL and its
clubs. As mentioned above, if the NFL or the clubs maintain sufficient control
over the operation of the Combine, National Football Scouting may likewise be
bound by the applicable employment discrimination laws.417 As we discuss below
in our Section on “Circumvention,”418 we would find any determination that
employers can circumvent the ADA’s or GINA’s protections by outsourcing the
prohibited examinations to be problematic. We therefore need clarity regarding
whether the separate corporate status of National Football Scouting and the
existing setup of the Combine immunize the clubs and the NFL from liability.
3. Scope of Medical Examinations and Inquiries (ADA)
Additionally, fully understanding how the ADA applies to professional
football also requires clarification regarding how the statute defines medical
examinations and disability-related inquiries, particularly with respect to the new
technologies outlined above. Certain athletic drills and wearable technologies
could reveal the presence of an impairment. If the results of these evaluations
convey disability-related information to the NFL or the clubs, could they be
considered medical examinations or inquiries covered by the ADA? If they are
medical in nature, the ADA would restrict when and how the NFL, the clubs, or
National Football Scouting may administer the drills or use the technologies. If
they are not medical, the ADA would not regulate their use.
We can again return to firefighters as an illustrative example. The firefighter
application process in Houston includes a pre-employment physical ability test
that involves various simulations, such as a ladder raise, a dummy drag, and a
mile-and-a-half run.419 After an applicant completes the physical ability test, a
civil service exam, and an interview, she may receive an offer of employment
contingent on her successful completion of a drug screening and medical and
physical exams.420 Because the physical ability test is not considered a medical
examination, fire departments can administer them pre-employment. Likewise,
assuming athletic drills and use of wearable technologies are not medical, the
NFL, the clubs, and National Football Scouting could require them even before
a prospective player has an employment offer. Thus, whether the ADA applies to
drills or wearable technologies that reveal impairments is another area that could
benefit from further clarification.
417 See supra text accompanying notes 155–56.
418 See infra Section III.C.
419 HOUS. FIRE DEP’T, FIREFIGHTER PHYSICAL ABILITY TEST: CANDIDATE ORIENTATION
GUIDE 1 (2014), http://www.houstontx.gov/fire/employment/Candidate_Orientation_Guide.pdf [http://per

ma.cc/C7YS-CUUY].
420 Hiring Process, HFDCAREERS.ORG, http://www.hfdcareers.org/hiring.html#PA [http://
perma.cc/5VCH-TSWG].
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The relationship between the ADA and GINA could also be clarified.
Genetic tests appear to meet the ADA’s definition of a medical examination.421
Yet in addition to abiding by the ADA’s medical examination provisions,
employers must follow GINA’s prohibition of requests for genetic information.
Thus, if an employer offers genetic testing, it would simultaneously violate both
statutes. The relationship becomes somewhat more ambiguous regarding
discrimination on the basis of genetic test results. In such cases, GINA would
provide a clear remedy. However, a claimant could also argue that an adverse
employment action based on her genetic information constitutes discrimination
on the basis of a perceived disability. It would be useful to clarify whether the
ADA provides concurrent protection in those cases.
4. Scope of Family Medical History (GINA)
Lastly, it would be helpful to have a definitive statement on the scope of
GINA’s protections for family medical history. As discussed above, the
definition of genetic information includes “the manifestation of a disease or
disorder in family members of such individual.”422 Neither the statute nor the
accompanying regulations restrict this provision to diseases or disorders
proven to have a genetic component. Instead, the regulations focus on who is
a family member.423 Perhaps Congress’s decision not to cabin GINA’s
protections to family medical histories that communicate a known genetic
risk was a strategic decision, as researchers constantly discover genetic risk
factors for more and more conditions.424 Regardless, the courts have taken it
upon themselves to limit the statute’s coverage of family medical history to
violations dealing only with manifested genetic diseases or disorders.425 Thus, it
421 See EEOC, supra note 176 (defining a “medical examination” as a “procedure or test that
seeks information about an individual’s physical or mental impairments or health”).
422 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff(4)(A) (2012).
423 See supra note 327 and accompanying text.
424 See, e.g., Gene Leads to Nearsightedness When Kids Read, COLUM. U. MED. CTR. (Aug. 31, 2015),
http://newsroom.cumc.columbia.edu/blog/2015/08/31/gene-leads-to-nearsightedness-when-kids-read/ [https://
perma.cc/V9EA-7KKB] (explaining the discovery of a gene that causes myopia in people who spent a lot
of time reading as children); Jenna Iacurci, Scientists Discover Two New Gene Variants Linked to Breast Cancer,
NATURE WORLD NEWS (Feb. 20, 2015, 3:07 PM), http://www.natureworldnews.com/articles/12875/201
50220/scientists-discover-two-new-gene-variants-linked-to-breast-cancer.htm [https://perma.cc/D3WM-R
TYC] (“Scientists have discovered two new gene variants associated with an increased risk of breast
cancer.”); Sharon Parmet, Strong Genetic Risk Factor for MS Discovered in Five Affected Siblings, UIC CTR.
NEWS (Mar. 4, 2015), https://news.uic.edu/strong-genetic-risk-factor-for-ms-discovered-in-family-of-fiveaffected-siblings [https://perma.cc/LN63-R423] (reporting on a study that identified a genetic variation
linked to an increased risk of multiple sclerosis in women); Researchers Identify New Genetic Risk Factor for NF1Associated Glioma, NEUROFIBROMATOSIS CTR. (Jan. 9, 2015), https://nfcenter.wustl.edu/research/researchnews/researchers-identify-new-genetic-risk-factor-nf1-associated-glioma/ [https://perma.cc/LKV5-UQNQ]
(summarizing a study linking subtle changes in children’s genes to glioma).
425 See supra note 328 and accompanying text.
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would be useful for Congress or the EEOC to specifically address these
interpretations. This clarification would be useful in the context of professional
football and beyond.
C. Circumvention
Again, National Football Scouting is not technically owned or operated by the
NFL but is rather a scouting service that is owned and managed by approximately
two-thirds of the league’s clubs.426 Indeed, all thrity-two NFL clubs consider the
medical examinations, performed by IU Health doctors and club physicians, to be
the most important aspect of the Combine.427 It is worth reiterating that while
employers can make job-related inquiries pre-employment, the ADA bans all preoffer medical examinations,428 rendering what happens at the Combine a clear
violation. Although some of the Combine’s interview questions might arguably fall
within a broadly construed job-relatedness exception, all of the Combine’s
medical examinations would seem to violate the ADA, as the statute applies to
the clubs, and National Football Scouting appears to be acting as their agent
when running the Combine.
Although we have no evidence to suggest that the corporate structure of
National Football Scouting or the Combine in relation to the NFL and the
clubs has been intentionally structured in order to circumvent the
applicability of the ADA and of GINA, that may nonetheless be the effect.
The end result is that through the Combine, the NFL clubs are getting the
exact kinds of health-related information that the ADA and GINA seek to
prohibit. Should these laws’ protections be rendered toothless because of this
contractual end run? We think the answer is no. It would frustrate the purpose
of those statutes to allow the corporate and contractual structure of the
Combine to immunize misconduct.
A non-football example is informative, especially given that the laws in
question are not football-specific. To return to the market for law professors,
imagine that AALS set up its own combine—the “AALS Scouting Combine”—
as a separately owned and incorporated organization to run a three-day event
where all prospective law professors were subjected to medical examinations
and inquiries of the kind done by the NFL. Should that be lawful if an
individual law school could not do the same testing or ask the same questions due
to the ADA’s or GINA’s protections? In other words, should the corporate
formality of this combine not being organized by the law schools themselves—
even if they send their own doctors and rely on medical reports done by combine

426
427
428

See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(A) (2012).
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doctors—immunize the parties from ADA or GINA liability? We think that
if the rules restricting medical examinations under the ADA or requests for
genetic information pursuant to GINA are to mean anything, such corporate
or contractual arrangements cannot be immunity-conferring.
The better rule, and the one for which we would advocate, would
discourage any potential circumvention of these protections. It is often said
one should “follow the money,” but in this context, one should “follow the
data.” Our approach eschews the formalism of corporate organization and
contractual relationships in favor of examining who is seeking medical data
and to what end it is being sought. Regardless of National Football Scouting’s
separate corporate status, the Combine is organized for the benefit of the
clubs—a fact made clear given that they even send their own club doctors to
interview and examine players there. The data is flowing to the clubs and
aiding in their decisionmaking as to whom to hire.
Nor is it any answer to these concerns that players voluntarily go to the
Combine and consent to these evaluations. Participating significantly
increases a player’s chances of playing NFL football.429 To say that NFL
hopefuls have freely chosen to participate adopts a truncated view of what
freedom means. Consenting freely to one activity may mean inadvertently
agreeing to subsequent activities, some in which—all things held equal—the
person would not have otherwise chosen to do. Hence, when an aspiring NFL
player consents to participate in the Combine, he also finds himself
consenting to the public release of sensitive medical information—a
condition to which, absent the Combine, he might not have agreed. The
ADA’s and GINA’s prohibitions were put in place in part to prevent a race to
the bottom and to prevent individual employees from facing a choice between
consenting to such medical examinations and being beaten out for jobs by
other employees who do. If such a purpose is to be effectuated, the design of
the corporate form cannot circumvent the underlying obligation.
D. Changes
While we advocate for both compliance and clarification under the current
law, we also recognize that playing NFL football—as well as professional
sports generally—is not a typical occupation and, therefore, could warrant
special treatment under the law. Thus, we propose three possible professional
sports exceptions to the ADA and GINA. Additionally, we suggest a general
reform to GINA designed to better protect employee safety.
429 See Jim Reineking, Notable Current NFL Players Who Weren’t Invited to the Combine, NFL
(Feb. 16, 2016, 12:51 PM), http://www.nfl.com/photoessays/0ap3000000636359 [https://perma.cc/
Z3YC-YZ6J] (noting that 83.6% of players selected in the 2016 NFL Draft had attended the
Combine and that no player who did not attend was drafted before the fourth round).
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1. General Professional Football (Sports) Exemption
As mentioned throughout this Article, the ADA and GINA apply with
equal force to professional sports as they do to traditional occupations. But
perhaps they should not. Given the very exceptional nature of NFL
football—the salaries, the selectivity, the degree of physical performance, the
risk of serious injury, etc.,—health-related and medical information takes on
an added level of relevance not present when hiring a factory worker or
perhaps even a firefighter. While giving the NFL, the clubs, and National
Football Scouting access to information that relates to disability or to genetic
makeup opens the door for subsequent discrimination, the benefits may
outweigh the risks. From the perspective of the clubs and the NFL, those
entities want as much information as possible and to be able to make a
decision about whether to invest in a particular player. From the perspectives
of the players themselves, they also could have reasons for wanting to give the
clubs, the NFL, and National Football Scouting medical or genetic information to
allow them to make decisions based on that information. Since professional football
is so physical, it may be in the interest of players to give as much medical
information as possible—and to permit the NFL and the clubs to use that
knowledge for work-related decisions, including injury-prevention purposes.
Furthermore, medical and health-related information could be used to enhance
performance and to help the players reach new levels of play. However, because of
the restrictions on medical examinations and requests for genetic information, the
NFL and the club may not be able to obtain data that could be used to enhance
performance. Moreover, even if they could lawfully gain access to that information
via one of the ADA’s or GINA’s exceptions, the statutes’ anticlassification
provisions could restrict the ability to act on it. Congress could therefore consider
adding a professional sports exemption to the ADA and GINA.
But with that said, the NFL is a workplace like all others. People have as
much a right to be free from disability and genetic-information discrimination
there as elsewhere. The ADA builds in myriad defenses for an employer, and it
is not clear that the NFL or the clubs warrant an extra privilege that is denied to
every other employer in America. Thus, if Congress chooses to revisit the
applicability of the ADA and GINA to professional sports organizations, it
should first conduct extensive fact-finding regarding the benefits and the dangers
of such a broad exemption, including the views of current and former players.
2. Exception to Medical Examination Provisions (ADA)
Another possibility would be a more narrow exception for just the ADA’s
disability-related inquiry and medical examination provisions, as opposed to an
exception to the entirety of Title I of the ADA and Title II of GINA. Pre-
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employment medical examinations are the most significant, especially given the
central role the Combine plays in hiring. A very narrow professional sports
exception might lift the outright ban on pre-employment medical examinations
and instead require professional sports employers to conform with the universality,
confidentiality, and antidiscrimination requirements imposed on employee
entrance exams. Such an exception would leave the ADA’s antidiscrimination
protections in place and still outlaw discrimination on the basis of disability that is
not job-related and consistent with business necessity and that falls short under the
direct threat defense. It would also leave intact the full panoply of GINA’s
Title II protections.
3. Exception for Family Medical History (GINA)
Similarly, Congress could adopt a narrow exception that would allow
professional sports employers to obtain and consider family medical history
when it is relevant to a player’s risk of injury or could be used to improve
performance. Such an exception would have to apply to both GINA’s privacy
and antidiscrimination provisions. To allow access to potentially useful
information about family medical history but prohibit the clubs or the NFL
from acting on that information would undermine the potential benefit of
such an exception.
4. Need for a Direct Threat Defense (GINA)
There is another respect in which we think GINA is too protective. As
discussed above, the ADA provides employers a defense to charges of
discrimination relating to threats to self or others.430 As mentioned, GINA
has no equivalent defense available for employers who wish to protect the
health and safety of their employees. In cases of direct threats to others, we
think the fact that such a defense is unavailable in the GINA context is
problematic. To be sure, because of the definition of “genetic information”
within GINA—which requires that the disorder has not yet manifested at the
time of the discrimination431—cases involving direct threats to others within
the meaning of the statute are likely to be few in number. But if such a case
arose—for example, if an NFL club determined through a genetic test that a
player was likely to pose a direct threat to the safety of other players—we
think that the club ought to have a defense if it refused to employ the player.
Whether there ought to be a similar exception under GINA for cases where
a player alleges he was discriminated against because he posed a direct threat to
himself is a closer question. To see how this might come about, imagine a genetic
430
431

42 U.S.C. § 12113(b).
See supra note 330 and accompanying text.
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test was developed to determine which players are at higher risk of chronic
traumatic encephalopathy (CTE) after suffering a concussion.432 Such a test
would reveal a susceptibility—not a manifested condition, and if the information
was genetic in nature, it would fall within GINA’s antidiscrimination protections.
Should the NFL clubs nonetheless be given a prerogative to discharge a
player if presented with this information? Our tentative assessment, with one
important caveat, is yes. To illustrate, imagine a parallel case involving a
susceptibility that had manifested: a player who was already showing signs of
cognitive impairment and whom—for that reason—doctors were confident
might suffer further (due to second impact syndrome433) if he took another
hit. Under the ADA, the employer might have a direct threat defense should
that player be discharged. Now imagine that a potential player has not yet
been injured but has a clear genetic susceptibility to traumatic brain injury.434
Why should we want a different rule in the context of genetic information? In both
cases, the law has made a decision to overrule the autonomy of the player to decide
whether or not to continue to play because there is a direct threat to his health that
cannot be resolved by a reasonable accommodation. It seems to us the cases should
be treated symmetrically, though we acknowledge that the matter is closer.435
The caveat we want to emphasize is one about uniformity of application,
a kind of equal protection notion. Because the direct threat defense is raised
on a case-by-case basis, a club could in theory permissively dismiss one player
due to a predisposition to CTE but not dismiss a similarly situated player.
Such cherry-picking could be used to unfairly target certain players. That is,
if the NFL or the club seeks to defend a discharge on this ground, the player
432 This example is provided only as a simplified illustration. We recognize that the science of
concussions and CTE is complicated and evolving and that there are disagreements on many things,
including the causal pathway from football to CTE.
433 Second Impact Syndrome, BRAINANDSPINALCORD.ORG, http://www.brainandspinalcord
.org/second-impact-syndrome/ [https://perma.cc/F4YV-7FC8] (“Second impact syndrome is a very
rare condition in which a second concussion occurs before a first concussion has properly healed,
causing rapid and severe brain swelling and often catastrophic results.”).
434 While a clear genetic susceptibility to traumatic brain injury has not yet been discovered, scientists
are researching the question. See Sun Xiao-chuan & Jiang Yong, Genetic Susceptibility to Traumatic Brain Injury
and Apolipoprotein E Gene, 11 CHINESE J. TRAUMATOLOGY 247, 248 (2008) (“It is now demonstrated that
genetic polymorphism may play a key role in the susceptibility to [traumatic brain injury] . . . .”); Press
Release, Am. Orthopaedic Soc’y for Sports Med., Gene Variation in Athletes Might Signify Longer
Recovery Following Concussion (Mar. 5, 2016, 6:00 AM), http://www.sportsmed.org/AOSSMIMIS/
members/downloads/media/SpecialtyDay2016/McDevittConcussionsAndGenetics.pdf [https://perma.cc
/3UG7-FWT3] (“[R]esearchers . . . believe there may be a new genetic connection regarding recovery rates
following a sports-related concussion.”).
435 Perhaps some readers will think that neither the ADA nor GINA should overrule the
player’s autonomy in this case, and that the direct threat to self-defense should be eliminated. That
is an argument worth discussing at length, though not here. For now, our only point is about
symmetry: conditional on believing that such a defense should exist, it is implausible to have it in
the ADA but not GINA.
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should be able to challenge that defense by showing that it has not been
consistently applied to similarly situated players. This strategy has enjoyed at
least some success in other employment contexts. For example, a diabetic
police officer sued her employer for removing her from patrol duties
following her diabetes diagnosis, arguing that the police department did not
similarly remove other diabetic officers.436 The court rejected the employer’s
direct threat defense and denied its motion for summary judgment on her
ADA claim,437 and the case later settled.438 A showing that the employer
treated some players one way while others a different way (perhaps based on
their perceived support among fans, for example) could demonstrate that the
offered defense is pretextual for discrimination, and thus forfeited.439 Yet
even with a clearer uniformity requirement, an employer could still attempt
to defend its actions by distinguishing between the two employees’ relevant
risks or abilities to safely perform the job.
*

*

*

A player’s health and fitness directly impact his ability to play professional
football. However, at present, federal employment discrimination laws—
mainly the ADA and GINA—apply to the NFL’s, the clubs’, and perhaps
National Football Scouting’s use of both old and new evaluative technologies.
To that end, we first advocate compliance with the current law. Next we
request clarity regarding how these statutes apply to the exceptional context
of NFL football. We also seek to avoid circumvention of the law’s goals
through clever corporate structuring. Finally, we suggest changes that could
better balance the interests of the players and of the NFL and its affiliates.
CONCLUSION
As our analysis reveals, several of the accepted practices of the NFL, the
clubs, and National Football Scouting could implicate current and prospective
players’ rights under the ADA and GINA. First and foremost, we encourage
the NFL, the clubs, and National Football Scouting to comply with the
436 Jackson v. City of New York, No. CV 06–1835(RRM)(MDG), 2011 WL 1533471, at *7
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2011), adopted in full, 2011 WL 1527935 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2011).
437 See Jackson v. City of New York, No. 06-CV-1835, 2011 WL 1527935, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Apr.
22, 2011) (adopting the magistrate judge’s recommendation in its entirety, which rejected the direct
defendants’ threat defense).
438 Stipulation and Order of Settlement and Discontinuance at 1, Jackson v. City of New York,
No. 06 CV 1835 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2012).
439 Pugh v. City of Attica, 259 F.3d 619, 626 (7th Cir. 2001) (applying the McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting approach to ADA claims, which includes an analysis of whether the employer’s
proffered reason for its adverse employment decision is pretext for illegal discrimination).
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existing law. We invite lawmakers and regulators—specifically Congress and
the EEOC—as well as stakeholders in professional football, to offer
clarification about how those statutes apply to professional football players.
We discourage circumvention of the law through clever corporate forms. And
finally, we suggest possible legal reforms, including a broad professional
sports exemption or more modest statutory exceptions.
While NFL players have been the exclusive focus of this Article—and we
have emphasized time and again the players’ uniqueness as individuals and
the uniqueness of their job—this Article has implications beyond professional
sports. Many jobs include some physical element or the risk of potential
injury. While the physical requirements of being a firefighter might be
immediately apparent, administrative assistants must sometimes lift heavy
boxes and nurses must help move patients.
Furthermore, employers have a number of reasons for being interested in
the health of their employees, such as keeping the costs of providing health
insurance down (especially now in the wake of the employer mandate440) and
avoiding lawsuits and workers’ compensation claims. Thus, while the NFL
may be particularly interested in the health of its employee players, health
risk and injury prevention are of interest to a wide range of employers for a
variety of reasons.
As a result, some of our recommendations have implications outside the
realm of professional sports. Specifically, clarifications regarding whether
essential, job-related functions can be relative—as opposed to absolute;
whether the ADA’s construction of medical examinations includes wearable
technology or genetic tests; and whether GINA’s family medical history
protections only cover manifested conditions with genetic components would
be of use to many if not all kinds of work. Moreover, adding a direct threat
defense to GINA could further employee health beyond professional sports,
and requiring uniformity in an employer’s invocation of the direct threat
defense for both the ADA and GINA could avoid using risk as a pretext for
discrimination. Thus, while NFL football is unique, it provides a valuable
analytical lens for exploring the intersections of employment, medical care,
privacy, and antidiscrimination.

440 See ObamaCare Employer Mandate, OBAMACARE FACTS, http://obamacarefacts.com/obama
care-employer-mandate/ [https://perma.cc/L8HU-JN6Y] (“ObamaCare’s ‘employer mandate’ is a
requirement that all businesses with 50 or more full-time equivalent employees . . . provide health
insurance to at least 95% of their full-time employees . . . .”).

